

The Authenticity and Adaptivity of Liberal Democracy

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Education in recent years has become increasingly oriented towards student-centered and anti-oppressive approaches. Many of these incarnations emphasize the value of students' lived narratives and truths as to be anchoring or even directing pedagogical approaches.¹ I believe such educational environments stand upon fundamental notions of the self rooted in *authenticity*, particularly from Charles Taylor's examination of its conceptual structure. It is useful to examine the educated "self" from the discourse of authenticity insofar as its conceptual structure reveals framings of self-understanding and relation with others that harbour important implications regarding contemporary democracy. Specifically, I argue the authentic self can *conceptually stunt* liberal democracy as it fails to fulfill the existential conditions of intersubjectivity necessary for its facilitated reality. My argument will consist of five parts – (1) an elaboration upon the authentic self and how it relates to education, (2) a discussion on the existential condition of self as intersubjective and asymmetrical, (3) a discussion of democracy as adaptive through Deweyan ideals, (4) a discussion of authenticity as conceptually stunting democracy and facilitating polarization, and (5) a concluding call for education to reclaim authenticity in its dialectical form.

THE AUTHENTIC CONCEPTION OF SELF

The discussion of authenticity with regards to its fundamental conception of the self is aptly elaborated through Charles Taylor's *Ethics of Authenticity*. Taylor anchors the conception of the authentic self upon the historical and philosophical context of its exceptional recency. Briefly put, the authentic self is produced by historical processes of turning *inwards* as sources of truth(s). Essentially, the authentic self renders the legitimacy of inner truth as the fact of its original livedness and expression, regardless of its coherence with external objectivity or authority. Taylor attributes such inwardness to "Herder's expressivism," which "put forward the idea that each of us has an *original* way of being human."² Herder propelled a "powerful moral ideal" of "Being true to myself...being true to my own originality, and that is something only I can articulate and discover."³ If the self is enshrined in its originality, then the divide between interiority and

exteriority becomes a narrative of *conflict* – whereby “my own inner nature... sees [itself] as in danger of being lost...through the pressures towards outward conformity [and]...in taking an instrumental stance to myself.”⁴ In other words, inner originality represents the defense against outer instrumentalizing and stifling conformity, which serves to rescue the “true” self through its inner discovery and expression. The enlarged chasm between interiority and exteriority through enshrined inner depth of originality “is the background that gives moral force to the culture of *authenticity*.”⁵

The chasmic conflict of inner originality essentially stimulates a *liberatory* possibility. If what is true and good are discoverable within the inner depths of the individual, the outer world becomes an oppressive limitation as it fails to fully grasp such nuanced authenticity. Freedom, therefore, becomes a compelling pursuit within this conflictive narrative. For the pursuit of freedom now stands upon the desire to ensure the inner authentic nuances are protectively *expressed and recognized* as the intrinsic truth and goodness that they are.

The authentic conception of self can enable radical notions of freedom and recognition by virtue of the *experiential* emphasis of its ideal. For authenticity *is* the lived knowing and truth solely accessible and therefore, original to the experiencer. The outer world can be rendered incapable of *fully* grasping such private truths without direct accessibility. If the outer world is incapable, it becomes discredited as the authorities of epistemological and moral legitimacy in the first place. In other words, the experiential fact of authenticity can frame internal truth(s) as *independently* legitimate. Experientiality does not necessarily require objective systems of rational certainty, doctrinal metaphysics, or political authority with which to ground its legitimacy. Rather, the self is intrinsically legitimate by virtue of it *having and expressing* experiences. As Taylor writes, the notion of the human now becomes “both fact and meaningful expression, and its being expression does not reside in a subjective relation of reference to something else, it expresses the idea which it realizes.”⁶

Intrinsic experiential legitimacy holds tremendous utility in informing pedagogical directions for both psychological and political purposes. Such directions seek to preserve the authentic legitimacy of self to resist the exteriority that can neglect its expression and discovery. If the authentic self is intrinsically

legitimate, then ineffective learning is not an issue of inability as much as the educational failure to actualize inner potential. I believe this conceptual foundation represents an important philosophical foundation for student-centered and/or anti-oppressive pedagogies.⁷ Specifically, this manifests through two implications of authenticity.

