

The Future Is Now: Rethinking the Role for Children in Democracy

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Eddie Glaude argues that we are living in another “after times”—a phrase he borrows from Walt Whitman to capture “the disruption and splintering of old ways of living and the making of a new community after the fall. The after times characterize what was before and what is coming into view.”¹ The urgent task of making a new community out of the disruption and splintering of old ways of living suggests the equally urgent and related task of re-examining how we conceive of and practice democratic education in schools and in society more broadly. Indeed, this most recent “after times”—darkened further by democratic crisis—presents a unique opportunity to reimagine the relationship between education and democracy. How we respond to this opportunity will have tremendous implications for the kinds of communities that can and will emerge beyond the “after times” and will determine whose contributions shape and sustain this emergence.

Formulating a sufficient response requires attention to a range of questions. I focus in this paper on questions concerning our *conceptions of children* in relation to democracy and citizenship—meaning how we understand children’s identities as citizens and their role in co-constructing our democratic communities. I begin by suggesting that philosophers interested in democratic citizenship education have tended to adopt a conception of children-as-citizens that is both “future-” and “deficit-oriented.” Next, I argue that the justifications for this idea of children—and subsequent ideas about their role in democracy—often rely on claims related to age or competence but that neither kind of claim stands up to scrutiny. Thus, children’s exclusion from the full activities of citizenship and the circumscribed role they are given in democracy constitute an injustice, the remediation of which requires that we develop and enact a conception of children-as-citizens that promotes their full participation in democracy, including voting, *in the present*.²

In the final substantive section, I defend these claims and develop such a conception by drawing on the “capabilities approach.” First, I argue that children undeniably possess what Amartya Sen calls “enlightenment relevance.”³ This both qualifies them for inclusion in “public reasoning” and other democratic processes and makes their exclusion problematic from the standpoint of justice. Second, I argue that to facilitate children’s meaningful and consequential participation in the present (and, thereby, to remediate this injustice) we should aim through schooling and other social institutions and practices to promote children’s *democratic capability*. This idea captures the dual importance of *both* facilitating children’s emergence as democratic citizens—in the present and not just for the future—and preparing democracy itself to accommodate children’s participation. I conclude by asking how schools might practice democratic education differently with this conception of children (as current and contributing citizens) in place—that is, how schools might promote children’s capability to participate more fully in democracy *in the present* rather than as part of some remote *future*.

FUTURE- AND DEFICIT-ORIENTED CONCEPTIONS OF CHILDREN AS DEMOCRATIC CITIZENS

Philosophical literature on democratic citizenship education generally evidences both *future-* and *deficit-*orientations toward children. According to the former, children are best understood as “future” citizens who are being educated for their eventual participation in democracy. According to the latter, children lack some prescribed stock of knowledge, skills, and values—the “entry conditions” for democratic participation—and must correct this deficiency before they can be considered full citizens.⁴ Thus, once children have completed a course of schooling through which they are equipped with the right knowledge, skill, and values, they are deemed ready for adult democratic participation. Until then, children are positioned primarily as learners rather than meaningful contributors to the project of co-creating our democratic communities. These future- and deficit-orientations toward children-as-citizens often cause us to overlook what children can (and already do) contribute to democracy and to ignore how democracies themselves can be reimagined so as to better facilitate

children's effective contributions in the present. Indeed, as Gert Biesta argues, most approaches to democratic education tend to locate the "problem" of democracy in ostensibly deficient individuals.⁵ Thus, the remedy for this "problem" is always to educate away such deficiencies, rather than rethinking the nature and structure of our democratic communities themselves, especially the kinds of participatory opportunities they offer to children and how conducive these are to children's meaningful and consequential participation.⁶

Amy Gutmann's work serves as a representative example of both the emphasis on children's achievement of certain entry conditions and the related future- and deficit-oriented conception of children. In *Democratic Education*, Gutmann states clearly the political purpose of formal education: to cultivate in children "the virtues, knowledge, and skills necessary for political participation."⁷ Schools are incubators for democratic citizens: the politically ignorant or deficient child enters; the informed, skillful, and virtuous democratic citizen emerges ready for democratic action. As such, democratic education prepares children for *future* political participation—for a time when they, as adults, will come to rule. Indeed, what makes democratic education a political as well as an educational ideal for Gutmann is that "being educated as a child entails being ruled" and "being a democratic citizen entails ruling." From this she derives the "ideal of democratic education": "being ruled, then ruling."⁸

