

## The Place of Locating Oneself(Ves)/Myself(Ves) in Doing Philosophy of Education

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### PRELUDE

Imagine a situation in which a group of philosophers of education, colleagues in the same department, are meeting to discuss a recently delivered letter from some students in the department. The gist of the letter is that they would like to see more “critical content” in more courses. The discussion might go something like this:

*Chair:* You’ve all read this letter from the students. So what do you all think? I’m open to advice about how we should handle it.

*Fac. #1:* I really wish they hadn’t used the word “demands”. I hate that word. What right does anyone, any group, have to *demand* anything of anyone else? This is a university where there is *supposed* to be academic freedom, for god’s sake!

*Chair:* I figured that’s what you would say, #1, but can we keep this open a little longer?

*Fac. #2:* Well, I think they have a point that we should at least consider. Philosophy of education has been changing over the last decade. Maybe some of our courses haven’t kept pace?

*Fac. #3:* Wait now. What’s their point? They’re asking us to be more “critical?” Well, hell, *all* of philosophy is “critical.” Being critical is what we *do*.

*Fac. #4:* Calm down. I think maybe #2 is suggesting that they might have a different understanding of “critical.”

*Fac. #3:* Yeah, what? As far as I know, I just used the understanding that’s been true of philosophy since Plato. So tell me how everybody has been so wrong for 2,000 years.

*Fac. #4:* No, no, no. No one’s saying that all of philosophy since Plato is all wrong. Just that there may be a certain kind of wrong that we need to attend to more now. I think they’re saying that more attention should be paid to issues of social difference in our courses.

*Fac. #3:* What? What’s that supposed to mean? So, we’re all different from each other. Thank god! I’d hate to think that #2 and I were the same!

*Fac. #2:* It’s mutual, I assure you.

*Fac. #5:* Wait a minute now...I think “difference” in the way #4 is using it doesn’t just mean “variation.” It’s pointing to the way this variation gets picked out and used in certain ways, from certain points of view, for the benefit of some at the expense of others.

*Fac. #3:* What?

*Fac. #4:* Yeah, that’s right. Just as an example, race and gender are two examples of forms of difference in this sense.

*Fac. #1:* Oh great! Now the political correctness police are after us!

*Chair:* OK people, let's keep this on track.

*Fac. #4:* It is on track...if we can get past the knee-jerk, right-wing, antiquated, inflammatory responses from some of us here.

*Fac. #3:* OK, let me tell you what track that would put us on — silly philosophy. It's a bad argument.

*Fac. #4:* I haven't made any argument yet.

*Fac. #3:* Oh but you will...and I'm going to tell you what's wrong with it so we don't have to listen to nonsense. The students want all of us to be dealing with things like race and gender in our courses. Well that's just a biased position, as bad as the converse, that none of our courses should include content like that. I suppose, nowadays, most of us would agree that it's good that somebody is dealing with this stuff in some course. Why? Well, because it's important that we have a range of perspectives offered in our curriculum. That's exactly what these students are missing. And let's face it, we all have to make choices about what we include in our courses. And of course we can argue about this. But no one has a monopoly on what's right to include or exclude. At most, leaving out some discussion of race or gender...or what color skin Descartes had...*might* be argued to be an academic mistake. Maybe like not spending enough time on Siegel in a course on critical thinking, or skipping over Indian philosophers in a survey course on philosophy of education. But claiming that *everyone* has to be politically correct and talk about race and gender, whatever the content of the course, is clearly just wrong. For god's sake, what does race or gender have to do with good objective thinking? So why are we even considering this letter? Just tell them they should go and study some more philosophy so they won't be sucked into such silly positions.

*Chair:* Any one else have anything more to say?

*Fac. #5:* Well, I might...Something doesn't sound right in #3's so-called counter-argument to something #4 has yet to say. When I focus on how central to my identity being white, middle class, masculine, and heterosexual is, I tend to be skeptical of claims that it's "silly" to even think that this might be relevant to how I think about education and to what my philosophy of education courses should deal with. If I bracket these aspects of me, what's left? I need some time to think about this.

*Chair:* So what're you saying I should do with the letter from the students...*stall?*

*Fac. #5:* Yes, but stall for reasons. Isn't that what philosophy comes down to in the end?

*Chair:* Anyone have problems with that?

*Fac. #3:* I can't imagine he's going to come up with anything sufficient to convince me. And I really wonder about his motives....I think he wants to call me (and #1) moral names. But, what the hell, let him try, if it'll placate the students.

## INTRODUCTION

The question I will explore in this essay stems from the reality of scenarios such as that just imagined. I intend the hypothetical scenario to ground, to make real, a practical question which *I* need to face more squarely. I have no intention or desire to point moral fingers at anyone other than myself. Indeed, I should acknowledge that I have found myself holding most if not all of the positions articulated in the scenario in some contexts, at some time. Moreover, there are legitimate and difficult curriculum questions raised in this scenario, such as that of balance of perspectives offered. I will not be addressing them, but this should not be taken to mean that I think they are unimportant. Rather, I want to focus on a particular question often raised by discussions of this sort, but usually eclipsed by other questions more “pressing,” or perhaps safer. The question, then, which focuses my exploration is this: “What kind of mistake might I be making if I try to “do” philosophy of education as if my social location does not matter?”

In regard to method, I do not claim to be speaking here as “just any philosopher who thinks clearly and soundly,” but, rather, from my real and limited position in contemporary North American society as a white, middle-class, heterosexual, still relatively able, ex-Protestant, morally concerned, academic, man...and how long I should go on with these descriptors is part of my problem. My subsequent comments about the relevance of these identity markers are *not* meant to be heard as claims about them in any place or time. *I* am asking my practical organizing question, and I am framing it the way I do because of my felt sense of something problematic and difficult to hang on to. I will approach my main question through reflection on four other questions that seem to me to be necessary constitutive pieces of an adequate answer, an answer that will emerge gradually from grappling with these questions in sequence. These four questions are:

- (1) How is education an inherently moral endeavor?
- (2) What are the implications of accepting this characterization of the moral quality of education for how I should understand my participation in educational discourse?
- (3) If this participation necessitates my sincere assumption of the performative attitude, from where do I start?
- (4) Given that I am unavoidably within social groups that are relationally defined in terms of each other, why/how does this matter?

In addressing each of these questions, I will seek to synthesize enough of an answer to carry me forward to the next. I wish to present for your consideration my own synthesis of a number of diverse ideas and how they might be seen as working together to outline what is for me the shape of a compelling answer to my practical question.

