

FOR AN UN-CREATIVE MUSIC EDUCATION? ON THE (UN)TIMELINESS OF SCHOPENHAUER AS MUSIC EDUCATOR

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In times when the presence of music in educational curricula is dwindling,¹ music education *advocacy* has become a major discourse within music pedagogy, including philosophy of music education.² Since the educational potentiality of music is no longer evident, and its traditional explanation in terms of aesthetic-cultural *Bildung* has lost much of its appeal, the question of what makes music relevant, significant, or even *essential* to (public) education, has been posed anew many times in recent years, issuing in various “new” scientific and philosophical answers. A philosophical voice that surprisingly is hitherto almost never referred to by music education advocacy,³ and that we would like to draw attention to in this paper, is that of German Romantic philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860). That his absence from philosophy of music education may be called surprising is due to the fact that there have arguably been but few thinkers who have provided more fundamental arguments for music’s pedagogical validation. Music occupies a crucial place in Schopenhauer’s philosophical system, where it is endowed with not only an unprecedented metaphysical significance, but also—by consequence—with a unique ethical and educational potentiality.

At the same time Schopenhauer’s absence from contemporary discourses of music education advocacy must not surprise us too much. The reason for this is that a growing majority of these discourses attach great importance to the notion of *creativity*. In more than one respect this notion is difficult to match with Schopenhauer’s ideas on music and its educational potentiality, to the point even that it seems impossible to use these in arguments defending a creative music education. Before going deeper into this curious incompatibility and its implications, also for possible *alternative* discourses of music education advocacy, I will therefore briefly sketch the complex discursive field that has

emerged around the notion of music(-education)al creativity. This will help to clarify and situate the paper's starting problem, and subsequently to bring out the (un)timely music-pedagogical urgency of some of Schopenhauer's ideas in response to this problem.

THE PRIORITIZATION OF CREATIVITY IN CONTEMPORARY MUSIC PEDAGOGY

Three major elements appear to have played a decisive role in the emergence of creativity as a music-pedagogical focus, and to continue to shape many of its discursive emanations: (1) the "praxialist" turn in music pedagogy, and philosophy of music education in particular; (2) the already much older turn to child-centeredness; (3) the capture of creativity by neoliberal educational discourses and policies. In many instances these three elements go hand in hand—if not perfectly, then at least "pragmatically," to achieve their respective goals—while in others there has been significant friction between them, revealing also that the notion of creativity is everything but monolithic. Especially salient for instance are the differences between discourses which present musical creativity as an individual disposition or competence, and those emphasizing its social and/or interactive dimensions.⁴ For the purposes of this paper however, we will not review all of these differences and nuances. Aside from the fact that this would require more space than the paper's scope warrants, it is also precisely their nonetheless shared, fundamental conviction that creativity is and should be the driving force of music education that we want to take issue with, through the "dissonant" music aesthetics of Schopenhauer.

Coming back to the three elements just mentioned, let us start by presenting the most specifically music-educational of these: the so-called "praxialist" turn. At the heart of all varieties of music-pedagogical praxialism stands the Aristotelian-Deweyan idea that since music is primarily *practical* or "praxial" in nature, manifesting itself in a multiplicity of (socio-culturally diverse) practices, music education should also primarily understand and legitimate itself in "praxialist" terms—that is: in terms of practical and active processes of *creating* music.⁵ Put differently: music can only be learned by creating it oneself—with others—through playing and composing, and this (co-)creative-performative

dimension is also what constitutes music's most unique and meaningful contribution to education. If this take on music education does not preclude a pedagogical validation of aesthetic listening and formal-technical knowledge *per se*, then these more traditional, passive praxes should still only be validated as *functional* elements of a radically practical and creative learning process. As such praxialist discourses tend to be very critical of what they perceive as the intellectualism, elitism, and monoculturalism of aestheticist music pedagogies—which until recently dominated the field of music education and are often held responsible for its ongoing demise.⁶ What these pedagogies, with their emphasis on disinterested appreciation and analysis of distinguishing (Western) musical works and styles, would mainly lack, is a democratic account of *creativity* as basic musical ingredient. Where they only seem to ascribe musical creativity to the personal genius of the instrumental virtuoso and the composer of masterworks, praxialism proceeds on the assumption that it can be developed on all levels of “musicking.” This is less a matter of “discovering the Mozart” in every individual than of nurturing and elaborating the many different kinds of creative-musical potentiality already present within educands and their environments.⁷