To be fair, Gutmann does carve out some opportunities for children to participate in democratic processes in schools. But these opportunities are deemed necessary only insofar as they help to cultivate what she calls "participatory virtues" (in other words, "a sense of social commitment, political efficacy, a desire to participate in politics, respect for opposing points of view, critical distance from authority").⁹ According to Gutmann, then, we need only "democratize schools to the extent necessary to cultivate the participatory . . . virtues."¹⁰ Thus, even the experiences children have with democratic participation in schools—and the democratic nature of the schools they attend—are primarily if not exclusively geared toward children's *learning*—that is, their achievement of the capacities and virtues that enable their *future* participation in democracy.

This understanding of children and of their relationship to democracy

significantly narrows if not forecloses the possibility that children *as children*—that is, before they reach legal or formal citizenship status and otherwise meet the “entry conditions” of democracy—might have something of value to contribute to what Gutmann calls “conscious social reproduction” or, more generally, to our shared political life. And, to varying degrees, this general understanding of and approach to children vis-à-vis democratic citizenship is consistent throughout much of the literature produced by philosophers of education who are interested in democratic education. That is, in most approaches, we find a clear conception of children as *future* citizens, a related emphasis on eliminating their ostensible deficiencies as part of their preparation for *future* democratic participation, and a commitment to children’s participatory experiences largely if not entirely for *educative*—rather than, we might say, *contributory*—purposes.

There are, of course, more nuanced conceptions of children in the literature concerned with democratic citizenship education. For instance, in *American Education and the Responsibility of its Citizens*, Sarah Stitzlein extends her conception of “role responsibility” to children, arguing that “students . . . can be responsible to our public schools and to democracy.”¹¹ And she is clear that “children, too [not just adult citizens], can engage in” deliberations about public schools. Perhaps most definitively, she states that “deliberations and publics are not the privilege of only adults, nor should children’s participation in them be held off until they have reached voting age.” Stitzlein also importantly notes that by having space to share their “experiences, ideas, and solutions,” children might “help others better understand life in schools today and the impacts of educational reforms.” There is, therefore, at least a nod toward a participatory role for children in our political work and toward recognizing that adult citizens can learn from children’s perspectives on certain issues (like “life in schools and the impacts of educational reforms”).

And yet, it is not clear that Stitzlein actually moves us very far beyond the future-oriented conception of children. Throughout the text, she relies on the same language that is ubiquitous in this literature, referring to children as “future citizens” (and related phrases like “developing citizens” or citizens “in the making” are applied only to children). Furthermore, her primary reason for

allowing children's participation in deliberation still seems to be that such participation is ultimately beneficial to children's *learning*—the correction of some ostensible deficiency—over and above any actual *contribution* children might be able to make to the deliberation.

Consider that amid the same language cited above in favor of children's participation, Stitzlein stops short both of offering a significant challenge to the standard conception of children's citizenship and of defending the limits she ultimately imposes on their participation. She states, for instance, that children's "contributions" simply are not "as complex or sophisticated as those of adults" and quickly shifts her emphasis to the educative benefit of children's participation, noting that it is "an important way [for them] to develop skills of dialogue and public work" and that it can "boost student agency and voice."¹² Furthermore, she seems largely content with limiting children's contributions to "their reflections on what they like, their experiences with testing and other accountability strategies, what seems to work best to help them learn, and more." If the "and more" is consistent with the specific examples offered, it would seem to suggest that children's contributions should be largely restricted to those that convey their firsthand experiences with school, something they are presumed to know more about than other social-political issues. It is not surprising, then, that children (as contributors) are largely absent from the book's earlier and broader discussion of "public work" and the construction of "public goods," which emphasizes collective deliberations and action through which we move beyond our own individual concerns or interests and develop a publicly oriented view of social and political matters. And yet, Stitzlein offers no explicit justification for why children's participation in "public work" is restricted. Rather, she seems simply to assume that on account of their age children lack sufficient competence to participate in or contribute meaningfully to this broader co-creation of democratic life.

