

## THE END OF JUSTICE: GLOBAL EDUCATION AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF SCARCITY

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This paper is a philosophical critique of the conception of global justice forwarded by the Centre for Global Education in two of its texts, *Earthrights: Education as if the Planet Really Mattered* and *Greenprints: For Changing Schools*. What I will show is that *this* notion of global justice is philosophically inconsistent with the aims that it intends to promote, but that this inconsistency is unavoidable given the implications of scarcity for its aims; then I will cashout the implications of scarcity, not only for global justice, but for all resource-based notions of justice.

The aims of global education and global justice are to alleviate and eliminate instances of both human marginalization and environmental degradation insofar as these instances are the products of human systems and not naturally determined outcomes. How global education intends to accomplish this goal is by educating people to be globally just citizens. Global justice is an amalgam of social justice and environmental justice. It regulates global education's vision of the fair and equitable distribution of natural and cultural resources.

The primary presupposition of social justice is that human life is intrinsically valuable. A corollary to this presupposition is that a generalized, descriptive, non-controversial notion of human flourishing can be derived and that any human system which promotes other than this general flourishing is unjust. In this, the corollary is a justifiable hypothetical treatment of the Kantian categorical imperative,<sup>1</sup> "Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold as good as a principle of universal legislation."<sup>2</sup>

From this corollary social justice derives a maximalist conception of human rights. Maximalist conceptions of human rights hold that social and economic rights must be conjoined with civil and political rights for human flourishing to take place; that is, both the malnourished homeless with civil and political freedom and well-fed slaves fall into the category of the marginalized.<sup>3</sup> In this conception, "the content of human rights specifies not merely what is required to keep everyone above some basic level, but all the requirements of practical reasonableness making possible the basic goods of flourishing."<sup>4</sup>

In this sense, rights are things which are held against others and they correspond with duties which potentially responsible others have towards the right holder.<sup>5</sup> These duties can be said to take at least one of three forms or a combination of the three. That is to say, in the maximalist conception, "...all human rights are said to have three correlative duties: duties to avoid depriving, duties to protect from deprivation, and duties to aid the deprived."<sup>6</sup> As human rights are tied to human duties, the idea that an individual's rights could or should be marginalized even if it would result in "the greatest happiness for the greatest number" is anathema.

The point to be taken here is not only that each human life is thought to be valuable in itself, but that each human life is so valuable that it is wrong for the basic conditions of human flourishing to be denied to any human, if it is possible for these conditions to be met. If the basic conditions for human flourishing can be provided to every human, every human has a "right" to these conditions. In other words, if some humans are flourishing at the expense of other humans, given artificial systemic marginalization, those humans who are flourishing have a duty to those who are

marginalized only to take their fair share and forsake any extra. Given the principle of fair and equitable distribution, it follows that if the basic conditions which could be provided are at levels below that of optimal flourishing, then whatever level could be shared by all is the level to be aimed for.

Two primary presuppositions underlie the notion of environmental justice forwarded in global education. First, that life-in-itself, i.e., life as a whole, is intrinsically valuable. The corollaries to this are that human actions should not compromise the life of the planet, that they should not degrade life on the planet, and that humans have duties to prevent this from happening. These duties are borne out in the form of environmental rights. The second presupposition is that all life forms have intrinsic value. The corollary to this is that this realization imposes duties upon humans to respect this value. These duties are also to be borne out in the form of environmental rights.

The ethical system which derives from these somewhat oversimplified first principles is biocentric holism, which is best represented by Aldo Leopold's "land ethic." As an understanding of this notion is key to understanding environmental justice, it deserves elaboration.