## QUESTION ONE: HOW IS EDUCATION AN INHERENTLY MORAL ENDEAVOR?

It is almost commonplace these days to characterize education as an inherently moral endeavor. Certainly there exists a significant number of philosophers who do so, offering a spectrum of interpretations of this characterization, and I find myself comfortably on this spectrum. From my point of view, to be concerned about

education is to be engaged, ultimately, with the question of what it means to be fully human. As I have summarized elsewhere, what is of concern on this view of education is, at bottom, this “education is one of the main ways we have as humans to define our humanity, to practice our humanity, to maintain our humanity, and to change our humanity. It is how we seek to connect ourselves today with ourselves of the past and it is how we project ourselves into the future.”<sup>1</sup> Although it is tempting to view much of what goes on in contemporary schools in much less grandiose terms, to do so risks losing sight of what schools are there for in the end.

If we do strive to maintain this ultimate seriousness of education, we also need to keep clearly in mind how this engagement can only be understood in moral terms. When I unpack this engagement, I identify four ways in which we need to understand it as essentially moral:

(1) The educational engagement focuses on something of overriding importance. What is attended to is not something trivial, far down on the list of what does or should matter to society. The range of interpretations of what is to count as the moral surely matches, if not exceeds, that of the understanding of education, but talk of what it means to be human shows up in most if not all of the views that we would want to recognize as moral points of views. The *subject matter* of education and thus educational discourse is in this sense within the moral realm, and importantly so.

(2) The engagement is often prompted by the felt sense of “something’s going wrong” in the direction that society is taking. Educational views are then offered as *corrections* to these perceived social tendencies, as guided by preferred moral/social/political norms. And they are corrections that *matter* significantly to those offering them. In short, thinking about education is usually morally *motivated*.

(3) Then, educational concerns are neither aimed at an isolated self nor expressible monologically. Views of education and claims pertaining to those views necessarily refer to and address others. In fact, they *presuppose* communicative interaction with others.<sup>2</sup> Some of these others are adults with educational views of their own, more or less in agreement with one’s own view, who desire to shape the humanity of succeeding generations in some way vs. another. And some of these implicated others are in fact members of the next generation(s), who will be significantly affected by the prevailing view(s) through which their teachers shape and communicate their educational intentions in facilitating students’ development as human persons. With regard to either set of others, insofar as morality paradigmatically involves how people relate to each other with regard to differing or common interests, the *mode* of the educational engagement is also inherently moral.

(4) Finally, *being part of the engagement itself* is imbued with moral import. As one of the ways we humans have constructed to define, practice, maintain, and change the shape of our humanity, to be engaged, along with others, in addressing the educational question is itself partly constitutive of our being human, and being recognized as such by others. To be excluded from this

engagement, whether as subject or as object, is thus one of the most fundamental of moral harms that can befall a person. To accept the benefits of being part of it calls for a response-ability to others that can accommodate the essential openness of the question. Considering what is required of one upon this acceptance moves me to my second question.

QUESTION TWO: WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF ACCEPTING THIS CHARACTERIZATION OF THE MORAL QUALITY OF EDUCATION FOR HOW I SHOULD UNDERSTAND MY PARTICIPATION IN EDUCATIONAL DISCOURSE?

When I sincerely accept this characterization of the inherently moral nature of education and the public discourse concerning it, my point of view is shaped in a particular way. My way of capturing this point of view, or attitude, is to think of it as “performative.” To be sure, there *are* legitimate questions about education that require a more “objectivating” stance, for example, those of an historian attempting to trace the development of public schooling that shaped and constrained ideas about education in modernity, or those of an anthropologist describing cultural variations in the content boundaries of what counts as education. To answer these questions one stands outside the phenomena being attended to, intentionally removing oneself from the picture. However, a perspective on education as inherently moral does not allow this removal. On the contrary, I can no longer look at issues from the outside, bracketing myself from the picture. *I am* part of the picture. And the picture frames *me* from the point of view of real others who are an unavoidable and interactive part of the picture. By referring to this reflexive recognition as “performative” I seek to open the question of what it requires of me in ways that are both active and involving of others.

There is a lot of, and quite varied, use of the notion of “performative” finding its way into contemporary educational discourse, broadly construed. What I am after here is my sense of the common spirit of what is being pointed to, or at least one main line of interpretation that I find useful.<sup>3</sup> I want to emphasize that I do *not* mean this focus on the performative to connote an emptiness of “only acting” or “insincerity” of the sort that might be associated with a stage or movie actor’s giving a shallow performance. Quite the contrary, I mean this notion to pick up, first and foremost, a *being-there*, a real presence, a stance of being real-as-self-to-the-other. I also intend “performative” to identify a particular form of interaction with the other as part of this presence. My interaction with you qualifies as moral just insofar as it does not waver from attending to your *being-there* as a person and to how neither of us can express our essential personhood outside efforts at reciprocal recognition.

But, in my context, what does this reciprocity of recognition really mean? What does it require of me in thinking/talking about education? It requires me, first, to accept that the cultural meanings which identify my certainty are nothing more than *my* certainty, and always suspect as such. My views about education — as that which facilitates the development of fully human persons — are apprehended as part of *me* in Gadamer’s sense of “prejudices.” However, this notion of prejudices should not be seen as a tool-box for meaning-making that I can pick up or leave behind at will. Rather, the tool-box *is me*; there is no “I” that can be so conveniently separated from

its prejudices. Using Gadamer's insights in *Truth and Method*, Jim Garrison has recently captured quite concisely what I think needs to be said here:

As Gadamer realizes, "In fact history does not belong to us; we belong to it. Long before we understand ourselves through the process of self-examination, we understand ourselves in a self-evident way in the family, society, and state in which we live....*That is why the prejudices of the individual constitute the historical reality of his being*"...Gadamer's emphasis here is crucial. Our prejudices constitute our personal identity.<sup>4</sup>

Neither my being there nor yours can start from anything other than our identities as so constituted. Where we locate our certainty simply locates us. (Or, as Garrison puts it, "Cultural traditions have us before we have them."<sup>5</sup>)

The reciprocity of recognition sought through the performative attitude also includes a shaping of how I orient myself-with-other toward truth, and its moral analog. It assumes the legitimacy of disagreement and the *prima facie* sincerity of that disagreement when it is discovered. Difference of viewpoint is accepted as the default position. The orientation is not to avoid disagreement, to explain it away, or close it off. Rather, effort is made to welcome it, be *with* the other *in it*, to open it up for mutual exploration and through this co-exploration to seek an intelligibility *of* the other that also serves to make myself more intelligible *to* the other. This orientation then pulls me into an historical/temporal practice, a kind of doing-with-other that is time-bound.