BEYOND FUTURE- AND DEFICIT-ORIENTATIONS

Now, to be clear, I do not wish to deny that children are learning and need to learn democracy. I do not wish to deny that education has a preparatory function in this and other ways. I do not wish to deny that participating in

democracy is an important way to learn to participate better. And I do not wish to deny the wisdom in understanding children as “developing” citizens or as citizens “in the making.” I only wish to call into question the idea that children are so unique in any of these ways that we are justified in labelling and treating them narrowly as *future citizens* whose present democratic participation should be understood largely if not entirely as *educative* rather than *contributory* in nature.

Indeed, it seems to me that we have established a rather arbitrary standard—namely, the acquisition of an essential store of democratic knowledge, skills, and values—and that we have wielded it to exclude one entire segment of the population from citizenship. And to be sure, it is a standard created for and applied to children alone. No other group of persons is subjected so explicitly to these kinds of entry conditions. There is, of course, a troubling history of exclusionary practices directed at women and African Americans, among others, in the United States and at similarly oppressed groups around the world. This history makes it even more important to acknowledge that the burden is on those who would continue excluding children—even temporarily—to prove that children are unique in a relevant and significant way and, therefore, must continue to be excluded even amid a broader history of expanding inclusion to groups previously declared incompetent or otherwise unfit for democratic participation. Instead, philosophers of education have continued generally to ignore the problem of what Francis Schrag long ago called “the child’s status in the democratic state.”¹³ At least two things remain largely unquestioned as a result. The first is that children—on account of their age and vague references to their developmental characteristics—are uniquely immature or incompetent relative to the standard for full inclusion in democracy (i.e., unique in lacking the knowledge, skills, and values often deemed essential to democratic citizenship). The second is that because of this unique incompetence, their exclusion from most if not all of the activities of citizenship—including voting—is justified.

But why, for instance, would the fact that children are learning and need to learn democracy constitute a special circumstance that calls for their broad and uniform exclusion in the present? This fact applies to all democratic citizens—we are all always learning and relearning democracy. Few doubt this,

at least in theory. So children are a special case in this way only if, again, we set some entry conditions and claim either that 1) *only* children are failing to meet these conditions and/or that 2) this is the *only* group that can rightly be excluded because of the failure to meet them.

The first claim would require us to ignore substantial evidence pointing to generally low levels of political knowledge among adult citizens both historically and in the present.¹⁴ The problem of citizens' political ignorance has long concerned theorists of modern democracy and has led to various arguments for circumscribing all citizens' participation in democratic decision-making on account (among other things) of their incompetence.¹⁵ This widespread problem of political ignorance gives the lie to the idea that children are unique in this way. Indeed, it seems just as plausible to argue that if children are, in fact, unique relative to adults it is because children "possess significantly greater political knowledge and capacity than they are given credit for, since, just as was the case for women and minorities in the past, not having the possibility to vote [and otherwise formally participate in democracy] removes the chief incentive for developing voting [and other] capacities in the first place."¹⁶

The second claim would force us to defend the exclusion of one group of citizens for reasons that are not also applied to other groups of citizens. This captures nicely the tension in what Christopher Martin calls the "generalization problem of children's political inclusion": if it is justifiable to exclude children because of their lack of requisite political knowledge, this "becomes reasonable grounds for excluding anyone."¹⁷ In other words, if an entire group of people—those under the age of eighteen—can be excluded on account of incompetence relative to a certain standard, why are those above the age of eighteen not held to the same standard and excluded accordingly? For example, sometimes the advance of old age leaves us cognitively incapacitated or otherwise severely and irreversibly impairs our judgment and other cognitive faculties. And yet we rarely entertain—and often shudder at the mention of—measures that would restrict the voting and other participatory rights of the elderly on account of their naturally declining cognitive ability.¹⁸ Rather, we understand voting and democratic participation as the sacred right of a democratic citizen

and recognize that, as a general rule, it is not to be taken away on account of competence-related criteria. Our failure to extend this right to children lacks sufficient justification, especially when the shortcomings of age- and competence-related arguments are exposed.

Following a similar line of thought, some scholars have defended expanding children's inclusion in democratic processes, including the process of voting. Daniel Hart and James Youniss, for instance, argue that "effective civic education [demands] imagining youth *as citizens* rather than as a class of individuals who *someday* will possess the qualities that allow for participation in society."¹⁹ Thus, they challenge the tendency to perceive children narrowly as future citizens who will "someday" be fit for political participation. And they go on to argue for lowering the voting age to sixteen, offering strong evidence that this would increase democratic participation and engagement amongst sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds while having no significant negative effect on the quality of our democracy or electoral system.