First, by virtue of the experientiality of intrinsic legitimacy, reductionist/instrumentalistic curriculum can be redressed through affirming the unique truths of students. Educational environments can be changed to give the space to accommodate their expressions. Student-led curriculum, for instance, can become justified on the basis that educators enshrine students' inner experiences as deserving the protection from suppressive exteriority. Importantly, the duality of authenticity becomes reproduced such that the pedagogical practice and the role of the educator are framed as facilitators of students' liberatory and actualizing expressions. However, one's inner truth is not necessarily entirely exempted from being concluded as suppressed just because curriculum is framed to accommodate.

Second, if the inner self is intrinsically legitimate, then even processes (for example, emotions, thoughts, and so on) of the person can be *dualized* as the suppressive exterior so long as they seemingly prevent genuine actualization of something "deeper." This can be justified through the combined status of inaccessibility (to external knowers) and intrinsic legitimacy attributed to inner authenticity. Students' authentic self cannot be held accountable as lacking potential as their inner depths simply cannot be accessed to be scholastically scrutinized. Inner potential, therefore, cannot be judged, but can only be accommodated for the full expression of something that is intrinsically legitimate. With such foundations, pedagogy becomes conceptually locked to dualize learning obstacles from students' authentic self, thereby framing even their experiences as the very suppressive external world. The authentic self can be suppressed by *internalized* obstacles of limiting psychological and hegemonic conditions, whereby students are shackled by the emotional contagions of obstructive environments. Relevant narratives, emotions, thoughts, and others can therefore all be framed as external obstacles that must be redressed pedagogically.⁸

Both conditions set up the educative situation as defined by the constant

friction between external curriculum and inner self. This friction can function to keep the educational environments perpetually accountable for student experiences as to accommodate their needs. The essential point here is that the inaccessible and intrinsically legitimate fact of self can bestow the conceptual power to fully *determine* the border that dualizes interiority from exteriority. This enables a perpetual attribution of accountability upon exteriority. Insofar as the self is always legitimate, the inadequacy of its learning and expression reflects external contamination rather than internal fault. If authenticity is only accessible to the experiencer, then the knowledge to determine the dualizing line (between authentic interiority and unauthentic exteriority) can become immensely *self-defined*. As such, any phenomena perceived as obstructive can be conceptually exteriorized, thereby rendering experientiality itself an object of educational responsibility. If exteriority can never fully capture the depths of authentic self, dualized frictional narrative becomes *endless*. As obstructions to authenticity can only reflect issues of exteriority, the dualizing line can be continuously *moved* to maintain the meaning of “true” interiority as deserving accommodation. Essentially, authenticity primes an existential conflict whose resolution can always compel and justify *external change*.

Such conceptual conditions support pedagogical goals towards social justice, whereby the inaccessible and intrinsic legitimacy can define social identities (such as gender, race, and class) and their uniquely lived realities as resisting oppressive hegemonies. Pedagogically, this translates into emphasizing and importantly, *reifying* the frictional dualism of authenticity as the object of educative *liberation* itself. This underlying principle anchors anti-oppressive approaches by developing critical consciousness upon and dismantling oppressive exteriority as both a systemic force *and* an internalized psychology. By virtue of inaccessible authenticity, the lived realities of the marginalized become *exclusive* to the members of its shared identity. Without the possibility of directly judging such lived realities, they become truths equipped with intrinsic legitimacy as to self define the boundary of its own authentic identity. As such, identities are equipped with the conceptual power to frame phenomenon as oppressive exteriority that are accountable for their expression and recognition. Through this conception, the oppressive exterior can also be extended to experientiality

itself. For one's inner psychology can reflect an internalized oppression against an identity's circumstances and therefore, the authentic self that lives them. Therefore, anti-oppressive education can emerge as a practice of "unlearning" to prune the stifling forces of exteriority (both institutionally and psychologically).⁹

Essentially, authenticity enables the conceptual power to (1) protect the inner self from external judgements and (2) compel perpetual external accountability for one's expression as borders between interiority/exteriority remain self-determined. This forwards a conception of self conducive for liberatory possibilities both psychologically and politically, which can importantly serve student-centered and anti-oppressive pedagogies. However, despite its progressive possibilities, I believe its conception harbours a risky implication upon liberal democracy. To understand the nature of such risk, it is important to elaborate upon both the necessary conception of self for liberal democracy as well as the justifiable notion of liberal democracy as a sustainable form of ethical and political structure.

