Rationality Redeemed?

Harvey Siegel, *Rationality Redeemed?* (New York: Routledge, 1997).

Rationality as a Philosophical Problem

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Several years ago, I read a paper to the Philosophy of Education Society that concerned itself with rationality in teaching. After the paper, Harvey Siegel took me to task for not providing him or anyone with any sense of what I would count as "rationality." What I was willing to take as an undefined term (or perhaps as an unspecified ideal), Siegel wanted to have nailed down. Where I would have accepted "having reasons for doing what one does" as a working definition (and I hope I did), I'm sure that Siegel would have pushed for more precision and accuracy, perhaps a theory of rationality. Where I'll go for a sweeping generalization, he wants a precise argument. Where I'll accept a Wittgensteinian language game, he wants a syllogism.

Rationality Redeemed? discusses the sort of analysis that I suspect Siegel would have liked me to have given. The book is pure Siegel; literate, well-argued, aggressive philosophy in the service of important educational ideals and clear thinking. It is a collection of previously published papers that deserve the attention that they are likely to get when presented this way, for Harvey Siegel's work exemplifies an important strand of twentieth-century philosophy that is under attack from many sides. It's a tradition that in most ways I share, the "modernist" position that Siegel unabashedly and effectively defends against "postmodernists" and others who attack the ideal or even the possibility of generalizability, universality, and rationality in thought and action.

There are some things we shouldn't look for in Siegel's work. He doesn't make specific suggestions about how to run schools, about what teaching methods are best; except very indirectly in his discussion of the "rationality theory of teaching" first brought out by Israel Scheffler in the early sixties. Indeed, Siegel eschews a view of philosophy that would have it on the educational firing line, at least if that means giving direct advice to school people about how to do things. Here's his view of philosophy of education:

> a philosopher of education is one who worries about fundamental philosophical questions concerning education — what are the aims of education?; how can such aims be justified?; what moral and intellectual considerations rightly guide and constrain educational activities?; what duties and obligations must educators and educational institutions meet?; how should we understand key educational notions, like "teaching," "learning," "knowledge," and so on?; how is the curriculum best understood and designed?; and a host of other such questions and worries about these questions in a way which is methodologically sophisticated and which is informed by past efforts to come to grips with them. This locates philosophy of education in a tradition, to be sure; and some may wish to reject that tradition (p. 165).

One might accept the "tradition" that Siegel appeals to here while at the same time holding that philosophers of education have a professional duty to be more involved in recommending specific policies and practices to school people. Siegel wouldn't

put up with Mr. Gragrind (he's not a rational teacher), but if I read him right, he wouldn't make suggestions to the school board about how to organize things so that Mr. Gragrind can't harm our children. I admire Siegel's modesty; he doesn't claim that philosophy can solve practical problems. We agree that philosophers aren't scientists, discovering and defending new information (or knowledge) about the world; nor are they school principals, expert in administering cumbersome educational bureaucracies. Rather, they show us what our lives amount to, and puzzle us about anomalies in our lives.

It's those anomalies that bother me in Siegel's analyses of educational ideals. Remember that he and I come at educational philosophy from within a similar "situatedness." As he describes himself,

> I am a white, male, analytically trained philosopher, who writes philosophy and philosophy of education in the no longer dominant (let alone hegemonic) analytic style. My main philosophical preoccupations concern some of the issues long regarded as central to epistemology: issues concerning justification, truth, rationality, and relativism (p. 156).

The description would fit me as well, although I have a few years on him. But we come at philosophical problems from different directions within that "style." I am much more of an "ordinary-language" philosopher than he. In Wittgensteinian fashion, I find myself puzzling over some things that Siegel says as he develops his conception of rationality and critical thinking. Let me briefly spell out one oddity.

The critical thinker, it is said (p. 2, and elsewhere) is one who is "appropriately moved by reasons." Later, Siegel puts this in terms of helping students:

> Students ought to be helped to develop appropriate skills of reason assessment, so that they can competently evaluate putative reasons and distinguish good reasons from weak or spurious ones; they should also be encouraged to develop attitudes of reasonableness and the disposition to be moved by reasons so evaluated; to be disposed to seek reasons on which to base beliefs and actions; and to believe and act on the basis of reasons they have themselves submitted to rational scrutiny (p. 49).