So how are we then to understand this practice into which I am pulled by this orientation toward disagreement? I sense it as a pull toward engaging the other in the co-directed activity of discursively sharing both claims about some point of contention and the support that warrants their legitimacy from our differing points of view. This is, I believe, something close to what Jürgen Habermas is pointing to when he ties the performative attitude to the communicative act of "redeeming a validity claim." As Habermas expresses it, "understanding what is said requires *participation* and not just *observation*."<sup>6</sup>

Owing to the fact that communication oriented to reaching understanding has a validity basis, a speaker can persuade a hearer to accept a speech-act offer by guaranteeing that he will redeem a criticizable validity claim. In so doing, he creates a binding/bonding effect between speaker and hearer that makes the continuation of their interaction possible.<sup>7</sup>

The fact that a speaker can rationally motivate a hearer to accept such an offer is due not to the validity of what he says but to the speaker's guarantee that he will, if necessary, make efforts to redeem the claim that the hearer has accepted.<sup>8</sup>

What I think Habermas is referring to in these passages is that one recognizes and responds positively to the claim that the other has on one's own capacity and disposition to ground beliefs rationally. It's *not* the truth of our beliefs that ties us together, that creates the "binding/bonding effect," but my willingness, and yours reciprocally, to show why they should lay claim to my/our acceptance. It is the being tied together through active, explicit recognition of this kind of reciprocal praxis that the performative attitude identifies.

Moreover, when this need is located within our *moral* disagreements (as it is in the case of educational discourse), it is not a bloodless, abstract, deductive notion of rationality that is being called forth, but rather, a form of interaction that has built

into it a web of interrelated emotional attitudes and feelings (such as resentment, gratitude, forgiveness, and so forth.) and we recognize the claim that the need has on us through these.<sup>9</sup> It is our mutual capacity to place ourselves on the inside of the appropriate form of reason-offering-to-other that these feelings depend on that marks off the performative vs. the objectivating attitude. As Habermas says, “The objectivating attitude of the nonparticipant observer annuls the communicative roles of I and thou...and neutralizes the realm of moral phenomena as such.”<sup>10</sup> In contrast, “The communicative roles of I and thou” are actively preserved by the response to disagreement from within the performative attitude.

Finally, a caveat needs to be added here concerning how I understand the underlying intention of this response. In short, I do not mean to imply that only *agreement* will satisfy, that without agreement the response somehow falls short. I am not really sure whether it is correct to see Habermas as so committed, as Gould has argued, but this does not concern me directly here. What matters more is my sense that Gould *is* right when she expresses the underlying intention in more open-ended, pluralistic terms: “I would argue...that, in addition to common agreement, interaction among people in public, whether discursively or in other modes of activity, is normatively oriented to the articulation, acknowledgment, and sometimes encouragement of differences.”<sup>11</sup> Indeed, it is exactly the paradoxical *tension* between these two basic social intentions (of seeking consensus and of facilitating differences) that I intend my appeal to the performative stance to capture. Holding onto both sides of this tension is what I understand Peggy Phelan to be articulating so eloquently in the following:

Perhaps the best possibility for “understanding” racial, sexual, and ethnic difference lies in the *active* acceptance of the inevitability of misunderstanding...Misunderstanding as a political and pedagogical telos can be a dangerous proposition, for it invites the belligerent refusal to learn or move at all. This is not what I am arguing for. *It is in the attempt to walk and live on the rickety bridge between self and other — and not the attempt to arrive at one side or the other — that we discover hope.* That walk is always suspended performance — in the classroom, in the political field, in relation to one another and to our selves.<sup>12</sup>

For me, the performative attitude seeks both to walk on and to maintain that “rickety bridge between self and other.” It is, as Phelan notes, “always suspended,” suspended through time, suspended in outcome, and suspended by my performative intention of engaging the other. What I want to explore next is the question of how I need to understand where I start my walk on this bridge. What, exactly, does this bridge have to bridge if it is necessitated by the categories of social difference that Phelan refers to?

#### INTERLUDE

Before addressing this question directly, I want to return to another hypothetical scenario of the sort with which I started — again, in order to ground in practical reality the kinds of abstract points that I believe answering it requires. Imagine, then, a passing conversation in the hallway of the aforementioned department:

*Fac. #1:* I’ve been hearing rumors about you and what you’re up to.

*Fac. #5:* How so? And from whom?

*Fac. #1:* Oh, you know...the turbo-charged grape vine. What I hear is that you

have the ear of the Dean and you're trying to turn this department into a department of race and gender studies. Well, I'll tell you something — you can forget about me being part of that. I'm not interested in any of that stuff. I just want to do good philosophy of education.

*Fac. #5:* Hang on, now, you've got it all wrong. I have no intention of arguing that we should abandon everything else we do and all study race and gender.

*Fac. #3:* Number 1 does get carried away a bit. But what I've heard worries me just as much.

*Fac. #5:* Just what, may I ask?

*Fac. #3:* Well, it's hard not to hear what's going on in that seminar room. Every other time I walk by I hear somebody talking emotionally about race and racism. I already get that too much. Every time I turn around there is somebody with that one-sided, over-blown, pressurized message. Enough is enough...you shouldn't really be adding to this pressure. Why don't they realize that there are all kinds of other things to be concerned about as well? Like poverty, or violence, or human rights, for example?

*Fac. #5:* Look, I can't answer for you, why you feel "pressured." But I can tell you why *I* am worrying about how my social location interacts with my doing philosophy of education, and why race might be a large part of that, maybe different from lots of other things.

*Fac. #1:* Oh, come on. Are you trying to tell us that we have to notice that you're white every time we talk to you. I personally don't care what color you or anybody else is...white, black, yellow, green, lavender, whatever, as long as they think well.

*Fac. #5:* Funny, I haven't seen many green or lavender people lately. But let me give you an example of what I'm trying to talk about. I was reading a paper the other day by a guy named Mills, a black philosopher at the University of Illinois, a paper called "Non Cartesian *Sums*." Well, I was really struck by something he said. He was talking about one of my heroes, someone I studied with, who asked me what I thought to be penetrating moral/political theory questions in my oral comprehensive for my doctorate, someone whose precision and purity of abstract rational reconstruction of some of my most basic, inchoate moral intuitions about justice literally enthralled me. What Mills said was this: "The only slavery Rawls mentions is that of antiquity."<sup>13</sup> I haven't checked, but I suspect he's right.