THE INTERSUBJECTIVE AND ASYMMETRICAL SELF

A fundamental condition of the self is its inherent intersubjective nature.¹⁰ The self does not emerge as a solitary unit, rather, it *grows* through preceding "traditions" of shared languages, rituals, and narratives. These traditions are not learned as cognitive artefacts per se, but as involved and embodied coordinative sociality with others. Such sociality initiates the self into the very traditions that enable its essential emergence. The coordinative interactions and rituals with others essentially function to establish parameters of enactive engagements with the world. That is, our understandings and actions are socially founded and constrained within specific meanings rather than opened as infinite possibilities. Such is the function of traditions—as intergenerational parameters of meanings that situate our experience within purposive structures of being in the world.

The intersubjective necessity for the self, however, is also fraught with intrinsic tensions with others. Rallying a Hegelian rhetoric, it is a tension (and perhaps "fight") of the mutual demands for *recognition*. The demand for recognition is understandable as an inherent condition of self by virtue of its "asymmetrical" fact.¹¹ By asymmetry, I mean that the experience of the world is accessed and informed by the lived meanings of the self. Despite the self being

intersubjectively constituted, the world nevertheless contacts the self through its exclusive experiential body and therefore, the meanings lived through its *singular* form. Essentially, the world as lived remains *asymmetrically* proportional to its direct experiencers. Therefore, the world is existentially lived as “for oneself,” as one cannot directly assume the body or consciousness of another.¹²

The asymmetrical fact renders encounters with others a challenge to the existential authority of one’s purposive structure. If the world is for oneself, then tensions occur as this fact is intrinsically *shared by all selves*. The presence of the other reveals the arbitrary fact of one’s egocentric reality, as the world of others is just as real as the exclusive world lived through one’s bodily self. The realness of other worlds exposes the asymmetrical existential conviction of the self as otherwise presumptuous. Yet, by virtue of its inescapable condition—as we cannot help *but* be asymmetrical in our lived-ness—reveals a contradiction between the authoritative realness of our uniquely bodied world and its revealed arbitrary condition through encountering others.

This contradiction can lead to existential orientations of domination. For the dominated other also negates the legitimacy of their lived worlds as competing against us. However, dominating dispositions are unsustainable as the other is also the very intersubjective source that constitutes us.¹³ Therefore, others need to be equally recognized such that they remain involved in the intersubjective facilitation of our own world. Essentially, the necessary and threatening status of the other compels intersubjectivity as (1) sustained by an equal mutual recognition and that (2) the condition of equality be defined by a *perpetual negotiation*. The negotiative equality builds upon the fact that intersubjectivity is a *mediated* sociality. That is, understanding and actions in the world, as Shaun Gallagher writes, are “structured and articulated by the symbolic mediations of narratives,” that are “always embedded in a larger historical and communal meaning-giving structure.”¹⁴ The constitution of self, therefore, points to the *shared* mediating symbolic narratives that contextualize pragmatic and social goals and concerns. Traditions represent such mediating roles—insofar as they function as parameters of meaning as *specific* relations between self and world.

Insofar as intersubjectivity is the facilitation of mediating narratives, and that such narratives constitute the purposive self, recognition therefore,

cannot simply be understood as a direct social act. Rather, recognition is a mediated process of symbolic narratives constituting and therefore, reifying the asymmetrical self in *coherence* with the encountered world. Recognition is inhabiting intersubjective traditions that affirmatively sustain the conviction that one asymmetrically inhabits. The intersubjective encounter, therefore, harbours tensions between *carriers* of intergenerational traditions that have yet to be reconciled. Through the necessity for equal recognition as intersubjectivity, reconciliation means to *negotiatively* recalibrate traditions such that they adequately constitute all involved selves. Intersubjective equality, therefore, is the *evolution* of traditions as propelled by the reconciled aftermaths of intrinsic tensions for mediating and distributing recognition equally.

The evolution of traditions ought to remain eternal insofar as the self is to be intersubjectively sustained. Its eternal necessity lies within the unique stature of the self as occupying distinct spatial/temporal positions that naturally depart from the traditions that constitute its emergence. Initiated by traditions of understanding, the self naturally enacts reinterpretations and misunderstandings that *deviate* lived worlds from their initial traditions. As such, lived worlds can never be *completely* recognized by traditions and their inhabitants. The relation between the self and traditions is arguably a constant match that oscillates between the fulfilments and failures of recognition. Insofar as the self remains perpetually deviant, traditions are compelled to evolve towards equality, only to be constantly surpassed by the changed criteria of its fulfilled condition through such deviations.