What I miss in Siegel's discussion here and throughout the book is any sense that there is a philosophical problem embedded in this discussion. A basic assumption is that human beings are responsible for their beliefs as well as for their actions; they can be praised or blamed for believing certain things, based, in Siegel's case, upon the evidence or reasons that support the beliefs. But "responsibility" hides all sorts of philosophical puzzles here. Siegel will (and does) analyze the notion by attending to the meaning of "probative force," or to logical validity, and other such notions. Turn in the other direction, though: to hold Abbie responsible for her beliefs seems to involve a belief that she could choose to believe otherwise; and this, as I've argued elsewhere, is at best a strange way of talking.[1] Siegel wouldn't come to the same conclusions as I have about choosing beliefs, but it worries me that he doesn't feel the problem there. To his credit, he does not say that students like Abbie have to decide on their beliefs only that their beliefs should be "based on" reasons. But the extent to which that sort of responsibility commits us to talk about choosing our beliefs is worthy of more philosophical discussion. I'd like to see Siegel turn his attention to such matters, because this seems so much closer to our lives.

This example may point to a deeper difference. What is philosophy all about? One doesn't have to reject the "enlightenment metanarrative" to see that there are

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very different ways of viewing philosophy. For example, I would argue that Wittgenstein, despite his radical differences from Siegel, is within the same "modernist" tradition that Siegel and I share. Yet the view of philosophy differs drastically. Here's Siegel:

> On my (admittedly traditional) view, philosophy is fundamentally concerned with reasons, arguments, and, with Socrates, is committed to following the argument wherever it leads — that is, to basing belief, action and judgment on epistemically forceful reasons. The aim of the exercise is the discovery of philosophical truths (p. 187, emphasis added).

Like Wittgenstein I wonder about that "aim." Wittgenstein, as is well known, denied that there were "philosophical truths" and spent his life trying to show why. I'm not so sure that I'd go as far as he did, since I think there are persistent philosophical problems that deserve constant worrying, but I have suspicions about the idea of philosophical truth. When could we be said to have arrived at a philosophical truth? Has Siegel arrived at any? Which would he claim to be philosophical truths? Perhaps the three points about epistemology ably defended in chapter 1 and summarized on p. 34: (1) that truth and justification are separable; (2) that relativism is untenable; (3) that the "upshot of rational justification is a prima facie case for truth." These are central to his justification for critical thinking as an aim of education, and to his definition for critical thinking. I would contend that they are philosophical because they are supported by the peculiar arguments that are used in their defense. But are they "truths?" I suspect they function more like rules or decisions than as truths.

To say this is only to say that Siegel and I share very different views of philosophy, and about why it's important to our lives. I wouldn't have wanted him to write a different book, but I'd love to see him take on this sort of question.

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1. C.J.B. Macmillan, "Choosing to Believe in Modern Schools," in *Philosophy of Education 1993*, ed. Michael B. Katz (Urbana, Ill.: Philosophy of Education Society, 1994).

Rationality and the Reach of Philosophical Argument

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What contribution can philosophical reasoning make to determining the goodness of reasons for belief or action? In *Rationality Redeemed*?, Harvey Siegel considers this question, but appears to offer conflicting accounts—or so I will argue.

Siegel's first answer appears in a chapter on the generalizability of critical thinking. The generalizability issue involves a dispute between the "generalists," who think that there are general criteria and skills of critical thinking, and the "specifists," who hold that skills and criteria are specific to particular content areas or fields. For the most part, Siegel defends the generalists. On his analysis of critical thinking, a critical thinker has to be able to evaluate reasons, i.e., to tell when putative reasons for beliefs or actions are good ones. Can philosophical work in epistemology

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provide criteria for the evaluation of reasons? If so, then, since the criteria provided by epistemology would be (on Siegel's view, at any rate) general ones, epistemology would aid the generalist cause.