*Fac. #3:* So what?

*Fac. #5:* The "so what" is not something about Rawls, or Mills...or you. The "so what" is about me. *I missed this!* Yeah, I know...it's quite easy to miss things in *A Theory of Justice*. But that I missed this one for thirty years is the kind of "non-accident" that matters to me in this piece that I'm working on now. I find myself in this, and I don't like it. It pins me down within a particular historically-defined group, a group within which one of its main apologist's focus on "ideal theory" is suddenly exposed for what it really is (lucky that I have the paper right

here), as Mills says: “a generalism, an abstractness, which is covertly particularistic and concrete, in that it is really based on a white experience for which [the] realities [of racial slavery] were not central, *not that important*.”<sup>14</sup>

*Fac. #3:* Good god, what now? Don’t tell me that you’re now going to start talking like a sociologist?

*Fac. #5:* I don’t care what it sounds like to you, as long as it helps me get a better grip on what’s at issue for me here. Not just about my connection to Rawls, but a range of similar cases, and how they might constitute a pattern of sorts. And, then, why I might need to worry about it.

QUESTION THREE: IF THIS PARTICIPATION NECESSITATES MY SINCERE ASSUMPTION OF THE PERFORMATIVE ATTITUDE, FROM WHERE DO I START?

If we bring back into our view Phelan’s metaphor of attempting “to walk and live on the rickety bridge between self and other,” my third question can be rephrased in terms of this image: who is actually *on* this bridge? Who is doing the attempting to walk and live on it? More personally, how do I need to understand *myself* as I step foot on it performatively? There is one kind of understanding that I believe goes to the heart of my central practical concern: that is how I understand myself as embedded in particular kinds of social groups. My main point here is that I need to understand that I do not, *can* not, walk on that bridge as an abstract, disembodied individual; there *is* no group-neutral me, however “philosophical” I get, that can initiate this engagement. Indeed, for me to assume that there *is* such a self, and that “I” can speak through it, is to be guilty of philosophical false consciousness.<sup>15</sup> It is this kind of false consciousness that contributes to, for example, my “missing” the fact that *A Theory of Justice* is grounded in a particular kind of experience, at the expense of ignoring other kinds, to my smug ignorance of the fact that the liberal tradition that has always felt “right” to me in its emphasis on notions of equality and respect for *all* humans was never meant to apply to some humans, even in the minds of those who wrote the canons.<sup>16</sup> In what follows I will try to explain and legitimate my sense of this kind of understanding of group-embeddedness as necessary.<sup>17</sup>

Immediately, there are barriers to clarity here that can easily mislead with regard to my intentions. I will mention four very briefly, not to deal with them directly, but to identify them clearly enough to circumvent them while still maintaining consistency of direction. Each represents a different kind of complexity factor that, in the end, must be kept in mind and dealt with, but it is that which they are complexities *of* that I am trying to capture.

The first obstacle is the conceptual slipperiness of the notion of a “group.” It sometimes seems so slippery that it is hard to hang on to it long enough to provide any leverage on a practical problem of the sort that concerns me in this paper. (And, once again, I am socially located by the fact that it has “slipped” through my grasp for most of my education and subsequent philosophizing: for the most part, I have found myself on the privileged side of group relations, and thus have not stood to risk much by not attending to them.) Part of this slipperiness comes from the looseness of ordinary language, combined with the need to say something that this looseness

obscures. In short, there are many different kinds of human collectivities, most of which can, at least in some contexts, be picked out by the single term “group.” Some stipulative tightening of language use will be necessary to get sufficient grip on groups of a particular sort. Then another part of the slipperiness is due to the complexity of conceptually clarifying *how* these collectivities are both different and still similar in being kinds of groupings.<sup>18</sup> Finally, yet another part of the slipperiness comes from the fact that so much moral/political weight is often put on the notion of groups in the critical literature aimed at broad concerns of social justice, such as anti-racism (for example, Dei, 1996; Peller, 1995), while leaving the conceptual boundaries of the notion quite vague.<sup>19</sup>

The second obstacle in my path might be called the “comma, comma, comma, comma...problem.” Here the issue is not so much the slipperiness of the concept of a group, but the contingent fact that, however it is used, we are all members of many different groups at the same time. As I noted in my introduction, how many of those locators do I need, how long is the string of commas, before *I* am standing in front of you? before there is *somebody-who-is-me* walking out on that rickety bridge? And how do I know which ones are important? I suspect that this obstacle often functions to block the path completely through our philosophical aversion to *ad infinitum* dangers: those ellipses at the end of the “comma, comma, comma, comma...problem” really scare us. But to be scared more by the possibility of runaway multiple subjectivities than the reality of some group-based harm is to locate who can fit into that “us.” For some people, it’s a silly worry in most contexts. What I need here is to dodge this obstacle to be able to see that getting *some* of what is before those commas is important.

A third obstacle springs up from *within* the categories set off by the commas, even if the worry about infinite regression is circumvented: for any one of them, and especially for those that I have highlighted in my own self-identification, there are arguably multiple lived configurations. With regard to gender, for example, it is now clear that bi-polar, static interpretations are inadequate.<sup>20</sup> Talk of masculinity and femininity is too gross; there are many masculinities and many femininities, and they are, in some contexts, significantly different and in relationship with each other.<sup>21</sup> Moreover, this variation itself is produced by the ways in which, at any point in time, and especially so historically, the different categories of difference interact with each other.

Finally, yet a fourth obstacle concerns the danger of naming the categories themselves. If, as I believe, the categories are themselves social constructions, *and* constructions that do harm, why use them at all? Why run the risk of contributing to that harm by participating in a discourse that by its very existence reifies those very things that are the problem? I want to circumvent this obstacle by always keeping the danger in mind while also recognizing what seems to me to be an unavoidable contingent fact: even though I might not often recognize how “I” am so marked (because dominant markers tend to disappear into the “normal”), these group categories *do* shape my social experience, and even more so, that of others. Further, I believe that understanding that experience without naming such a strong influence

on it is impossible. The more important point, to which I will now turn, is to understand what we need to name.<sup>22</sup>

Having almost qualified myself out of the picture, I want now to jump back in with both feet and point to what I think needs naming. My question is: What makes the bridge between self and other so rickety when self and other seek to approach each other performatively? When I point to the need to come to grips with my unavoidable group-embeddedness, I have in mind a particular kind of grouping, one picked out and shared by notions such as race, gender, sexual orientation, class, ethnicity, and ableness. There are two reasons for this narrowing of the field of my concern.