What the intersubjective situation of the asymmetrical self reveals is an intrinsic existential potential for the *perpetual evolution* of lived worlds and the mediating traditions that purposively contextualize them. It remains a potential for it requires the condition of *equality* to hold the tension between unique selves demanding mutual recognition. Insofar as equality is sustained, reconciliation is forwarded as traditions readapt themselves eternally through the endless deviating selves whose demand for recognition is *never* fully sated. The self and shared traditions, therefore, inhabit a *dialectical* space of mutual transformation as the very dynamic reality of each other.

THE ADAPTIVE LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

The endless evolution of shared traditions through intersubjective and asymmetrical self can be understood as the existential foundation of *liberal democracy*, particularly viewed through Dewey's pragmatism. As Jerome Popp argues, Dewey does not understand liberal democracy as "just a form of government," but that "it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience."¹⁵ Democratic association functions to facilitate experimental inquiries for reconstructing experience and growing intelligence as an *endless* activity. Growth is *pragmatically* rather than metaphysically rooted, whereby the emergence of understanding is propelled by the demands to address changing communal interests rather than transcendental ideals. It is what Matthew Feinstein discusses as "mundane processes of inquiry" as demanded by a "problematic situation" of our "habits...running into trouble...through new needs...desires, or through conflict with others."¹⁶

If democracy stands upon perpetual growth, then its principle is one of *adaptivity*. For the democratic function is to facilitate the constant unfolding of *both* problematic situations and their stimulated communal demands and inquiries that can redress them. Ongoing demands and inquiries are protectively sustained such that collective expressions can generate growths adaptive to shared emergent "niches." Such generative growths are ultimately sustained by democratic principles of *equal freedom and recognition*. As Dewey asserted, growth depends upon a "democratic faith in equality," whereby "each individual shall have the chance and opportunity to contribute...and that the value of his contribution be decided by its place/function in the organized total of similar contributions."¹⁷ Therefore, both the contribution of demands/inquiries and the criteria in qualifying their value are part of the *evolving* process of growth itself, such that their continued evolution is the point of democracy.

The principle of equality under Deweyan pragmatism points to the eternal dialectic of the intersubjective and asymmetrical self. That is, liberal democracy is operatively adaptive precisely because it represents the "mode of associated living" that *channels* the intrinsic dialectical tension of self as the fuel for *continuous adaptivity*. Democratic equal freedom and recognition ensures that each self—by virtue of their intrinsic deviations—stimulates variability of

paradigms as communal involvements. Variability facilitates adaptivity insofar as populations maintain diverse possibilities to accommodate inherently dynamic local circumstances. However, variability alone cannot guarantee adaptivity if not through focused developments of such possibilities through certain *selective pressures*. That is, for certain paradigms to proliferate with memetic force, there must exist boundary conditions of selectivity that reinforce certain possibilities over others. Without pressures, no individual deviations would emerge with greater “survivability” over the others, thereby stunting adaptive change.

The selective pressure towards variability is the intersubjective tradition that mediates and therefore, enables meaning and recognition between selves. That is, the pressure is propelled by the collective demand for reforming traditions that enable greater equal freedom and recognition. Insofar as the self remains both intersubjective and asymmetrically deviant, a selective pressure becomes forwarded to readapt mediating traditions for the sake of reconciling tensions between selves. As traditions initiate emergent selves into intersubjective participation, new pressures develop to propel the cycles of adaptivity as the eternal growth and reconstruction of inquiry. Adaptivity, therefore, is a communal process rather than an individual one insofar as the self is already intersubjectively constituted by traditions held and inhabited by its proximate communities.