Leopold believes that the extension of ethics to the land is merely another step in the evolution of ethics to encompass more of the biotic community.<sup>7</sup> Leopold perceives ethics as determinate of how individuals should act within the community, and ecology as determinate of how individuals do act within the community. From these two notions, Leopold asserts that:

The extension of ethics, so far studied only by philosophers, is actually a process in ecological evolution. Its sequences may be described in ecological as well as philosophical terms. An ethic, ecologically, is a limitation on freedom of action in the struggle for existence. An ethic, philosophically, is differentiation of social from anti-social conduct. These are two definitions of one thing. The thing has its origin in the tendency of interdependent individuals or groups to evolve modes of co-operation. The ecologist calls these symbioses.<sup>8</sup>

He further states:

All ethics so far evolved rest upon a single premise: that the individual is a member of a community of interdependent parts. His instincts prompt him to compete for his place in the community, but his ethics prompt him also to co-operate (perhaps in order that there may be a place to compete for).<sup>9</sup>

From these premises Leopold develops the "land ethic." It states, "A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise."<sup>10</sup> The "land ethic" takes into account that humanity is only one species among many who are striving to persist and flourish. The "land ethic" demands that humanity recognize its ecological community embeddedness by taking into account that it is a member of such a community in its act deliberations. The reality of trophic pyramids and energy exchange places the responsibility upon humanity to behave in an ecologically sound manner because not to do so destroys the community upon which humanity's survival is predicated.<sup>11</sup>

That said, Leopold is under no illusions about the difficulty of developing a "land ethic" among humanity. He notes the trend to urbanization and recognizes that humanity's illusory unattachedness with the land would detract from the recognition that we are part of an ecological community. Leopold states:

Perhaps the most serious obstacle impeding the evolution of a land ethic is the fact that our educational and economic system is headed away from, rather than toward, an intense consciousness of the land.<sup>12</sup>

Losing this connectedness is a serious concern for Leopold because he recognizes that the foundations for ethics are not merely a group of abstract principles, but the actual physical, intellectual, and emotional connection with the beings upon which these principles are founded. According to Leopold:

Obligations have no meaning without conscience, and the problem we face is the extension of the social conscience from people to the land.... No important change in ethics was ever accomplished without a internal change in intellectual emphasis, loyalties, affections, and convictions.<sup>13</sup>

The gist of the matter is then that if people are not well aware of their connection to the land, they will not be able to develop the compassion towards the land which results in the adoption of duties towards the land. Duties towards the land, however, are necessary if humanity is not to subvert not only the land's survival, but that of humanity itself. The most sound way to do this, in Leopold's mind, is to develop an ethic which truly takes into account how it is that we are in the world. To disregard this is to undermine our health and the health of the planet. He states:

A land ethic, then, reflects the existence of an ecological conscience, and this in turn reflects a conviction of individual responsibility for the health of the land. Health is the capacity of the land for self-renewal.

Conservation is our effort to understand and preserve this capacity.<sup>14</sup>

That said, the adoption of the "land ethic" does not prevent humanity from "using" the land. It is much more like a call to responsible stewardship.<sup>15</sup> To be responsible stewards, however, of necessity demands a firm understanding of how it is that the land "lives" and how it is that our wellbeing is mutual. In this sense, responsible stewardship could be said to beget even more responsible stewardship because the more we become aware of our interrelatedness the more we are likely to incorporate this "holistic" knowledge into our deliberations.<sup>16</sup> This is particularly necessary when non-glamorous land comes into question.<sup>17</sup> Marshes, bogs, swamps, and estuaries all have their place in the ecological order of things and non-appreciation of their roles can be catastrophic.

The "land ethic" does not presume individual rights for non-humans, but asks that the individual be considered with respect to its place in the systemic whole. The ecological reality of existence is, after all, that beings need to consume in order to survive and some of what they consume is other beings. J. Baird Callicott states:

The land ethic manifestly does not accord equal worth to each and every member of the biotic community; the moral worth of individuals (including, n.b., human individuals) is relative, to be assessed in accordance with the particular relation of each to the collective entity which Leopold called "land."<sup>18</sup>

Note that the moral value of humanity is placed on the same footing as all other species insofar as humanity's moral worth is also "to be assessed in accordance with the the particular relation of each [species] to the collective entity."<sup>19</sup>

Following the "land ethic," the consumption of other beings is wrong only if it harms the "integrity, stability and beauty" of the ecosystem. This is not to say that humans should not act if they cannot act without harming the biotic community because plainly humans cannot. It is only to say that because humans have this effect they must make sure to mitigate it wherever possible.