Sometimes it sounds as if Siegel says that epistemology does provide such criteria: "Epistemology involves the study of the determination of the goodness of reasons." Furthermore, general criteria of reasons assessment are "sanctioned by a common epistemology: a theoretical understanding of the nature of reasons, according to which putative criteria are recognizable as appropriate criteria of reason assessment" (pp. 32-33). Claims such as these suggest a deductive structure in which a specific epistemology underwrites general criteria of reasons assessment that themselves are employed in evaluating reasons in particular cases. The specific epistemic commitments Siegel lays claim to for critical thinking (and, by extension, rationality) include a commitment to a radically non-epistemic conception of truth, the denial of relativism, and a commitment to fallibilism. Also, the "unitary epistemology" underlying critical thinking tells us that, while there are different criteria of reason assessment, in all cases "reasons are good reasons if (and only if) they afford warrant to the claims or propositions for which they are reasons" (p. 32). While these are quite substantial philosophical commitments, they do not appear to provide standards for assessing whether "putative criteria" of reason assessment are "appropriate." For example, suppose we want to know whether a person's jaundice is a good reason for believing that the person has liver disease. We could employ one of the general criteria of reasons assessment Siegel proposes such as "does the proposed explanation provide the best explanation of the phenomenon in question?" (p. 32). But it is unclear how philosophical work in epistemology "sanctions" this criterion or helps us to recognize its "appropriateness," nor is epistemology any help in telling us how to apply the criterion to the case at hand. (Applying the criterion will require substantive medical knowledge, a fact that might be thought to aid the specifist's case but that Siegel regards as irrelevant to the controversy, apparently because he regards the point as readily agreed to by generalists and so not at issue in the debate.) Nevertheless, in this discussion of the generalizability of critical thinking, Siegel appears to claim a strong role for philosophical argument in establishing the goodness of reasons.

However, in a latter chapter responding to Mark Weinstein's review of his earlier books, Siegel denies that "epistemology's task is…to decide what in fact is a good reason in…any particular disciplinary context." He grants that determining the goodness of reasons in a particular case will "depend at least in part on the theoretical and methodological situation within the relevant discipline" (p. 117). And he says that analyses of critical thinking "may say nothing about … the strength of particular candidate reasons in the myriad of disciplinary contexts in which reasons play a role" (p. 118). This despite his earlier claim against the specifists that fields cannot be regarded as the "sole arbiter" of "the goodness of reasons within their domains," that a field could be mistaken in these claims and that epistemology has a role to play in determining the legitimacy of the principles a field employs (p. 33). Yet in his response to Weinstein, Siegel agrees withWeinstein that the reach of philosophical argument in determining the goodness of reasons "is limited" (p. 118).

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I am more inclined to agree with the stance Siegel takes in his response to Weinstein than with what I take him to be saying in his dispute with the specifists. Further I think Siegel's clarifying his position here may help him address the postmodern critics he responds to later in this book. The idea that epistemology "sanctions" criteria of reasons assessment in every context of evaluation perhaps gives credence to the position of those who see analytic philosophy as trying to establish itself as a kind of thought police, as "terroristic" or a "hegemonic force."

I do, however, agree with Siegel that the epistemology and metaphysics of rationality are important, even if they do not do real work in the evaluation of reasons. Relativists, I think, argue that if truth, rationality, objectivity, have content only when embedded in specific traditions, why not lop off these "regulative ideals" as a non-functioning part of the machinery? And postmodernists argue that such ideas are worse than non-functioning; they're dangerous. They believe that Siegel is committed to "Truth capital T," as it has become fashionable to call it, and by extension one assumes, to "Reason capital R." They see him as believing that there's some way of getting around the participation of mind in the construction of the world through access to a set of criteria for justifying claims that God uses. Further, this picture is not just mistaken philosophy, says the critic: it has human consequences. Some have the power to define the "right" criteria of truth, to say what counts as being reasonable or objective, and force others to comply or withdraw from the field of action.

So what is the role of philosophical argument in debates about rationality? In my view, it has the modest role of reminding us of the goal of rational thought and action. Rational belief aims at truth, rational action at success, rational desire at the good, and so on, however these end states are to be defined. Embedded in the concept of rational judgment, then, is the assumption that some ways of forming beliefs or deciding how to act or what ends to seek are more likely to meet with success than are others. But the analysis of rationality does not itself reveal any criteria of rational judgment; that is, it doesn't tell one how to determine which beliefs are true or what actions are right. It merely says, "seek truth by the best available means," For actual guidance one needs to turn to a particular substantive tradition of rational thought. Nevertheless Siegel is right that one cannot just say no to rationality. To abandon rationality would require either rejection of the goals of rationality (such as truth, strategic success of action, a good life) or extreme skepticism about the claims of any forms of judgment (any traditions of reason) to be better ways of reaching these goals. Of course, one may coherently reject a particular tradition of how to achieve rationality in belief, desire, or action and attempt to form a new conception of what rationality requires. It is in this way that rationality is indeed "redeemed."