Liberal democracy viewed in light of the existential conditions of self reveals two fundamental conditions for its eternal adaptivity: (1) variability of paradigms through individual deviations and (2) selective pressures through intersubjective traditions of recognition. Briefly put, democracy represents a dialectical balance for individual freedom to deviate from given traditions such it is the very deviations that enliven the traditions to realize freedom. Democratic equality does not only function to free individuals, but it also, perhaps more fundamentally, functions to generate necessary degrees of *conflicts* intrinsic within our existential condition with encountered others. Through our enduring commitments to such conflicts we are compelled to reconcile towards renegotiated and readapted relations and ethics with each other. As Dewey wrote regarding the meaning of democratic engagements, it is to facilitate *both* the individual for the “secure release and fulfilment of personal potentialities” and the collective

as a shared structure of concerns/meaning as participations “according to need in the values which the groups sustain.”¹⁸

AUTHENTICITY AS A FORGOTTEN DIALECTIC

In connection to authenticity, inaccessibility and intrinsic legitimacy of self function to *prevent maladaptive* selective pressures of intersubjective traditions. Authenticity can redress a dialectical imbalance whereby variability of individual deviations is stifled under some ossified forms of tradition such as tyrannical ideologies. For they eliminate tensions within intersubjectivity, as the individual freedom to expressively deviate is suppressed to excess degrees. The self becomes deprived of the very intersubjective *dialectic* between tension and reconciliation for its dynamic reality. It is a non-adaptive intersubjectivity that initiates the self but fails to *channel* the intrinsic force of demanded recognition to propel a readaptation of its traditions.

Authenticity functions to conceptually redress stifled variability through reframing the notion of self primarily with the emphasis of its asymmetrical and uniquely deviating fact. By doing so, it conceives a self that *dualizes* the interiority from the exteriority of intersubjective traditions. As the inner self is intrinsically and inaccessibly legitimate, it reframes recognition from perpetual dialectical tension to an obtained status *as an end*. As previously discussed, intrinsic and inaccessible legitimacy can render the meaning of “true interiority” entirely self-determined. The self-determination of interiority can conceptually hold exteriority as perpetually accountable for its perceived suppressed status. This essentially transforms the relation between the self and its intersubjective structures, whereby it no longer is propelled by a *mutual transformation* through negotiative tensions and reconciliations. Rather, the self seeks only the transformation of its exteriority to fulfill its demand for recognition and freedom. Intrinsic and inaccessible legitimacy renders the self no longer negotiable with others but *discoverable from within*. It is a self no longer involved in the dialectical cycle that renews itself and the intersubjective traditions for constituting its reality.

Fundamentally, what the authentic self is intending to achieve (in the context of pursuing freedom) is preserving a dialectical return towards its deviating freedom as to reconcile its contradicted asymmetry as inflicted by suppressive exteriority. It is to essentially protect and restore the dialectical

nature of its existential constitution that can be vulnerably lost in the risky face of tyranny. Conceptually, it does this by carving a dualism with which the interiority must liberate from the oppressive exteriority. However, the risk of such dualism is that the pursuit of freedom becomes contorted as an *end* in itself—thereby forgetting its dialectical purpose as ongoing return and instead remains fixated as a linear progression of permanent *escape* (towards the “better” side of interiority).

If the self is not dialectically propelled, the intersubjective traditions that constitute its reality become incapacitated to equally distribute equality and freedom. The authentic propensity to demand recognition from exteriority can very well negate others insofar as they are perpetually framed as oppressive forces. Insofar as the authentic self is not conceptually defined through a negotiative dialectic, the self no longer contributes to the readapted traditions with which *also* constitutes the other as equally recognized. Naturally, the negated others become compelled to (like the authentic self) resist and oppose the intersubjective conditions that stifle their recognized status. For the others also conceive their negated status as a reflection of an oppressed authentic self. If all selves frame the other as but an external obstruction against their interior truth, then intersubjectivity becomes a maladaptive tension that never adaptively reconciles. For all selves mutually frame the other as an exterior target of resistance that is obliged to change in certain manners that ought to accommodate oneself. Essentially, it is a tension of conflicting demands for a transformed other to *directly recognize* the self rather than the transformed mediating structure of meaning that negotiatively enables distributed equal recognition.

Such conditions arguably underlie important dimensions of the issues regarding boundaries of free expression as well as identity politics (whether on college campuses or in the public arena of political discussions). These issues increasingly and notoriously reflect polarizing politics—with one side committed to regulating expression for their “unsafe” conditions and the other opposing the limitations on expression through challenging the relevance of “safety” in the first place.¹⁹ Yet, this polarization is conceptually enabled by a shared existential conception of self—one that is ultimately attempting to pursue freedom as a linear end rather than the dialectical return that sustains its very reality. This

reflects a maladaptive intersubjectivity that no longer dialectically renews itself, for each self faults the other for their oppressed state, perpetually locked in an intrinsic legitimacy that cannot negotiatively change.