Nonetheless, and as a means of driving home the point, under the "land ethic" the worth of all beings, including humans is a function of their particular relation to and within an ecological community with the *summum bonnum* of the community being the imperative.<sup>20</sup> In this sense ecosystems function like an utilitarian entity which posits worth in all of its constituents, which is why it comes into existence and regulates its worth in accordance with its own best interests.<sup>21</sup>

A quick perusal of both social justice and environmental justice suggests that a merger of the two has a solid basis, namely that both views posit human life as intrinsically valuable. This perception is further strengthened by the unquestionable likelihood that social justice does offer some protection to the environment, if only as a recognition that some degree of environmental health is a precondition for human flourishing. Once one goes beyond a superficial analysis, however, the commonalities dissolve.

The commonalities dissolve because the intrinsic value of humans is very much differently conceived in each of the views. Under social justice, human intrinsic value is grounded in the categorical imperative, which is to say that each human has a value which does not diminish or increase situationally. Human value under environmental justice is, on the other hand, a matter of utilitarian consideration. What this means is that human value is a function of ecosystemic health, i.e., that ecosystemic health is the prime directive and that human worth is determined by considering human impact on the health of the ecosystem. The point to be taken here is that insofar as human flourishing, as conceptualized in social justice, infringes upon ecosystemic health, as conceptualized in environmental justice, and vice versa, the attempted merger fails. It cannot help but do so as the interests which each view of justice promotes are competing. This brings us to the role that scarcity plays in this competition.

An axiom which I find particularly helpful in explaining precisely what implications scarcity has for global justice and, indeed any form of justice which concerns the distribution of natural and cultural resources is, “*Rights realization costs resources.*” What I mean by “rights realization costs resources” is that any system of rights provision is of necessity determined by the availability of resources to found and sustain that system. This can be best shown through example.

Let’s assume that a workable system of democracy presupposes the existence of a well-educated populace capable of rational, autonomous judgment, an adequate and available supply of information upon which to base their decisions, and the ability to not only freely make those decisions, but to freely engage in discourse concerning whatever question is at hand. To establish such a system costs resources. Resources are needed to establish the appropriate schools, to establish the information systems, to establish the social conditions, and to maintain them. If such resources are not available, a workable system of democracy cannot be sustained. The point to be made here is that a right to democracy is only a right in name if it is not a right in practice. A right in name only is practically equivalent to no right at all.

Hence, rights distribution is in a very important sense the same as resource distribution, and the rights which we have available to us are very much contingent upon the resources which are available to bring them about. The rights which we are able to feed upon are determined by the pot of resources which we have to feed from.

Rights realization as outlined here, of course, is not a problem, if scarcity is not a problem. When scarcity enters the picture, however, we are faced with the unpleasant task of determining which rights are more important than others and to what degree. Which rights and to whom is also a question which can arise. To clarify this last point I would like to introduce Kant’s distinction between persons and things, or, in other words, persons and resources. The relevant consideration here is that persons can do what they want with things in order to optimize their flourishing. Persons only have duties to other persons.

It is here that global justice reveals its philosophical inconsistency. As persons only have duties to other persons, under social justice, whatever rights are offered to ecosystems would of necessity be secondary to the rights of human beings. Ecosystem health, therefore, is secondary to human flourishing, even if it becomes the case that adherence to this model leads to social suicide, i.e., equal sharing of the goods of survival when there is not enough to go around. Ecosystem rights, being secondary, are thrown back in to the pot of resources. Offering rights to ecosystems, on the other hand, effectively gives them personhood and removes them from the pot of resources. Depending upon the extent that human impact compromises ecosystem health, humans can lose their status as persons and become resources. What I mean by this is that one can do what one wants to things and if one has to eliminate things to bring about ecosystem health, one does.

It is in this way that global justice is philosophically inconsistent with its aims. Given scarcity, it must abandon the first principles either of social justice or of environmental justice. Interestingly, my interpretations suggest that ecosystemic survival overrides the categorical imperative.