First, any attempt to understand my social relations *must* include these markers of difference because they are so systemically determinant of both our identities and our life prospects as persons. For example, with regard to *identities*, I find Linda Alcoff's recent way of accommodating the depth of this determination by race through the language of a (historicized) social ontology quite appropriate, that is, as "a difference at the most basic level concerning knowledge and subjectivity, being and thinking."<sup>23</sup>

This fundamental centrality of race as an element of social reality shapes not only our identities but also our material prospects of life. Alcoff also points to this aspect of racialized reality in contemporary North American society:

Race tends toward opening up or shutting down job prospects, career possibilities, available places to live, potential friends and lovers, reactions from police, credence from jurors, and presumptions by one's students....It persistently correlates with statistically overwhelming significance in wage levels, unemployment levels, poverty levels, and the likelihood of incarceration.<sup>24</sup>

Although I will not attempt to do so here, I think that similar analyses could be offered for each of the other categories of difference on my list.

The second reason for this focus in the context of my practical concern pertains to the peculiar nature of these kinds of groupings and how it suggests that I can't leave them in the closet when I start out on that bridge. The best analytic treatment of this difference that I have found is Iris Young's discussion in *Justice and the Politics of Difference*.

The kind of groups that Young focuses on — and that I think crucial in the context of my practical question — can be identified by three characteristics: how they are experienced by individuals, how they are ontologically related to individuals, and how they must be seen in relational terms. With regard to the first of these characteristics, as Young notes, group affinity

has the characteristic of what Martin Heidegger...calls "thrownness": one *finds oneself* as a member of a group, which one experiences as always having been. For our identities are defined in relation to how others identify us, and they do so in terms of groups which are always already associated with specific attributes, stereotypes, and norms.<sup>25</sup>

We are simply born into some groups, and socialized into others, and they are experienced as pre-us, whether in terms of positive or negative constraint. We can, in some instances, shape these constraints more to our liking, or even with

considerable upheaval choose to change our affinity, but they are still that *with which* or *against which* we must work.<sup>26</sup>

Second, because they are experienced as already there, groups in this sense “constitute individuals”:

A particular sense of history, affinity, and separateness, even the person’s mode of reasoning, evaluating, and expressing feeling, are constituted partly by her or his group affinities.<sup>27</sup>

Group meanings partially constitute people’s identities in terms of the cultural forms, social situation, and history that group members know as theirs, because these meanings have been either forced upon them or forged by them or both.<sup>28</sup>

On this understanding, groups are ontologically prior and individual identities are formed (partly) in terms of them. “The self is a product of social processes, not their origin.”<sup>29</sup> I cannot leave my whiteness behind when I start out on that rickety bridge, nor my masculinity, nor my heterosexuality, nor my class...because they are partly constitutive of who the “me” is that has the intention and who wants to interpret it performatively to/with an other(s).

The third characteristic of groups, understood in this way, pertains to their relationality. What this characteristic does *not* refer to is the relations among members of a particular group. The relationship that is of concern here is not intra- but inter-group. As Young says, “Groups are an expression of social relations; a group exists only in relation to at least one other group.”<sup>30</sup> What this means is that a group, in this sense, can never stand on its own, nor be viewed on its own, but always and necessarily in terms of some other group that constitutes a Difference. One “finds oneself” in some particular group *as and insofar as* one “finds” the other in a particular contrasting group. I am “white” because others are deemed to be “black”; I am “masculine” because others are deemed to be “feminine”; I am “heterosexual” because others are deemed to be “gay/lesbian”; I can write this paper (in part) because I am in an economic position (class) to get away with doing it (I hope!); and so on...

QUESTION FOUR: GIVEN THAT I AM UNAVOIDABLY WITHIN SOCIAL GROUPS THAT ARE RELATIONALLY DEFINED IN TERMS OF EACH OTHER, WHY/HOW DOES THIS MATTER?

I must warn you that in order to address this question, I find it necessary to use the “p-word,” though in doing so, I will also avoid the “f-word.” The former is “power”; the latter, “Foucault.” With regard to why I avoid the latter, I must admit that I have not taken my thinking far enough in this direction to determine if a Foucauldian dimension might help, though it is clear to me that doing so would require another, and perhaps a quite different, paper. I resist this pull at this stage because of my uneasiness with how my primary focus on groups of a particular kind changes the nature of some moral concerns, an uneasiness that I believe Hartsock has convincingly made legitimate in the context of her reading of Foucault.<sup>31</sup> On the other hand, with regard to my use of the “p-word,” I also believe that the issue of how groups are related to each other, at least from the point of view of a practical question, cannot be broached without attention to the notion of power, and, in particular, a specific understanding of that notion.

The particular interpretation that I think works best here is found quite clearly in a recent analysis provided by Thomas Wartenberg. Identifying his focus as a “situated social power” that emphasizes the role of the “social field,” Wartenberg articulates a conception of power that broadens our focus away from exclusive attention on dyadic relationships:

The situated conception of power replaces a model that treats power as an agent’s possession by a model of a social field....It asserts that many relationships of social power are constituted *in the first instance* by the way in which peripheral social agents treat both the dominant and the subordinate agents.<sup>32</sup>

I believe that the “peripheral social agents” that need to be seen as constituting the relevant “social field,” as Wartenberg puts it, at least in some instances, need to be seen in terms of their being constituted by on-going group relations.

Indeed, Wartenberg’s discussion of *how* the “social field” exerts its influence as power in terms of what he calls “alignment” nicely fills out the needed understanding of the relationality of groups.<sup>33</sup> For Wartenberg, the notion of alignment picks out and integrates two aspects of the social field that work together to produce situated power — the *orientation* (as in the “alignment” of nations with the superpowers) and *coordination* (as in the “alignment” of all four tires on a car) of the actions of agents peripheral to particular agents whose interaction is under scrutiny. It is through this kind of alignment that, as Wartenberg puts it, “the situated conception of power explains how individuals come to have a social being that transcends their own individual existence.”<sup>34</sup> In short, both our experience of the social world and our interactions within it are already “aligned” for us insofar as we are unavoidably members of groups (in Young’s sense). And by this, we are differentially enabled/constraining or dis-enabled/constrained in relation to each other.