In all, authenticity can justify any experienced phenomenon to be changed and removed insofar as they are framed as an oppressive exteriority. On one side, the self may frame the other as inflicting psychological harm and hegemonic narratives that obstructs the authentic self. On the other, the self may reactively perceive imposed regulations upon supposed harmful contents as oppressive forces that (once again) obstructs authentic expression and recognition. This facilitates a mutual negation as each self is framed as an obstructive exterior, fueling a tension that never reconciles into adaptivity, but festers into a polarization unproductive for democratic processes. Ultimately, the educational facilitation of the authentic self can conceptually *stunt* adaptive liberal democracy as social encounters are no longer dialectically constituted, thereby depriving the propelling force of reconciliation that ought to eternally adapt intersubjective traditions *as* growing inquiry.

CONCLUSION

The restoration of liberal democracy, however, is not the conceptual or the educational minimization of authenticity itself as much as the reclaim of its dialectical intent. For its notion can be vulnerable to critical condemnations against its seeming “narcissistic” and “coddled” visage, whose egocentricity often becomes targeted as some signs of cultural decadence and erosion of intellectual lineages. This, however, simply reproduces the very dualism that harbours the issues that such critiques sought to address in the first place—in this case, the *exteriority* of traditions (instead) become overly enshrined to address the subjectivism of self-centeredness. Yet, the authentic conception can very well function to redress and resist the maladaptive forms of suppressive/oppressive traditions of education and broader society. To denigrate and stereotype its conceptual consequence, therefore, is to riskily miss the dialectical intent of its pursued freedom and the lesson of its forgotten dialectical form. Ultimately, it is of utmost importance for education to pedagogically conceive freedom and the student self within the remembrance of its return to the existential fact of traditions as a temporary necessity. The educator and student, therefore, ought

to approach democracy not as an opportunity for achieved freedom per se, but as an eternal commitment to endure the dialectical tensions of adaptivity as the very reality of the *authentic citizen*.

1 Charles Taylor, *Ethics of Authenticity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).

2 Taylor, *Ethics of Authenticity*, 29.

3 Taylor, *Ethics of Authenticity*, 29.

4 Taylor, *Ethics of Authenticity*, 29.

5 Taylor, *Ethics of Authenticity*, 29.

6 Charles Taylor, *Hegel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 17.

7 I mean student-centered in the broad sense of a “pedagogical attitude,” whereby curriculum can center around students’ experiences. By anti-oppressive directions I mean general classroom approaches that attempt to examine and dismantle oppressive hegemonic institutions and narratives.

8 This can be observed in the therapeutic incarnations of student-centeredness, as argued in Kathryn Ecclestone, *The Dangerous Rise of Therapeutic Education* (New York: Routledge, 2008).

9 The notion of “unlearning” is a fundamental aspect to anti-oppressive education, particularly regarding the psychology of internalized oppression. See Kevin Kumashiro, “Toward a Theory of Anti-oppressive Education,” *Review of Educational Research*, 70, no. 1 (2000): 25-53.

10 See Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi, “How We Know Others,” in *The Phenomenological Mind* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 172-197.

11 My usage of the term “asymmetry” is derived from the philosophical discourse on the epistemic disconnection between one’s and other’s consciousness. See Anita Avramides, “Other Minds,” in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2019 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/other-minds>.

12 John Russon, *Reading Hegel’s Phenomenology* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 88.

13 The clinical extremes of such domination are elaborated in Laing’s discussion of “objectification” in Ronald David Laing, *The Divided Self* (London:

Penguin, 2010).

14 Gallagher and Zahavi, *The Phenomenological Mind*, 86.

15 Jerome Popp, *Evolution's First Philosopher* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2008), 85.

16 Matthew Feinstein, "Dewey's Political Philosophy," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2019 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/dewey-political>.

17 John Dewey, "Democracy and Educational Administration," in *John Dewey: The later works, 1925-1953*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987).

18 John Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems* (University Park: Penn State Press, 2012), 121.

19 The relevance of this issue is demonstrably expressed through the cautionary grasp of its politically polarizing effect. See Amy Chua's discussion in "How America's Identity Politics Went From Inclusion to Division," *The Guardian*, March 1, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/mar/01/how-americas-identity-politics-went-from-inclusion-to-division>.