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Rationality Overrated?

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In his 1988 book, *Educating Reason*, Harvey Siegel explains and defends a conception of reason/rationality/critical thinking as a "fundamental educational ideal."[1] A number of critical papers were published after the book — which I see as indicating not that Siegel's arguments were vulnerable to criticism, but rather that people read the book and took it seriously. Indeed, in a number of papers he has published since then, Siegel has shown — I believe quite forcefully — that the criticisms were misguided. These papers are collected in Siegel's recent book, *Rationality Redeemed?* The answer to the question of Siegel's title is yes. Rationality has been redeemed, in the sense that the arguments allegedly showing that:

•the nature of rationality is contextual;
•all metanarratives must be rejected;
•universal, or general, epistemological theories are necessarily false; and
•universal, or general, epistemological theories are necessarily exclusionary and oppressive have been shown to be specious.

But I fear that more needs to be said. As Siegel acknowledges, these arguments "will be of little interest to those not already disposed to worry about rational justification" (pp. 185-86). Which is to say, they won't persuade the precise people to whom they are addressed. Nick Burbules, the editor of *Educational Theory*, had advised Siegel to resist the temptation to argue the rationality of his view and instead to try to teach his critics why they should care about epistemology and consistency and the like; but Siegel acknowledges that he cannot follow this advice. He limits himself to offering arguments. His aim is not persuasion, but truth. We'll return to this point.

For the most part, Siegel makes the more prudent claim that rationality is "a" fundamental ideal. But he also refers to it as "the central aim, and the overriding ideal, of education" (p. 2). Siegel's real position is more complicated than either of these, and he admits that he hasn't paid a great deal of attention to specifying the place of rationality in a hierarchy of values. I want to direct some attention to this issue. Consider this example. A certain Messrs. Scrooge and Marley are business partners. Marley dies. Scrooge thinks: "I have been friends and partners with Marley. I should take time off work to grieve, to help Marley's family, and so forth. But now I have no business partner. What will happen to my business? What shall I do? I need to talk to my accountant."

"Hold on there, Scrooge," he hears himself thinking. "Why are you thinking of business at this time. You should be thinking of loyalty and social obligations.'' I have little doubt that, when this dialogue is played out, the voice of rationality would come down on the side of prioritizing sensibility and human feeling; the Ebenezer Scrooge in Dickens's story, even if he were a critical thinker (Dickens does not provide enough internal dialogue for a reader to judge), was surely not a very good one. But two sources of discomfort have already appeared.

First, philosophers know that any question can lead to any other question. Presuming the number of possible questions is transfinite, a person who attempts to

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devote a finite amount of time to contemplating each question will die before completing the job. Another side to this problem is that simple, everyday questions often lead to enormous, complex questions to which we have no satisfying answer.

To try to answer all of these questions would have to come at the expense of getting anything done. I suppose it would be irrational. Socrates made a virtue of following the argument where it leads, but there's a thin line between philosophy and insanity. It is true that during the course of a life we have an opportunity to benefit from past decisions we have made. A mature person doesn't spend much time going through a mental list of all the ramifications of sending white carnations as opposed to yellow chrysanthemums. Nevertheless, if you think that each of your actions must be justified by a valid argument starting from justified premises, there's no end to the questioning. Rationality demands limits on its own use. Perhaps you think that the chain of questioning will end if it reaches a meta-question such as, "How much time should I spend answering this question?" Decision theorists have made progress towards understanding the costs of gathering information. The arguments and equations are beyond the ken of most people. People who do not understand these arguments cannot have a rational basis for deciding when to end the chain of questions. People who do understand these arguments do not have the time to apply them prior to making everyday decisions such as whether to go to a funeral, what's the best route to take, how long to stay, when to send flowers of what varieties and colors, how much to pay for them, and so forth.

Even if we could break or avoid these meandering endless chains of questions, it is clear that there are many questions to which we cannot and many to which we simply do not yet have adequate answers. Of particular importance is a theory of value, including a theory of the good. Reasonably, Siegel would not demand an axiomatized system of practical reason. He explains — to a limited extent — how we can have good reason to believe or to act in the absence of certainty. If one has made a sufficiently sincere and intelligent effort to discover all relevant reasons and to evaluate them impartially, the mere fact that there may yet be unknown good reasons for believing or acting differently does not justify withholding all belief or action.