In terms of the metaphor that I have been working with, what this means to me is that I must accept the fact that it is *impossible* to walk out on that rickety bridge alone, attempting to approach the other as just “me.” On the contrary, however much I am, and experience myself to be, a unique individual, I am in fact already part of a mob.<sup>35</sup> In some cases, I may be leading that mob (though I shrink from the thought). In other cases, I’m in its middle, or it’s pulling me along in its wake...or I may even be resisting in every way I can. But however I am located in terms of the others with whom I am aligned, they are part of my social existence, they/I walk together in facing *some* others. And those others I recognize — and they recognize me — as opposing mob. I am unavoidably part of something that is doing something to me, for me, through me, as me.

The question now is what is being done. In my answer to Question Three, I made the analytic point that there is no group-neutral “me,” at least in the sense of a particular understanding of some kinds of groups, some that permeate both our identities and our life prospects in significant ways. That earlier point regarding the necessity of recognizing my group-embeddedness must now be seen as something a bit more insidious, not just a nice politically pristine, analytic point. The reference to a “mob” is intended to carry this connotative counter-weight. “Mobs” are never

neutral, and seldom “nice.” They form *to do something together* vis-à-vis some set of others. What is done, or at least attempted, is not due to the intentions of members as discrete individuals, but to intentions formed *qua* members of the mob.<sup>36</sup> The issue that I want to bring into clearer focus through this rhetorical allusion is what is being done through my group alignment and how it is a form of basic moral harm.

Wartenberg explicates his notion of alignment primarily in terms of the differential positioning of peripheral others toward the *actions* of individuals related as dominant and subordinate. Without a doubt, this focus is important in terms of understanding the difference in material conditions of members of social groups. However, I think there is another level — perhaps one even more “basic” in the sense of providing putative legitimation to such actions — at which the notion of alignment needs to be utilized to understand the relationality of groups. This level pertains to the *images* that group members have of each other vs. counter-group members, images that permeate all forms of social discourse, including language, art, media, history, educational ideals. At this level, what is at issue is *who can count as a more fully human person*. The images of relative personhood are constructed by many different but interrelated aspects of our shared formal capacity to make sense out of social existence, including, especially, ideals, values, norms of behavior, shareable experiences, modes of discourse and thought, narratives of connection, and salient practical concerns.<sup>37</sup> Being aligned with the content of these in certain ways serves to establish me as normal, good, more fully human — by their corollary placement of others as abnormal, deficient — human...but less so.

For example, being “white” has relatively little to do with my skin color. The “whiteness” of my skin color is simply a marker for my living a set of social practices aligned in such a way as to place me on the higher end of a continuum of being human, through the placement of others, especially those others marked as “black,” on the lower end — on the continuum, to be sure, but *less*. It is exactly this relationship that Charles Mills articulates so well in his discussion of how he chose the notion of a “sub-person” to be the organizing idea of his introductory course on “African-American Philosophy”:

A sub-person is not an inanimate object, like a stone, which has...zero moral status. Nor is it simply a non-human animal, which...[might be] regarded...as outside the moral community altogether....Rather, the peculiar status of a sub-person is that it is an entity which, because of phenotype, seems (from, of course, the perspective of the categorizer) human in some respects but not in others. It is a human who, though adult, is not fully a person....So [such racialized sub-persons] are seen as having less mental capacity, with rights on a sliding scale from zero to a ceiling well below your white co-humans, a creature deemed to have no real history, who has made no global contribution to civilization, and who in general can be encroached upon with impunity.<sup>38</sup>

In short, my “whiteness-as-more-fully-human” produces, and is produced by, my alignment around images of others as “black-as-less-fully-human,” and it is this alignment that is the active “agent.”<sup>39</sup> David Theo Goldberg emphasizes this active sense of race and how it functions as a moral claim in the following way:

Its meaning, as its forces, are always illocutionary. In using ‘race’ and the terms bearing racial significance, social subjects racialize the people and population groups whom they characterize and to whom they refer.<sup>40</sup>

Although I do not have space here to demonstrate how, I believe that similarly active, illocutionary, analyses of how other major group differentiations “work” can be provided, the best example being, perhaps, Butler’s work on the performative nature of gender.<sup>41</sup> The point that I want to emphasize here is that some of my group identifications place me in the position of actively claiming — through my very “social being that transcends my own individual existence” — that others are relatively less worthy as human beings. By existing as white, as masculine, as heterosexual...I live this moral claim. I perform it daily and it performs me. The mobs that form my social being only set foot on the rickety bridge to push others off.

Moreover, I believe that my lived situation is even worse than this, because it is largely hidden. The kind of alignments that I am talking about do not present their true faces to the world *as moral claims*. The mobs that I am part of, that represent me, that are me, dress themselves up in disguises that are designed to hide their intentions. And the disguises are conveniently provided, supposedly, by Mother Nature herself, someone who surely has got it all right. Again, focusing on how this works with regard to racialized groups, Goldberg succinctly captures this naturalization move that is part of what is being enacted: “The minimal significance race bears itself does not concern biological but naturalized group relations. Race serves to naturalize the groupings it identifies in its own name.”<sup>42</sup> The projected value hierarchy of relative humanness is itself thrown back on the world as something not *established* by the alignment, but something already in the world which the alignment just “naturally” reflects. In short, the mobs that form through my alignment — that constitute the “social being that transcends my own individual existence” and whose very *raison d’être* is to push others off that rickety bridge — accomplish their work by moral fraud.

But, make no mistake about it, this is not a moral fraud of little consequence, only an “interesting” nuisance that we might be advised to just overlook (and thus really a matter for only those *so-called* politically correct police). That rickety bridge on which the mobs do some of their dirty work is *not* just any old bridge, just a quaint historical curiosity found in some moral Madison County. Rather, it is something akin to a golden moral suspension bridge between self and other that stays up only through carefully balanced, reciprocal, and on-going effort. And when it spans generations, when it is made of educational concerns, it goes to the heart of our human existence. Thus to be identified through my surreptitious complicity in pushing others off the bridge has serious implications for me.

#### CONCLUSION

Thus an answer to my organizing question, or at least the shape of an answer, now comes more clearly into view. Remember, that question was: “What kind of mistake might I be making if I try to ‘do’ philosophy of education as if my social location does not matter?” My answer is — a moral mistake, and one with varied dimensions and of egregious proportions. To fail to take account of how I am located *via-à-vis* some others is to inflict moral harm and to avoid responsibility for doing so. To fail to locate myself in my doing philosophy of education is to professionalize this avoidance.