How justice relates to scarcity is strongly implicit in the notion that justice pertains to the fair and equitable distribution of natural and cultural resources over time. Given that what is fair and equitable is the concern of, and determined by, the system of ethics which is adopted, the function of justice is to facilitate the distribution of said resources. These resources, which are essentially the goods of human flourishing, are close correlates to rights, insofar as rights determine people's access to resources. Under conditions of scarcity there are fewer resources to distribute and therefore, fewer rights, or lesser degrees of rights, available for distribution. Depending upon how great the scarcity is, the body of ethics itself can fall victim, as resources are the stuff which fleshes out the body.

The axiom *rights realization costs resources* is derived from the resource-based description of justice, which generally holds true for all modern political philosophy. This description finds its roots in the moral and political philosophy of David Hume. David Hume argued that conditions of scarcity are a precondition for the creation of a system of justice. Hume believed that people are fundamentally interested in and concerned about the well-being of their families and friends, which, for the sake of clarity, I will refer to as the person's community. Under conditions of relative scarcity, however, the well-being of one's community is not secure, in that one individual or group seeking to benefit a community, might see fit to harm another individual or group. For example, if one had a reason to fear an attack from another community one might engage in a preemptive attack so as to weaken or frighten that community. If another community had some desirable goods, one might attack that community directly, or sneak under cover of night, to acquire those goods. Essentially, scarcity can and does lead to a community-based, quasi-Hobbesian "war of all against all."

According to Hume, that scarcity exists demands that humans create an artifice by which to regulate their intercourse so that a certain degree of security of condition can be achieved and maintained.<sup>22</sup> Societies, therefore, are created with the idea of protecting the well-being of one's family and friends and their means of sustaining themselves.<sup>23</sup> In other words, the protection of community, as distinct from society, and property, is the reason behind the creation of a system of justice. This notion fits comfortably with other social contract theories such as those of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. For the sake of driving home this point, I'll invoke the words of Hume himself, who declares, "Hence the ideas of property become necessary in all civil society; hence justice derives its usefulness to the public; and hence alone arises its merit and moral obligation."<sup>24</sup> To continue along these lines, Hume further argued that a system of justice has no need to arise in conditions of abundance because, having abundance, no one has any reason to deprive another.<sup>25</sup> In a roundabout way, this view finds agreement in Marx's political thought. According to Will Kymlicka, "Marx was emphatic about the need for abundance, for he thought that scarcity made conflicts inevitable."<sup>26</sup> Marx presupposes abundance in his political entity, thus mitigating the need for justice.<sup>27</sup>

Interestingly, and as alluded to by Marx, Hume recognized the dual nature of scarcity. Scarcity is a precondition both for the creation and the dissolution of justice. Conditions of scarcity demand that one seek security of condition, through a system of justice, to protect the well-being of one's community.<sup>28</sup> If one cannot find that security of condition, meaning that the well-being of one's family and friends is not being attended to within a system of justice, one no longer has a reason to stay within that system, insofar as one can escape its ties.<sup>29</sup> Hume states:

Thus the rules of equity or justice depend entirely on the particular state and condition in which men are placed, and owe their origin and existence to that utility which results to the public from their strict and regular observance. Reverse, in any considerable circumstance, the condition of men; produce extreme abundance or extreme necessity; implant in the human breast perfect moderation and humanity, or perfect rapaciousness and malice by rendering justice totally useless, you thereby totally destroy its very essence and suspend its obligation upon mankind.<sup>30</sup>

The point to be taken here is that people try to enter into, or exit, just societal relations, in order to improve their security of condition. Whether expressly stated or not, this theme has variations in Hobbes,<sup>31</sup> Locke,<sup>32</sup> Rousseau,<sup>33</sup> Rawls<sup>34</sup> and Dworkin.<sup>35</sup> In fact, scarcity, necessarily, has

implications for any mode of justice concerned with the distribution of natural and cultural resources.