However, I don't see how this solves the problem of weighing values; for the main problem isn't a lack of information (although that can be a problem), but that the information is too complicated. For instance, it appears that people who have an optimistic outlook are healthier, happier, and more successful than those who have a pessimistic outlook It also appears that people who have a pessimistic outlook have more accurate perceptions of their circumstances (just because you're a pessimist doesn't mean things aren't bad).[2] The realist can sometimes avoid disasters that an optimist wouldn't, but many bad events are unavoidable or unpredictable, and the optimist can recover from them more readily. So is a realistic outlook more desirable than an optimistic outlook? I know what the reasons are for both views; I just don't know which reasons are best. Of course, if we know that optimism is best, then we are faced with a rational justification for avoiding reality, for adopting a maxim that would have us intentionally and systematically believe what is not true.

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The second cause for discomfort is this: Whether or not we can always be rational, sometimes doing so is clearly inappropriate. I do not want my children to learn to make an explicitly reasoned decision to attend the funeral and to comfort the relations of a deceased friend.

Let me offer another perspective on the notion that rationality isn't a sufficient educational ideal. (I remind the reader that Siegel never claims that it is.) I said that the essays in this book are responses to critics. However, there is one other paper included in the book, a sort of odd man out, not a response but a stand-alone paper arguing an independent thesis (or two). Chapter 3, "Teaching, Reasoning, and Dostoyevsky's *The Brothers Karamazov*," is largely an analysis of the role of reason and reasons in *The Brothers Karamazov*. It is also an analysis of how literature, narrative fiction in particular, teaches. According to Siegel, it does so by means of "felt reasons." A reader learns to feel the import of particular reasons by observing characters (with whom she identifies, sympathizes) react to those reasons. From this activity, a reader also learns the abstract ideas that reasons can have a visceral quality and that reasons deserve serious consideration.

For my present purposes, this paper is the most interesting of the bunch. Its uniqueness is of two sorts. First, as I said, it is the only paper in the collection that is not a response. Second, and most interesting, it is the only paper in the collection that offers a deeply and thoroughly unsatisfying explanation of its central notion.

My point is not to criticize the paper. It offers solid explanations of how literature and authors teach. I agree with Siegel that the notion of "felt reasons" is of the utmost significance in understanding rationality, teaching, or, indeed, cognition in any form. But that it's an important phenomenon does not entail that anything else intelligible can be said about it. My point is that there just is not anything worth saying in explanation of the notion of "felt reasons": Siegel's lack of incisive description and explanation on this point is, because of the nature of the subject, to be expected.

Now, I cannot offer an argument that reason, here in the form of analytic philosophy, is inherently or necessarily inadequate to capture the essentials of human mental life in either concept or words. I do have in support of my view Siegel's failure to do this. I have also the failure of philosophers of phenomenological methods and concerns to link up their "research" with any of analytic philosophy, and the failure of analytic philosophers to find any links, either.

I have also an anecdote. But before I share it, let me step back and call to your attention that by relating this anecdote, I am trying to help your memory and imagination create for you a (subjective) experience similar to the (subjective) experience I had. I was once given a class assignment to write a paper on a poet. Any poet. I hadn't been interested in the poets we had read in class, so I started reading through the poetry section at the library. I found that I liked reading Auden, and decided that I would write my paper on Auden. I read some more. I read thoughtfully. I was moved emotionally. I was led to contemplate my past, my dreams, my future, and my hopes for humanity. (If it weren't for copyright restrictions I'd read you a short poem now.)

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Then it was time to write the paper. I had nothing to say.

I could write about my reveries, which came about after my reading; but such writing would not have been about Auden's poetry in any sense at all. I could write about the feelings I had, which had been stimulated by my reading. But what could I say about them? I could use words like "alienated," "longing," "touched": concepts that could categorize and in some sense describe the feelings. But how empty an exercise that would have been. I believed then — and nothing I have read or thought since has changed my mind — that the value of the poetry was in the subjective experience of it. The artistry of the poet is to create something that stimulates or brings about an experience. I couldn't describe anything significant about my reading of Auden: to communicate this to someone — for instance, you — I'd have to get you to have some experience like mine; which is to say, you'd have to read the poem for yourself.