What matters here primarily is that I recognize that any adequate interpretation of the notion of “social location” must accommodate the existence of social groups of the sort I have pointed to. I may have the good intention of approaching the other around the inherently moral question of education as an individual aiming at reciprocal recognition, but this is largely impossible. I already have a “social being” that is identified in terms of alignment with some, against others. And this group alignment hinges on a falsely naturalized hierarchical ordering of relative status as being fully human. Failing to recognize how this alignment serves me can be morally criticized from two different directions.

The first direction of critique points out the *consequences* of this failure. In short, it starts from a recognition that the group relations within which I am unavoidably embedded are themselves often forms of oppression. They are intrinsically harmful to the life prospects of some, and they privilege others. If I fail to identify this aspect of social reality by naming the source of this harm, and my part in it, by omission I am contributing to maintenance of the status quo, and thereby not taking due responsibility for being part of the oppression. My doing philosophy of education in this way has the consequences of both contributing to and legitimating the harm.

The second direction of moral critique stems more directly from the nature of education as I have sought to develop it in this paper. This direction is, to my way of thinking, more fundamental than the first, in that it pertains to the *form* of the failure in the context of what philosophy of education addresses. Failing to locate myself in the sense of group-embeddedness warps the nature of my performative moral engagement with others that is necessary for educational discourse. Not seeing myself as part of groups entails that “I” “work” to vitiate the very possibility of reciprocity in the performative interaction by making the other(s) into sub-person(s). It does this by stripping the other of the capacity to engage in that fundamental human endeavor of co-determining what it means to be fully human through educational discourse. (My being part of a mob pushes others off that bridge.) And it also makes it impossible for me to hear and respond to the others’ claims when they emerge from their own, subordinate position. (I never really even set foot on the bridge.)

Insofar as philosophy of education deals with *education* in the sense that I have characterized it, it must deal with its inherently moral quality. As Habermas has been at pains to point out, “The moral philosopher must take up a vantage point from which he [sic.] can perceive moral phenomena *as* moral phenomena.”<sup>43</sup> I have now reached the point where I hope it is clear that philosophers of education are necessarily caught by this injunction. This means that *qua* philosopher of education I must understand my work to be part of that engagement with what it means to be fully human. I do not stand outside this, *cannot* stand outside this, via my philosophizing. That rickety bridge between self and other presents itself to my attention as a philosopher of education. I cannot walk on it without my mob(s). If I do not want my profession to be itself a moral fraud inflicting the serious harm of pushing others off, I must locate myself(ves) and assume the responsibility of attending to how this should inform my doing philosophy of education.

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1. Dwight Boyd, "Professionalization and the Moral Jeopardy of Teaching," in *Philosophy of Education 1989*, ed. Ralph Page (Normal, Ill.: Philosophy of Education Society, 1990), 109-10.

2. Here I think I am in agreement with the core of Biesta's recent attempt to differentiate from other forms what he calls an "empirical variety of communicative pedagogy," which he captures as follows: "The central claim of the empirical variety is that education *is* communication. This should be understood in the sense that communication is a constitutive precondition of all human interaction, including education." See Gert Biesta, "Education/Communication: The Two Faces of Communicative Pedagogy," in *Philosophy of Education 1995*, ed. Alven Neiman (Urbana, Ill.: Philosophy of Education Society, 1996), 192. See also his related and intriguing attempt to develop an account of "education as practical intersubjectivity" in "Education as Practical Intersubjectivity: Towards a Critical-Pragmatic Understanding of Education," *Educational Theory* 44, no. 3 (1994): 299-317.

3. I think that this interpretation can be found in a number of diverse sources—sources often thought to be at odds with each other in some ways. And they probably are. But I want to suggest that they are converging in this direction. Thus I do not care if you tie me to Habermas, to Buber, to Gadamer, to Hoagland, to Dewey, to Jagger, or to Phelan. For my purposes in this paper, what matters is not so much that I give a correct account of, or gloss on, what one or more of these rich thinkers have had to say that pertains to the notion of performative, but more that I manage to capture and articulate in a useful way the general idea with which I think all of them are working.

4. Jim Garrison, "A Deweyan Theory of Democratic Listening," *Educational Theory* 46, no. 4 (1996): 434.

5. *Ibid.*

6. Jürgen Habermas, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, trans. Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990), 27.

7. *Ibid.*, 59.

8. *Ibid.*, 58.

9. Habermas clarifies this understanding of the performative attitude through a discussion of P.F. Strawson's well-known essay "Freedom and Resentment," quoting the relevant passage as follows: "It [the objective attitude, in contrast to the performative] cannot include the range of reactive feelings and attitudes which belong to involvement or participation with others in inter-personal human relationships; it cannot include resentment, gratitude, forgiveness, anger, or the sort of love which two adults can sometimes be said to feel reciprocally for each other. If your attitude towards someone is wholly objective, then though you might fight him, you cannot quarrel with him, and though you may talk to him, even negotiate with him, you cannot reason with him. You can at most *pretend* to quarrel, or to reason, with him," Habermas, *Moral Consciousness*, 46.

10. *Ibid.*, 46-47.

11. Carol C. Gould, "Diversity and Democracy: Representing Differences," in *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 172-73.

12. Peggy Phelan, *Unmarked: the Politics of Performance* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 174. I should acknowledge that I am extending Phelan's metaphor for my own purposes, and I do not know, since it appears only in her "Afterword," whether this extension is in keeping with her intentions. That Orner, Miller, and Ellsworth have recently utilized the same quotation from Phelan in their interpretation of performance as *contrasting* to dialogue might suggest that my appropriation of it in the context of Habermasian sympathies is misleading. See Mimi Orner, Janet L. Miller, and Elizabeth Ellsworth, "Excessive Moments and Educational Discourses that Try to Contain Them," *Educational Theory* 46, no. 1 (1996). However, I believe that criticism would be legitimate only if agreement is thought to be the only aim allowed in the assumption of the performative attitude.