The latter strongly dovetails with the second major element of music-pedagogical creativity discourses: that of child- or student-centeredness. In a nutshell this notion stands for the progressive-pedagogical idea that education must always try to meet, if not completely depart from, the personal (learning) needs of individual educands, in order to emancipate them from oppressive structures inherited from their personal or socio-cultural past. As such child-centeredness is typically contrasted with more traditional teacher-centeredness, which prioritizes initiation into the culture, values, and practices of the “teaching” generation, and which on that account is commonly criticized for reproducing the status quo, including its forms of oppression.⁸ With regard to music education and its advocacy it is fairly obvious to see how an emphasis on creativity can be articulated in terms of (critical-pedagogical) child-centeredness. If music ought to be part of education, it is because music education ought to be creative, and this in turn because musical creativity uniquely contributes to educands' personal wellbeing and agency, over and against “necrophilic” inculcation by older generations.⁹ Not only does musical creativity afford individual educands

a singularly vast stage for more embodied and affective self-expression, but it is also claimed to involve intense processes of bottom-up communication and collaboration.

Finally, we come to the third element of the music-pedagogical creativity discourse, earlier described as the “capture of creativity by neoliberal educational discourses and policies.” At first one might think that this element sits rather awkwardly with the other two, and this certainly is true to the extent that educational neoliberalism is often critically dismissed by praxialist and child-centered pedagogies as an oppressive, capitalist, and pre-eminently *un*-educational exploitation of education.¹⁰ When the (music-)pedagogical notion of creativity comes into view however, such a simple dismissal easily sounds simplistic, especially when one is faced with how many “emancipatory” praxialist and child-centered arguments for music(-education)al creativity are successfully integrated into neoliberal educational discourses.¹¹ For instance, the belief in creativity as a more practice-oriented antidote to traditional music-pedagogical ideals of disinterested aesthetic contemplation, smoothly translates into the neoliberal claim that music’s educational significance depends on its capacity to make us more performative, namely, to stimulate—even in a neurological sense—the “creative” development of various socio-economically valuable competences and skills (communication, emotional intelligence, concentration, mathematical thinking). More than merely practical then, the creativity music education should aim for is thus entrepreneurial: by having educands develop an intense, direct, and personal sense of performativity, productivity, and innovation, music can help to ensure that education remains a driving force of the competitive market system.¹² Similarly, as can be gleaned from the last phrase, many neoliberal music-educational discourses thrive on a child-centered approach to music education. In order to make music educationally and socio-economically performant, its unique potential for *personalization*—that is, customization—needs to be fully exploited, in the sense that the individual educand gets maximally “empowered” in her personal needs for musical consumption and production.¹³ Not coincidentally this perfectly aligns with the latest developments in the music industry. Thanks to the unprecedented possibilities of digital audio-technologies

(for example, headphones, YouTube, Spotify, remix and composition software), these processes have been democratized to the point where today everybody can independently learn to cater music to their own creative taste, without explicit interference by any external authority (since algorithms “only” *respond* to prosumers’ own input).¹⁴