Importantly, security of condition applies to both property and bodily protection. This leads to trade-offs which are inevitable simply because those who enter into systems of justice have to sacrifice some goods to achieve others. For example, some sacrifice some property so as to secure other property from those who would otherwise seek to acquire that property through bodily force, whereas others withhold their recourse to bodily force so as to acquire the property that is offered. Whether or not that property was acquired justly is another matter, as is whether or not it should be redistributed in some way now, regardless of how it was acquired.

The implications of Hume's conception of justice for global justice, and, therefore, global education, are significant. Primarily, it suggests that people will not operate within the constraints of global justice unless the interests of their communities are served.<sup>36</sup> This point is reinforced in reality when one realizes that, for most of us, our worlds are divided into a myriad of nested communities, some of which we have closer ties to than others. For the most part, these closer ties mean a greater sense of obligation toward the community and the members with which we are joined — which is precisely the point upon which Hume posits his notion of justice. In fact, if we consider the Humean model of justice, the world can be said to be comprised of many nested communities, each of which has its own conception of well-being. These communities, whether familial, micro-social, local, regional, national or global, are linked together through a series of just and unjust relations, the relevant conception of justice being the notion of well-being held by the individuals within the relation. The point to take here is that unjust relations exist precisely because one community values its well-being more than it values the mutual well-being of other communities with which it is in relation, and that the marginalized community cannot escape that interrelation, at least without worsening its situation.

Indeed, it is a tangled web we weave, with all sorts of different just and unjust relationships on a myriad of levels in a constant state of interplay. This reality has serious implications for global education insofar as its aim is to eliminate artificial systemic human marginalization. Global education, if it is to succeed, must find a way to counter destructive community affiliation when it comes to teaching global justice. This first point has further implications for global justice. It suggests that people will not allocate resources to the environment unless they perceive it as necessary to their community. It also suggests that those who do perceive the environment as part of their community will perceive those who harm the environment as harming the well-being of their community. Logically extending these points, the outcome is a war between communities over the environment.<sup>37</sup>

Global justice, and, therefore, global education have the daunting task of introducing a universalized conception of global justice to people who, quite naturally, tend to value their closer community relations over those of the global human totality. This demands asking those who presently benefit the most from unjust relations to sacrifice their excesses to lower the level of marginalization of those who have not benefitted.

A further implication of Hume's work is that the key to ethical behavior is community membership. If other humans or non-humans are seen as members of one's community, then ethical concern follows. The question global education must answer is, how do we educate people to perceive themselves as part of a global community of humans and non-humans?

Interestingly, some philosophers, namely communitarian ethicists, suggest that the basis for ameliorating this problem lies within the problem itself. Communitarians suggest that notions of loyalty to a group ground morality. Loyalties are said to be based neither upon self-interest nor on an impersonal morality. Rather, they exhibit some or all of the characteristics of an impersonal morality within a particularized group or groups with which an individual feels a shared ownership.<sup>38</sup>

Communitarians also posit the nesting of communities and assert that the more loyalty one feels towards a group, the more likely one is to adopt a fuller moral obligation towards them. According to Andrew Oldenquist:

Our wide and narrow loyalties define moral communities or domains within which we are willing to universalize moral judgments, treat equals equally, protect the common good, and in other ways adopt the familiar machinery of impersonal morality.... A loyalty defines a moral community in terms of a conception of the common good and a special commitment to the members of the group that share this good.<sup>39</sup>

Communitarians, such as Oldenquist, suggest that moral grounding in one's communities provides individuals and communities with a basis for moral consideration towards individuals and communities with whom loyalties are not shared.<sup>40</sup> In this sense, one acquires ethical consciousness and learns ethical conduct within one's close communities, and then the acquisition and learning thereof can potentially be directed outwards to non-associated communities.

Significantly, communitarians also suggest that inasmuch as a person can develop a loyalty towards a group, she can also be alienated from that group. Oldenquist views alienation as a manifestation of something gone wrong with the "causal machinery" of society.<sup>41</sup> In other words, loyalty is learned, and when an individual does not feel herself as sharing ownership in a society it means that the individual has not been made to feel an integral, important part of the society. She has not learned that she is valued. Moral education, therefore, of necessity must not only teach why certain acts are just or unjust, but also serve to integrate the person within the community itself.