And yet, ultimately, Hart and Youniss seem simply to push up the "someday" on which children are to be deemed ready for citizenship. They build their argument from data showing that sixteen-year-olds demonstrate the "relevant capacities" of citizenship in degrees that "are indistinguishable from" eighteen-year-olds.²⁰ This moves us in a promising direction, but their argument is still limited to expanding inclusion for reasons narrowly connected to children's levels of political knowledge and demonstrated capacities. This argument, then, has nothing to say about the broader questions of justice surrounding the exclusion of children below sixteen years old. Furthermore, and related, it leaves us no room to consider a more thoroughgoing and radical reconceptualization of children vis-à-vis democratic citizenship from which we could develop a more robust idea of children's inclusion—one framed in terms that are not so closely connected to what we deem to be "relevant capacities."

More promisingly, Martin has taken up the question of children's inclusion in electoral and deliberative democratic processes. He introduces a distinction between "means of inclusion" and "ends of inclusion" to argue that we can achieve the "end" of counting everyone's preferences in elections by

re-thinking the “means” of such inclusion, namely, our voting practices. Thus, the electoral state “can modify the practice of voting to ensure the child’s preferences register in ways that are meaningful for the political decision-making process.”²¹ Martin makes a similar case in relation to the deliberative aspects of democracy, arguing for modifications to deliberative processes and practices so as to accommodate the broader inclusion of children, who are understood here as “independent sources of claims about what is just and fair.”²²

Martin’s insight about modifying democracy in ways that accommodate children and enable their fuller inclusion in democracy (both as voters and deliberators) is significant. We can call this a shift from thinking strictly about how to *prepare children for democracy* to thinking (also) about how to *prepare democracy for children*. When we talk *only* of preparing children for democracy—as we tend to do when we work with a narrow future- and deficit-oriented conception of children—we seem to take democracy itself as fixed, and we assume it is children who must become fit or ready for democracy.²³ Rarely do we consider the opposite, namely, that democracy must become fit or ready for children’s unique kinds of participation and contributions. But if we take seriously the commitment to inclusion that informs most ideas of democracy, and if we recognize how our typical treatment of children violates this commitment, then we have good reason to consider further how to modify (or prepare) democracy itself so as to enable children’s meaningful and consequential participation as *contributing* citizens in the *present*. Doing so, I argue in the next section, requires that we commit ourselves—through schooling and other social institutions and practices—to promoting what I call children’s *democratic capability*.

First, though, I want to make a positive case for a conception of children-as-citizens that takes them seriously as *contributors* to democracy (including through voting and other kinds of formal participation) *in the present*. In other words, thus far, I have argued that we have no good reason to *exclude* children—at least not on account of the age- or competence-related arguments that tend to ground our future- and deficit-oriented conceptions of children. But I also want to argue that we have, in fact, good reasons to *include* them fully in the activities of democratic citizenship. To do so, I draw on scholars working

within the “capabilities approach” (CA) framework—especially Sen’s argument for expanding processes of public reasoning to include anyone who might add “enlightenment relevance” and Miranda Fricker’s argument for prioritizing the capability for “epistemic contributions.”

Sen has made “public reasoning”—which, for him, is the defining feature of democracy—central to his CA-inspired idea of justice.²⁴ And while this is not in itself unique, Fabienne Peter has identified two novelties about Sen’s use of public reason.²⁵ First, Sen emphasizes the value that *reasoning from particular social positions* can have for the quality of our public reasoning and, thereby, for our quest to identify and pursue more just societies.²⁶ The idea is that differently positioned reasoners can illuminate public reason not in spite of their positionality but precisely because of it. In other words, consistent with some strands of feminist thought, Sen understands the contributions of diverse reasoners as “*information resources for constructing* more global points of view through their critical interaction.”²⁷ For this reason, among others, his idea of public reasoning includes a radical openness to differently positioned reasoners and their epistemic resources so that democracies can continually seek and incorporate new information for the sake of making and revising social decisions. Indeed, we can say that for Sen there really is no ideal reasoner. We should not, for instance, require reasoners to achieve some ideal of objectivity (i.e., a view from nowhere) by hiding their positionality behind a Rawlsian “veil of ignorance.” Nor should we establish a set of “entry conditions” that one must achieve before participating in democracy as public reasoning.