13. Charles W. Mills, "Non-Cartesian *Sums*: Philosophy and the African Experience," *Teaching Philosophy* 17, no. 3 (1994): 226.
14. *Ibid.*, 226, my emphases.
15. As Anthony Appiah has noted with regard to how race and gender are so central to our identity, "In our society, being-of-a-certain-gender and being-of-a-certain-race are for many people facts that are centrally implicated in the construction of life plans. To ignore one's race and one's gender in thinking about the ethical project of composing a life for oneself requires, in many minds, a kind of ignoring of social reality which amounts to attempting to fool oneself." See Anthony Appiah, "'But Would That Still Be Me?' Notes on Gender, 'Race,' Ethnicity, as Sources of 'Identity.'" *Journal of Philosophy* LXXXVII, no. 10 (1990): 499.
16. Mills, "Non-Cartesian *Sums*," 226.
17. Part of what I am doing here — as race is one of my central categories of concern in this paper — might be seen as at least a first step in the direction of responding positively to Kal Alston's recent invitation to members of this Society: "The author wishes to incite the audience to an honest appraisal of self-interest, to come out from the safety of philosophy to experience themselves and their profession as racially situated...The opportunity arises to question the practices of philosophy itself, the comfort of its language, privileges, and strategies and how being a philosopher can itself evade the question of race by falling back on history and custom. Philosophers can begin by questioning their own presumed racelessness." See Kal Alston, "Race Consciousness and the Philosophy of Education," in *Philosophy of Education* 1995, ed. Alven Neiman (Urbana, Ill.: Philosophy of Education Society, 1996), 149-50.
18. Larry May's discussion in *The Morality of Groups: Collective Responsibility, Group-Based Harm, and Corporate Rights* (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame Press, 1987) evidences this complexity in attempting to cover collectivities as diverse as mobs, corporations, and ethnic/racial identities.
19. For example, see George Dei, *Anti-racism Education: Theory and Practice* (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 1996); also Gary Peller, "Race Consciousness," in *After Identity: A Reader in Law and Culture*, ed. Dan Danielsen and Karen Engle (New York: Routledge, 1995), 67-82.
20. For different ways of articulating this point see R.W. Connell, *Gender and Power* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987) and Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham, "African-American Women's History and the Metalanguage of Race," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 17, no. 2 (1992).
21. For instance, that my way of talking about "One Man's Reflection On a Masculine Role in Feminist Ethics," in *Philosophy of Education* 1990, ed. Ralph Page (Normal, Ill.: Philosophy of Education Society, 1991) depended on my heterosexual location within gender was gently but forcibly revealed to me by Victor Worsfold in our discussion of my paper by that title in a previous meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society, though our discussion was, on my recollection, quite "white."
22. The best treatment of this problem that I know of is Patricia Williams's discussion of the sausage-machine case as a metaphor for the need for simultaneous appreciation of different levels of acceptance and rejection of the named categories of difference. See Patricia Williams, *The Alchemy of Race and Rights: Diary of a Law Professor* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), chap. 6.
23. Linda Alcoff, "Philosophy and Racial Identity" *Radical Philosophy* 75 (Jan/Feb): 7. Lewis Gordon also talks of race in "ontological" terms in Lewis Gordon, *Bad Faith and Antiracist Racism* (Atlantic Heights, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1995). For a remarkably compelling first-person account of how this centrality of racial identification shaped the early life of one African-American man through his childhood experiences of *changing* his racialized identity, see Gregory Howard Williams, *Life on the Color Line: The True Story of a White Boy Who Discovered He Was Black* (New York: Penguin, 1995).
24. *Ibid.*, 6. Talk of the "green and lavender people" (as in the above "interlude") in the context of race functions to undercut this importance so that this reality does not have to be faced squarely. And talk of poverty, violence, or human rights as "equally important" serves to obscure *who* is often relatively more impoverished, the object of violence, or a victim of human rights violations.
25. Iris Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 46.
26. How one identifies in terms of categories of sexual orientation locates an important social grouping in this sense. In "Identity: Skin/Blood/Heart," in *Yours in Struggle: Three Feminist Perspectives on Anti-Semitism and Racism*, ed. Elly Bulkin and Minnie Bruce Pratt (Ithaca, N.Y.: Firebrand Books, 1988), Minnie Bruce Pratt provides a particularly poignant personal account of the depth of upheaval required by efforts to move across the boundaries of this particular group affinity.

27. Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, 45.
28. *Ibid.*, 44.
29. *Ibid.*, 45.
30. *Ibid.*, 43.
31. Nancy Hartsock, "Foucault on Power: A Theory for Women?" in *Feminism/Postmodernism*, ed. Linda J. Nicholson (New York: Routledge, 1990), 157-75.
32. Thomas E. Wartenberg, "Situated Social Power," in *Rethinking Power*, ed. Thomas E. Wartenberg (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1992), 87.
33. It should also be noted that, although he intends his analysis to refer to collectivities broader than the specific notion of social group that I have been working with, two of his extended examples of how this can be used refer exactly to groups that qualify in Young's sense and that I repeatedly refer to, namely, the domination of men over women and the domination of capitalists over workers.
34. Wartenberg, "Situated Social Power," 96.
35. This is not to suggest, however, that I am likely to be identified as such by other members of groups with relatively dominant status, especially those in positions of political authority. Quite the contrary, it is more usually those that are seen from this position to be "other" whose collectivity is interpreted to be "mob-like."
36. Building on Sartre's discussion of the storming of the Bastille in *The Critique of Dialectical Reason*, Larry May (*The Morality of Groups*) discusses this difference in terms of what he calls "pre-reflective intentions": "Pre-reflective intentions are intentions which are not yet fixed as "my intentions" but which motivate me toward purposive action, for instance, within an unorganized group such as a mob. These pre-reflective intentions seem to arise out of the collective relations of a group such as a mob, specifically out of solidarity....The intentions and goals of some or most of the mob members are different from their intentions and goals as individuals (pp. 61, 64)."
37. For elaboration of this point see Barbara Applebaum and Dwight Boyd, "The Meaning of Dominance, the Dominance of Meaning, and the Morality of the Matter," in *Values Education/Values in Education/Cultural Diversity*, ed. Mal Leicester, Celia Modgil, and Sohan Modgil (London: Cassell, in press).
38. Mills, "Non-Cartesian Sums," 228-29.
39. In "Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law," *Harvard Law Review* 101, no. 7 (1988), Kimberlé Crenshaw has articulated what I believe is the same point in the following: "Racism does not support the dominant order simply because all whites want to maintain their privilege at the expense of Blacks, or because Blacks sometimes serve as convenient political scapegoats. Instead, the very existence of a clearly subordinated "other" group is contrasted with the norm in a way that reinforces identification with the dominant group. Racism helps create an illusion of unity through the oppositional force of a symbolic 'other.' The establishment of an 'other' creates a bond, a burgeoning common identity of all non-stigmatized parties—whose identity and interests are defined in opposition to the other."
40. David Theo Goldberg, *Racist Culture* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 81.
41. Judith Butler, *Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex"* (New York: Routledge, 1993).
42. Goldberg, *Racist Culture*, 81.
43. Habermas, *Moral Consciousness*, 47.