PROBLEMATIZING MUSIC(-EDUCATION)AL CREATIVITY WITH SCHOPENHAUER

What this summary discursive overview already shows, is that the (fetishizing?) prioritization of creativity in music education is more problematic than we are sometimes led to believe. In the remainder of this paper, we propose to carry the problematization of the music-pedagogical notion of creativity still a step further, by approaching it from a different, more strictly philosophical angle, and by questioning the music-educational potentiality of creativity *as such*. Rather than discussing it on a descriptive level (as an aspect of existing practices), on a didactical level (as a teaching method), or on the level of policy (as legitimating ground for music education’s embedment in public curricula), we want to raise the more fundamental, metaphysical question of what might constitute the *essence* of music education, and whether creativity belongs to that essence. Against the foreseeable critique that such an essentialist endeavor per definition misses out on music education’s practical diversity and contextuality, we can only say that it is precisely provoked by the apparent contemporary essentialization of music education in terms of creativity, as sketched above.

The philosophical work we will turn to for our enquiries is that of Arthur Schopenhauer, who in his defining work *The World as Will and Representation* (1859) let there be no mistake about his high opinion of the arts, and of music in particular, to which he attributes a profound metaphysical and ethical significance.¹⁵ Earlier we already pointed out the curious fact that Schopenhauer’s aesthetics—also despite the great traction he gained among artists (such as Richard Wagner and Thomas Mann¹⁶)—has not sparked more interest in the field of aesthetic education, including philosophy of music education, which hitherto has always defined itself more in (critical) relation to the aesthetics of Kant.¹⁷ In part, we suggested, this can be explained by the glaring incompatibil-

ity of Schopenhauer's music aesthetics with the idea of creativity as founding principle of music education. It is primarily this incompatibility, and the implicit supposition that it renders Schopenhauer's views on music pedagogically redundant, that is at stake in the ensuing investigation. At the same time, it is also true that, apart from his appearance in Nietzsche's well-known essay *Schopenhauer as Educator* (1874), Schopenhauer has rarely been considered as a philosopher of education at all.¹⁸ On the one hand this is again curious: not only did he include in his writings quite a number of explicitly pedagogical observations, but in several of these he moreover takes a notably "progressive" stance, defending the Rousseauian ideal of natural, experience-based education.¹⁹ On the other hand, Schopenhauer's near-absence from philosophy of education likely has a lot to do with the infamously pessimist tone pervading his work. His tragic outlook on life, his plea for radical ascetic self-denial, his relative indifference towards politics and community: these do not easily strike one as pedagogically very promising thoughts. And yet, though they certainly point to the general limitations of using Schopenhauer's philosophy in relation to education, we believe their pessimism may also prove very refreshing vis-à-vis the sometimes cruel optimism dominating much of contemporary pedagogy—not in the least where the value of creativity is concerned.²⁰

Our discussion of Schopenhauer's potential significance for philosophy of music education will unfold in three steps. First, we will briefly introduce Schopenhauer's metaphysics of the Will, which in a sense entails a radical validation of creativity, as fundamental ontological principle (the *principium individuationis*), yet also marks it as the principal reason for the omnipresent suffering in reality, as expression of an absolute Will, and for mankind's misery in particular. In a second step we then present and analyze the place of music in Schopenhauer's philosophy. After explaining why the arts in general are specifically dear to Schopenhauer—because of their privileged access to the order of Ideas, which mediates between the Will and its phenomenal representation—we show why music still takes up a unique place in his aesthetics. Basically this entails the paradoxical rationale that since music constitutes a direct representation of the metaphysical Will, it allows for a temporary neutralization of the personal

will in the one contemplating the music, which again provides relief from the suffering bound up with our willfulness, next to supplying deep pity for the suffering of the rest of reality. Finally, in a third and last step we reflect on the music-pedagogical implications of this Schopenhauerian metaphysics and ethics of music. It is here that we return to the creativity discourse in music education, problematizing it in confrontation with the essentially *un*creative idea (I) of music and musical experience elaborated by Schopenhauer. While it is far from our intention to argue against creative music-educational practices per se, we make the case that at the educational heart of these there *must* always remain a contemplative experience of music that confronts the subject with the tragic groundlessness of its willful individuality and exercises it in the “conversion” of its willing into transcendental compassion for the whole world as one’s deeper, non-individual self.