The natural extrapolation of these points, as it applies to environmental justice, is that people must learn to see themselves as integral parts of their eco-communities if they are to develop an environmental consciousness to ground their ethics. Conversely, if people are alienated from their eco-communities, they are not likely to act ethically towards them, even if they know which actions count as ethical. People can also learn to view the environment as solely a resource.

The point to take from this is that ethical consciousness, as the foundation for ethical actions, is learned within one's communities. Depending upon which type of ethical consciousness is desired, and provided the teaching approach is successful, a foundation for potential ethical universalism or parochialism can be developed.

This said, the problems which global justice faces are manifold, simply because the evolution of such a system presupposes itself to a large extent. If global justice is to arise in a way which is consistent with the means and ends of global justice, the adoption and maintenance of global justice must come about through democratic choice. Ideally this demands that those who presently benefit from the unjust distribution of resources agree to such a redistribution of their own accord, i.e., they must have a non-coercive motivation to renegotiate their position, insofar as coercion is a human phenomenon.<sup>42</sup>

The point to take here, metaphorically, is that if the third world is not to consume the world's seed grain, e.g., as in the Amazon rain forests' oxygen production, the developed world must sacrifice some of its feed grain. When a people eat their seed grain, they effectively leave themselves open to starvation, as they have nothing to plant future crops with. Oxygen is a staple dietic component of many species, of which ours is no exception. If the rain forest is consumed, a major source of oxygen that is effectively self-planting and easily harvested from is lost. It being lost, it cannot replant itself. That said, overpopulation is a key issue when it comes to environmental concerns and as such feed grain, as there are limits to its production, should not be used to create even more mouths to feed. To act otherwise is to exacerbate the problem much the same as putting a bandage on a gangrenous wound. In such cases, to save the body one might need to amputate the limb.

This allusion serves to introduce the options for actions, should it be the case that human impact upon the planet is too great to fall within the parameters of the biocentric paradigm, namely:

- i) We can reduce the impact of humanity upon the planet by changing how humans act upon the planet. This requires that people's actions become sustainable.
- ii) We can reduce the impact of humanity upon the planet by reducing the numbers of people upon the planet.
- iii) We can do a combination of the above.

If rights realization costs resources, then resource scarcity costs rights. Rights, insofar as they are the mechanisms of human flourishing, are the goods of well-being. Given that human impact upon the planet is excessive and that it must decrease, human rights, as a sum total, must correspondingly decrease. Given global justice, and the possibility that resource redistribution is sustainably possible without going below a lowest common denominator level of flourishing (not as yet decided), and allowing for an environmental safety factor cashed out in environmental rights (also undecided), then rights cutting measures will be invoked. If these cannot be met, given the biocentric imperative, then human life cutting measures, in combination with rights cutting measures, must be invoked.

The point to be taken here is that the measures which will have to be introduced to bring about global justice and life flourishing are monumental, to say the least. Of necessity, first world rights will require a dramatic decrease. Some of the rights decreases will feed the coffers of the environment, while others will go to the rights treasury of the developing world. Given some redistribution to the developing world, some developing world rights will probably increase, such as those which pertain to improving the basic conditions of subsistence, whereas others will of necessity decrease. The extent to which first world rights must decrease and third world rights must decrease will be determined by what rights values the environment receives and what safety factor for biogeosphere survival is built-in.

The upshot of all this, and it is just the tip of a very large iceberg, is that the changes which are required are fundamental and all-encompassing. A radical change in the way the first world lives, as well as how the ruling classes in the developing world live, is required if global justice is to be implemented. The task of developing a consciousness which is amenable to such change and sacrifice is that of education.

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<sup>1</sup> Given the position which Earthrights takes on the rights of development, I suggest that the categorical imperative is the most likely foundation for this grounding.

<sup>2</sup> I. Kant, "The Critique of Practical Reason," in *Great Books of the Western World: 42: Kant*, ed. M. Adler (Toronto: Encyclopaedia Britannica Incorporated, 1971), 302

<sup>3</sup> R.J Vincent, *Human Rights and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 11, 112.