I could, of course, have cataloged the poet's use of certain linguistic devices. Probably, this is what was expected. I understand that, just as doctors retain their perception of the patient as a feeling, thinking human being even as they treat her as a system of interlaced organs, so the literary scholar retains her emotional response to a poem even as she dissects its allusions and tropes. For the trained reader, poetical analysis adds meaning to the poem. But there has to be something to add to; this added meaning must be built on a core of "felt significance."[3] At least, this is my view: cleverness and obscure allusions do not themselves make a poem worth studying. A poem that does not affect the reader emotionally may be clever and may require a great deal of research to understand, but why bother?

This criticism does not show or attempt to show that there's anything wrong with critical thinking or rationality as an educational ideal. What I'm trying to say is that, whatever can be said for reason, it is to a large extent beside the point.

I had occasion once to discuss discipline with the principal at an elementary school. He wanted to punish someone by having her spend one recess period sitting on display in the center of the playground. He called this "time out." I discussed with him the origin of the idea of time out and the difference between time out and punitive isolation and humiliation. He wrote off our disagreement as one of semantics. I decided to give up the argument. But I did not give up the attempt to get him to alter the punishment. It really doesn't matter to me whether the principal has a coherent theory of punishment, as long as the actual punishments meted out are consistent with my own theory. This is what matters in schools: I want my kid's school's principal to realize that he's wrong to focus his energy on enforcing order and discipline and on treating every kid the same, instead of inspiring and improving instruction so kids are excited about learning. I want the townspeople to agree to spend more money on school art supplies. Philosophy can be helpful in persuasion, but it needs to be the slave of rhetoric. I'm standing with Gorgias and Thrasymachus against Socrates.

I suppose this is unfortunate: it ought to be the case that rational argument were effective. But it rarely is. Socrates may in some sense win the argument with Protagoras, but he does not get Protagoras to give up his practice, he doesn't get

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Protagoras's pupils to find new teachers, and he doesn't get his fellow citizens to live by his values. You can try to engage in philosophical debate, but outside of a few professional societies such as PES you will not find people whose views are well-grounded enough to sustain it. If you are sensible, or even perhaps reasonable, you will become irate or insulting or demanding or placating or solicitous, depending on what will work better in your circumstance. You will realize that epistemology is a tool that is sometimes useful and sometimes not. You will realize that "the truth" doesn't matter: what matters — to you and to me — is the quality of people's lives; and some people's lives matter more to us than others. If reason doesn't tell us this, and if reason makes consistency, questioning, and justice the ultimate standards of conduct, rather than love and happiness, then we'll just have to ignore reason sometimes. We ignore it on pain of inconsistency, no doubt; but life is filled with many pains.

At least, this is what I believe. What Siegel would say — which he has said — is that my principles of action and my values can either be based on reasons or not. If they are not, then clearly I have no reason to act on them and no basis for convincing others to act on them.

> To hold [a position] seriously involves the (perhaps implicit) beliefs both that it is in principle possible for it to be justified by reasons, and that the position does in fact enjoy such justification….But this sort of transcendental argument will be of little interest to those not already disposed to worry about rational justification (pp. 185-86).

Siegel is not addressing himself to these people, however. He is addressing himself to philosophers, people who are "fundamentally concerned with reasons, arguments, and, with Socrates,…committed to following the argument wherever it leads" (pp. 187). While Marx could write, "philosophers have only interpreted the world…the point, however, is to change it," Siegel does not agree, that is, he does not agree that this is the purpose of philosophy; or at least, he does not accept it as his purpose in doing philosophy.

Well, he is free to choose his own purposes, and I love him for his choices. However, I am not entirely convinced that his purposes are purely academic. Siegel offers an answer to the question, What matters in schools? His educational ideal of critical thinking is meant to guide school people; teachers, principals, curriculum specialists, teacher educators, and so forth, are supposed to be convinced by his arguments to focus their efforts on promoting critical thinking of the sort Siegel describes. And I, for one, am convinced. I believe that the things Siegel says matter, matter. But other things matter too, and matter more. In particular, getting school people to improve instruction in critical thinking matters more than getting them to adopt the epistemological theory that is closest to the truth.

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1. Harvey Siegel, *Educating Reason* (New York: Routledge, 1988).

2. Martin E.P. Seligman, *Learned Optimism* (New York: Pocket, 1990), 172-78; 77-82; pt. 2, *passim*..

3. D. Bob Gowin, *Educating* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1982).

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