SCHOPENHAUER’S METAPHYSICS OF THE WILL: PROTO-EXISTENTIALISM AND “AFFECTIVE TURN”

According to Schopenhauer, who overall considers himself a loyal disciple of Kant, the latter’s crucial failure is his reluctance to name the “thing-in-itself,” the noumenal essence and ground of phenomenal reality, which he himself readily identifies as *Will*.²¹ This metaphysical, absolute Will, which is one and all-encompassing, must not be mistaken for our own individual will, in all its various expressions, even though in first instance Schopenhauer does appeal to individual existential and affective experiences of willing to argue for the possibility and need of reaching beyond the level of phenomenal appearances. At the risk of simplifying matters, the basic rationale runs as follows: while our will perforce attaches itself to appearances which it represents to itself as individual objects—of material, moral, or epistemic nature—and occasionally derives pleasure from the satisfaction of its desire, such pleasure can never appease its drive, and hence always culminates in the pain of dissatisfaction and renewed craving.

What this deeply felt existential experience reveals, Schopenhauer argues, is the irreducibly excessive nature of the will, which not only exceeds every individual need (and its satisfaction), but even our individuality as such. Though

we primarily experience willing as expression of *our* personal bodies—namely through the pleasures and pains of bodily desire—the will does not stop at our body’s limit, since we constantly desire things beyond our reach and are often thwarted in our desires by the will of others. What Schopenhauer, influenced by Hindu and Buddhist traditions,²² concludes from this, is the following: the personal “will to life,” as it appears in our mortal bodies and their individual needs and desires, is but a parade of ephemeral appearances of a metaphysical, noumenal Will—the thing-in-itself—whose groundless, all-encompassing drive ceaselessly individuates and objectivates itself in the world’s particular spatio-temporal phenomena, in a senseless alteration of pleasure and pain, creation and destruction, life and death.²³ As such moreover, the Will’s empire does not only rule over human existence. As Schopenhauer tries to demonstrate in *Über den Willen in der Natur*, its *principium individuationis* equally expresses itself, in different gradations, on all levels of natural reality, up to and including the mechanic “strivings” of inorganic phenomena.²⁴

The privilege of humans, however, is to be able to become *aware* or *conscious* of their tragic metaphysical situation, while other creatures, who live by instinct, blindly undergo the Will’s fateful play of appearances. In the first place humankind can acquire rigorous and systematic scientific and moral knowledge of the world, which at the very least provides it with insight in the different (material and psychic) causalities governing the world and its individual appearances. Yet though scientific concepts and moral precepts may thus afford some measure of control and relief in our lives, this ultimately remains limited, for they only operate in the world as representation, on the level of already individuated and objectifiable phenomena. This becomes evident, Schopenhauer says, in the common experience that new insight kindles a thirst for *more* insight—the painful consequences of which had just been portrayed in Goethe’s *Faust*—and in the tragic fact that no morality can ever overcome egoism, so that most of the time people actually require egoistic motives to do good. As regards philosophy: if its transcendental procedures certainly have better chances of reaching into the deeper, noumenal layers of reality, then still Schopenhauer doubts the ability of philosophy to do so purely on its own, given its heavy reliance on represen-

tational concepts. Thus, he eventually seems to concur with Pascal that human existence, though superior on account of its (potential) metaphysical awareness, is irredeemably stuck in its tragic condition, suffering even doubly compared to non-human nature *because* of this (impotent) awareness.²⁵