A second and related novelty in Sen’s idea of public reason is that he significantly expands the scope of those rightly included in any process of public reasoning beyond two traditional limitations. The first is what Sen calls “membership entitlement”—the idea that only members of the focal group are entitled to contribute²⁸—and the second is what Dryzek refers to as the “all-affected principle”—that anyone *affected* by a decision is entitled to contribute.²⁹ Both, Sen argues, are too restrictive and exclusive. Thus, he expands the entitlement to participate in a process of public reasoning to anyone who can add “enlightenment relevance” to any stage of the process—that is, to anyone

who can contribute something that will enlighten public reasoning and social choice procedures. Sen puts the point this way: “A person’s voice may count . . . because the person’s perspective and the reasons behind it bring important insights and discernment into an evaluation, and there is a case for listening to that assessment whether or not the person is a directly involved party” (i.e., whether or not the person is a member of the focal group or “affected” by the group’s decision in any way).³⁰ Thus, the radical openness and inclusivity Sen builds into public reasoning and social choice procedures (indeed, into his idea of democracy itself) is motivated by the importance of communities being able to act in light of the fullest possible range of epistemic resources available at any given decisional moment. Indeed, the strength of democracy and our ability collectively to develop and pursue an “idea of justice” depends on such radical openness.

Fricker makes a similar CA-inspired argument for what she calls the capability to make an “epistemic contribution.”³¹ To have this capability means two things. First, being capable of contributing one’s “informational materials (including . . . anything bearing on the question at stake, such as evidence, critical doubt, hypothesis, argumentation, and so on)”; and, second, being capable of contributing to a stock of “interpretive materials required to make sense of a more or less shared world (including . . . anything bearing on their justification and reasonability, such as the concepts used, or alternative interpretations, or other relevant critical materials).”³² This capability, Fricker argues, deserves a place on any list of central human capabilities because of its importance to promoting *epistemic* justice.

Neither Sen nor Fricker have written much about children. But, to my mind, nothing in either of their thinking suggests that children—on account of age or competence—cannot add enlightenment relevance or make meaningful epistemic contributions to our public reasoning and other democratic processes. Indeed, the historical record and our current empirical reality also supports this conclusion. More importantly, nothing in their work suggests that children should be (or can justly be) excluded from making contributions to public reasoning and to democracy more broadly—including through their vote.

I propose, then, that we shift from a conception of children as future citizens who are deficient with regard to what full and present citizenship ostensibly requires in terms of knowledge, skills, and values. Rather, we should foreground children's "enlightenment relevance," honor their epistemic contributions, and prioritize the work of creating and sustaining the kind of democracy that enables and accommodates their participation as full and present citizens. In other words, we should ensure that children, like anyone who can add something—an argument, judgment, insight, experience, vote, etc.—that is valuable to public reasoning and other social choice processes, should have the *capability* (i.e., the effective opportunity or real freedom) to do so.

CONCLUSION: TOWARD THE PROMOTION OF CHILDREN'S DEMOCRATIC CAPABILITY

The conception of children as current and contributory citizens sketched in the previous section raises important questions about how societies can—and must, as a matter of justice—promote what we can call children's democratic capability—that is, their capability for contributing their epistemic resources to democracy. Space precludes a full answer to these questions. But we can make a good start by developing a deeper understanding of the meaning of a capability and the process through which one comes to have any capability. As Martha Nussbaum puts it, capabilities "are not just *abilities* residing inside a person but also the *freedoms or opportunities* created by a combination of personal abilities and the political, social, and economic environment."³³ Indeed, the latter—the "conditions in which functioning can actually be chosen"—are as important as the former in determining one's level of any given capability.³⁴ To highlight the importance of this combination, Nussbaum refers to one's developed abilities as "internal capabilities" and to the overall "substantial freedoms" one enjoys as "combined capabilities." In a particularly relevant example, she reminds us that a society might do quite well at cultivating citizens' "internal capabilities" for political participation and yet utterly fail to provide citizens with opportunities through which to exercise these internal capabilities. Conversely, a society might fail at cultivating citizens' "internal capabilities" for political participation and yet do quite well at providing them with ample opportunities for such participation.