<sup>4</sup> Vincent, 112.

<sup>5</sup> Vincent, 9-11.

<sup>6</sup> Vincent, 11.

<sup>7</sup> A. Leopold, "The Land Ethic," in *People, Penguins and Plastic Trees*, ed. D. VanDeVeer and C. Pierce (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Incorporated, 1986), 73.

<sup>8</sup> Leopold, 73.

<sup>9</sup> Leopold, 82.



<sup>10</sup> Leopold.

<sup>11</sup> Leopold, 78-80.

<sup>12</sup> Leopold, 82.

<sup>13</sup> Leopold, 76.

<sup>14</sup> Leopold, 80-81.

<sup>15</sup> Leopold, 73-82.

<sup>16</sup> Leopold, 80-82.

<sup>17</sup> Leopold.

<sup>18</sup> J.B. Callicott, "Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair," in *People, Penguins and Plastic Trees*, ed. D. VanDeVeer and C. Pierce (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Incorporated, 1986), 192.

<sup>19</sup> Callicott, 192.

<sup>20</sup> Callicott, 190.

<sup>21</sup> To say that nature functions like a utilitarian entity is to say that the good of an ecosystem is the desired endstate toward which actions concerning individuals are directed. There are no individual rights in nature, per se, and it is presumed that nature functions in her own best interest. As a matter of utilitarian calculation, therefore, individual well-being can be and is sacrificed to benefit the ecosystem.

<sup>22</sup> D. Hume, "An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals," in *Hume's Moral and Political Philosophy*, ed. H. Aiken (New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1972), 181-206.

<sup>23</sup> Hobbes, 183-88, 251-61; J. Locke, "An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and Lend of Civil Government," in *Social Contract*, ed. E. Barker (Oxford: Robert Cunningham and Sons, 1966), 23-64; J.J. Rousseau, "The Social Contract," in *Social Contract*, ed. E. Barker (Oxford: Robert Cunningham and Sons, 1966), 253-58.

<sup>24</sup> Hume, 189.

<sup>25</sup> This point is controversial. Could not a person merely have a tendency to be cruel which abundance could not alleviate? It appears presupposed that abundance would mitigate such a development.

<sup>26</sup> W. Kymlicka, *Contemporary Political Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 166.

<sup>27</sup> Kymlicka, 165-66.

<sup>28</sup> Hume, 181-206.

<sup>29</sup> Hume, 181-206.

<sup>30</sup> Hume, 188-89.

<sup>31</sup> G. Kavka, *Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 237-240, 443-46.

<sup>32</sup> Locke, 3-43, in particular 23-43, where Locke presupposes relative abundance or moderate scarcity.

<sup>33</sup> Rousseau, 240-68, 363-65, 380-83.

<sup>34</sup> Kavka, 237-40.

<sup>35</sup> Kymlicka, 76-90, 164-66, 185.

<sup>36</sup> It is important to reiterate that interests can be served in one of two ways: first, if lowest common denominator acceptable well-being is achieved, second, if lowest common denominator well-being is not achieved but leaving the

system is even worse, so that a partial serving of interests is accepted. In other words, people leave a system only if extrication from the system is better than staying within the system and if the system can be left. As to the latter point Rousseau said, "So long as a people is constrained to obey, and does, in fact obey, it does well. So soon as it can shake off its yoke, and succeeds in doing so, it does better."

<sup>37</sup> A dialogue between communities over the environment is also a possibility if this is perceived as necessary for community survival and war is taken to be less palliative than mutual well-being decrease.

<sup>38</sup> A. Oldenquist, "Loyalties," in *The Journal of Philosophy* 79, no.4 (April 1982): 174-76.

<sup>39</sup> Oldenquist, 177.

<sup>40</sup> Oldenquist, 178.

<sup>41</sup> Oldenquist, 187-90.

<sup>42</sup> The potential for environmental holocaust, for example, counts as a non-coercive motivation in that the problem, upon the exclusion of Biosphere II, is equally shared.

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