MUSIC AS AESTHETIC REPRESENTATION AND SUSPENSION OF THE WILL

It is at this point that Schopenhauer brings in the arts and reveals the fundamental aesthetic inclination of his philosophy.²⁶ Only art truly manages to pierce through the veil of phenomenality (the “veil of Maya”) and provide humankind with knowledge beyond representation—reaching into the realm of the thing-in-itself—so as to afford it more or less enduring relief from the Will’s blindly creative, individuating drive. That art is so uniquely capable of this has to do with its curiously mediate existence between the world as representation—the empirical variety of artistic means, works, and styles—and the world as Will—to which art has privileged access by way of the *Ideas*.²⁷ These quasi-Platonic Ideas are not the phenomenal appearances of things, nor their philosophical or scientific concepts (which merely schematize common qualities of empirical phenomena), but the things’ transcendent and eternal *essences*, and hence also the Will’s most adequate objectifications. Through the aesthetic forms of art, which paradoxically manage to represent them to our experience, we can “contemplate” these transcendent Ideas, thereby acquiring a more direct knowledge of the metaphysical Will, which in turn allows to suspend the process of its individuation and inherent suffering. The Ideas are namely not particular objects or representations for our personal-subjective will to desire, in the economy of need and satisfaction. Instead in the aesthetic contemplation of Ideas the whole phenomenal contradiction between object and subject is *undone*, leaving us as “pure”—that is: self- and will-less—“subjects of knowledge,” immersed *in* the Ideas.²⁸ When I contemplate the sunflowers of Van Gogh, it is no longer I who subjectively “looks at” (the objective representation of) individuated sunflowers, but it is the Idea of sunflowers that summons an “ideal,” selfless subject who no longer wills anything.

In this scheme of things music takes a very particular place in the eyes

of Schopenhauer (who was himself an amateur flutist and avowed aficionado of the classical music of his time).²⁹ Whereas the other arts are capable at best of representing the Will's eternal Ideas, and thus remain caught in the dynamic of individuation and representation—albeit on the highest level, beyond empirical phenomenality and subjective willfulness—music alone is capable of “*representing*” the *unrepresentable Will itself*. What distinguishes it from the other arts is its radically non-representational and affective nature. Though they can of course accompany lyrical representations and evoke images, the harmonies, melodies, and rhythms of music do not as such represent anything—*any-thing* in particular. What they do “represent,” or express, in the immediacy of their affectivity, is the objectless drive of the Will—not the personal will of the phenomenal subject who plays or listens, but the noumenal thing-in-itself. In the movements of music, Schopenhauer claims, we contemplate the metaphysical movements of the Will; no longer merely in their ideal objectifications, but in their essential, individuating dynamics.

As such Schopenhauer almost sees in music a surer road for what should be the project of (his) philosophy: gaining the deepest, most direct, *and* most redeeming insight in the metaphysical genesis of the phenomenal world, and of human existence in particular. Through it we can “experience” all interlinked tonalities of pleasure and suffering with which the Will affects itself in the phenomenal world and its individual subjects, and yet in such a way that they do not concern us (or anyone in particular) personally. Better even: in the musical contemplation of the Will we momentarily *subtract* our personal will to life—and its inherent suffering—from the Will's empire to the point of (quasi-)total self-annulment.³⁰ When for example we perform or listen to Mahler 9, and are overcome by its expression of sadness, anguish, and despair, we can still “enjoy” these painful passions, because we do not primarily recognize them as Mahler's or our own, but as direct passions of the metaphysical Will, and because contemplating the music's aesthetic forms allows us to deny our individual, suffering selves, and their subjection to the Will's fickle empire. Schopenhauer repeatedly warns for any subjective appropriation of music, as *my* creation, or the expression of *my* feelings, and for music that encourages this

(which he believes is more often the case with lyrical music). In both cases the music's metaphysical potentiality is degraded to sheer personal desire, which due to music's lack of clear representational content always risks to pervert into hysterical sentimentality.³¹