In both cases, citizens lack the combined capability for political participation on account of a societal failure (indeed, a social injustice).

In light of this distinction between “internal” and “combined” capabilities, we can formulate the argument made throughout this paper as follows: our approaches to democratic citizenship education have tended to focus too narrowly on developing children’s (ostensibly lacking) “internal capabilities” for the sake of their future political participation. And these approaches have given insufficient attention to ensuring that 1) children *also* have meaningful opportunities to function as democratic citizens in the present and that 2) these opportunities are structured in ways that both facilitate children’s contributions and ensure they are given adequate uptake in public reasoning. Only when these are taken together can we say we are promoting children’s (combined) democratic capability. Thus, the work of promoting this capability is necessarily a project that requires a significant role for schools and other educational institutions as well as a significant restructuring of how we organize and conduct the work of our democracy.

1 Eddie Glaude Jr., *Begin Again: James Baldwin’s America and Its Urgent Lessons for Our Own* (New York: Crown, 2020).

2 I am particularly interested here in traditional school age children, namely, those between six and seventeen years old.

3 Amartya Sen, *The Idea of Justice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009).

4 Gert J.J. Biesta, *Learning Democracy in School and Society: Education, Lifelong Learning, and the Politics of Citizenship* (Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, 2011), 88.

5 Biesta, *Learning Democracy*, 88.

6 Daniel Hart and James Youniss, *Renewing Democracy in Young America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018).

7 Amy Gutmann, *Democratic Education* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 287.

8 Gutmann, *Democratic Education*, 3.

- 9 Gutmann, *Democratic Education*, 91.
- 10 Gutmann, *Democratic Education*, 92.
- 11 Sarah M. Stitzlein, *American Public Education and the Responsibility of Its Citizens* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 134.
- 12 Stitzlein, *American Public Education*, 134.
- 13 Francis Schrag, "The Child's Status in the Democratic State," *Political Theory* 3, no. 4 (1975): 441-457.
- 14 Michael Schudson, "American's Ignorant Voters," *The Wilson Quarterly* 24, no. 2 (2000): 16-22.
- 15 Walter Lippmann, *The Phantom Public* (London: Transaction Publishers, 2009).; Jason Brennan, *Against Democracy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016).
- 16 John Wall, "Democratising Democracy: The Road from Women's to Children's Suffrage," *The International Journal of Human Rights* 18, no. 6 (2014): 652.
- 17 Christopher Martin, "Should Deliberative Democratic Inclusion Extend to Children?" *Democracy & Education* 26, no. 2 (2018): 1-2
- 18 Wall, "Democratising Democracy."
- 19 Hart and Youniss, *Renewing Democracy*, 104 (emphasis added).
- 20 Hart and Youniss, *Renewing Democracy*, 104.
- 21 Martin, "Should Deliberative Democratic Inclusion Extend to Children?" 3.
- 22 Martin, "Should Deliberative Democratic Inclusion Extend to Children?" 8. This does not mean that children are taken as "reliable, valid, or credible sources of such claims" (emphasis in original). Martin's commitment to "circumspection" when it comes to children's inclusion is limiting in this sense.
- 23 Biesta, *Learning Democracy*.
- 24 Sen, *The Idea of Justice*.
- 25 Fabienne Peter, "Sen's Idea of Justice and the Locus of Normative Reasoning," *Journal of Economic Methodology* 19, no. 2 (2012): 165-167.
- 26 Peter, "Sen's Idea of Justice," 166.
- 27 Elizabeth Anderson, "Sen, Ethics, and Democracy," *Feminist Economics* 9, no. 2-3

(2003): 240.

28 Sen, *The Idea of Justice*.

29 John Dryzek, "The Deliberative Democrat's Idea of Justice," *European Journal of Political Theory* 12, no. 4 (2013): 329-346.

30 Sen, *The Idea of Justice*, 108.

31 Miranda Fricker, "Epistemic Contribution as a Central Human Capability," in *The Equal Society: Essays on Equality in Theory and Practice*, ed. George Hull. (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016).

32 Fricker, "Epistemic Contribution," 76.

33 Martha Nussbaum, *Creating Capabilities* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 22.

34 Nussbaum, *Creating Capabilities*, 22.