Finally, the latter also contrasts with the supreme virtue which according to Schopenhauer one should expect art and music (and philosophy?) to bring about: pity, or compassion (*Mitleid*). After all this pity must not be confused with the kind of highly personal empathy that, also within creativity discourses in music education advocacy, is often associated with music.³² Where such pity already presupposes a personal-moral appropriation of music—enabling *me*, with *my* sensibilities, to become more sensitive to the sufferings of *individual* others—Schopenhauerian pity is in the first place but the corollary of the metaphysical knowledge which music should impart to us.³³ Given its precarity moreover—even musical contemplation cannot fully overcome the Will—this compassion for the fundamental suffering of individuated reality *as a whole* cannot immediately or lastingly impact our personal moral sentiments and actions. At best, it would seem, judging also by Schopenhauer's conservative support for bourgeois morality, the latter helps to preserve metaphysical pity, that is the fruit of aesthetic(-musical) contemplation, under the tragic conditions of our phenomenal and social life-world.

FOR AN UN-CREATIVE MUSIC EDUCATION?

When we seek to relate Schopenhauer's music aesthetics to the starting problem of this paper—the need for music education advocacy and the supposed self-evidence of creativity as “progressive” principle for such advocacy—then soon two basic assertions present themselves: (1) music is of fundamental educational importance, because it affords unique insight into the Will as the essence of reality and the human condition; (2) this insight is gained through practices of self-denying aesthetic contemplation, which explicitly do *not* aim for personal creativity. It is especially on this second assertion that we now still want to expand, also in more directly music-pedagogical terms.

Where our analysis in the first section of this paper showed that the

creativity discourse in music education is marked by an uncanny affinity between elements which seem utterly incompatible (music-pedagogical praxialism, child-centered pedagogy, and educational neoliberalism), a Schopenhauerian point of view may prove crucial for making sense of this problematic affinity, and for countering it with a credible alternative. Whether or not one actually endorses them, and their extravagant and pessimist implications, Schopenhauer's metaphysical and ethical thoughts on music at least enable us to grasp the problematic point—which is a metaphysical and ethical point—where the various “incompatible” creativity discourses in music education nevertheless meet: the *principium individuationis*, that is to say, the Will's relentless drive to *creative individuation*. The call to creativity always implies a need for music-educational practices to *produce something new*—a new musical experience, skill, expression—and something that is per definition new for every *individual* educand. Even in praxialist discourses which deliberately argue for practices of *collective* musical creativity, the expectation of individual differentiation persists. Within the collective endeavor everyone still must be able to contribute in their *own new* way, or at least to appropriate the “co-created” novelty on a personal level. As such creativity and individuation are two sides of the same coin: music education should be creative, so that educands can both learn to (co-)create new music, *and re-invent* themselves, as the musical, emotional, social selves they (individually) *want* to be.

In first instance, revealing its deepest foundations, Schopenhauer's philosophy of the Will thus renders this music-pedagogical rationale perfectly plausible. Ultimately however, it also forces us to problematize it, and to think about possible alternatives. As a foundational music-pedagogical principle creativity only confirms and intensifies the individuating dynamics of the Will, in its unsatisfiable drive to create new subjective desires and objective desiderata in the phenomenal world. Not only could this easily encourage music-educational practices that mainly perpetuate the tragic, oppressive cycle of need and satisfaction—making us want more and more—but it especially risks depriving us of music's unique potentiality, which is precisely to contemplate and suspend the Will, and to support an ethics of compassion.

Nevertheless, this problematization need not entail a wholesale denunciation of the music-educational practices per se which creativity discourses argue for. Despite Schopenhauer's Kantian intellectualism and cultural conservatism, there is no indication in his writings that contemplative aesthetic insight, which he emphatically distinguishes from (scientific) knowledge, excludes embodied practice—in *casu quo*: musical play. (Admittedly though, Schopenhauer's music-aesthetic observations still primarily appeal to "classical" listening experiences,³⁴ paying little attention to how music-making's more practical dynamics can transgress aesthetic signification.³⁵) Hence the properly Schopenhauerian question rather is to what extent such music-educational practices—playing, but also composing and improvising—actually *are* creative, and whether they should necessarily be granted their place in education *for the sake of* creativity. On the one hand this relates to Schopenhauer's elitist and questionable conviction that genuine, "great," music is only ever created *outside* the confines of regulated education, through the fated genius who is able to sustain the impossible tension between personal, willful existence and impersonal, contemplative expression.³⁶ On the other hand, more interestingly, it also hints at the surprising possibility that such practices might still be valued for different pedagogical reasons, oriented towards contemplation rather than creativity. Music-educational practices, including those we all too rapidly call creative, should then first and foremost make educands reflective about how to recognize forms, techniques, and effects of "genuine" music—which is to say: how to use these for the sake of self-emptying contemplation and pity, that make us sympathize with the world as our deeper, non-individual self.³⁷

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21 The following is an extremely condensed synthesis of Schopenhauer's core philosophical insights, as they can be found in parts 1 and 2 of the first volume of *The World as Will and Representation*. For an alternative introduction to his thought, see Judith Norman and Alistair Welchman, "Introduction: Schopenhauer in the Time of Pandemic," in *Schopenhauer's "The World as Will and Representation,"* eds. Judith Norman and Alistair Welchman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022), 1-10.

22 For the music-pedagogical implications of this connection, see Ryan White, "Schopenhauer, the Philosophy of Music, and the Wisdom of Classical Indian Philosophy," *Sophia* 60, no. 4 (2021): 899–915. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-021-00875-z>; see also: Ming Lu, and Li Tan, "On the Usefulness of Nothingness: A Daoist-Inspired Philosophy of Music Education," *Philosophy of Music Education Review* 29, no. 1 (2021): 88–101. <https://doi.org/10.2979/philmusieducrevi.29.1.06>.

23 See also: Rudolf Bernet, "Schopenhauer on the Will as Drive of my Libidinal Body and as Natural Force of Material Bodies," *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 44, no. 1 (2013): 59–77. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2013.11006788>. This article also (critically) assesses the proto-Freudian significance of the "drive economy" in Schopenhauer's idea of the Will.

24 Arthur Schopenhauer, *Über den Willen in der Natur*, ed. Arthur Hübscher (Wiesbaden: Brockhaus, 1972).

25 See also: Thomas Mann's masterful analysis of the "pessimist humanism" of Schopenhauer; Mann, "Schopenhauer," 233-34.

26 The following mainly deals with book 3 of *The World as Will and Representation*, again in a very concise form. For the parts on music, see especially Schopenhauer, *The Worlds as Will and Representation*, Vol. 1, §52; Vol. 2, ch. 39.

27 For a more detailed and technical analysis of Schopenhauer's account of (aesthetic) sensibility: Vandenabeele, "Schopenhauer on Sense Perception and

Aesthetic Cognition.”

28 Clifton. “Schopenhauer and Murdoch.”

29 For a broader perspective on Schopenhauer’s music aesthetics, see also: Michael Gallope, *Deep Refrains: Music, Philosophy, and the Ineffable* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017), 34–48.

30 Clifton. “Schopenhauer and Murdoch.”

31 Schopenhauer, *The Worlds as Will and Representation*, Vol. 1, 290.

32 See also: Lynda Laird, “Empathy in the Classroom: Can Music Bring Us More in Tune with One Another?” *Music Educators Journal* 101, no. 4 (2015): 56–61.

33 See also: Ryan White, “Schopenhauer”.

34 Timothy W. C. David, “Will-Less Contemplation through Listening to Music: An Epistemic Process Analysis of Arthur Schopenhauer’s Concept of Music,” *Manusya : Journal of Humanities* 20, no. 2 (2017): 77–100. <https://doi.org/10.1163/26659077-02002004>.

35 See also: Regelski, “Resisting Aesthetic Autonomy”; Kanellopoulos, “Envisioning Autonomy”.

36 See especially Schopenhauer, *The Worlds as Will and Representation*, Vol. 2, ch. 31.

37 See also: Lu and Tan, “On the Usefulness of Nothingness.”