

Reclaiming the Feminine Voice in American Transcendentalism: Bridging Divides in Political Education

Naoko Saito
Kyoto University

Introduction: Spiritual Vacancy in Democracy

In his film *Fahrenheit 119*, Michael Moore provides a trenchant critique of contemporary politics in the United States, as epitomized by the election of Donald Trump as president.¹ Beginning with the unexpected defeat of Hilary Clinton in the election of 2016, the film is not simply a criticism of Trump; rather, it describes how the silenced voices of people, their frustration, their distrust of politicians—both Republican and Democrat, on the right and on the left—have contributed to the election of Trump. Behind its apparently “just” political slogans, democracy always harbors injustice. Democracy as a political system never guarantees democracy at the level of people’s daily lives. It is fragile, always on the verge of destruction. The film illustrates this with vivid images of angered underpaid teachers, of the despair of people in Flint, Michigan, now poisoned by toxic water, and of the grief and outrage of young students over the gunning down of a fellow student. Such negative political emotions of fear, anxiety, and hate and the sense of deep divides stir beneath sanitized political discourse. At the same time, the film depicts the way in which the voices of grassroots activists provide hope for change. It is a reminder that the resources for healthy democracy are to be found in the voice of the people—voices that are so often at present marginalized, silenced, or rendered inaudible—and that democracy must always be resuscitated from within the spirit of the people, and, hence, criticized from within.

As one of the historians in the film comments, democracy is always on the way, still to come. This reminds us of John Dewey’s idea that democracy is both an ideal and a fact—created and recreated in people’s daily lives. In the midst of tension and hostility, we human beings can be open,

he claims, to the crossing of bridges if we learn from our enemies as from “friends.”² As much as Dewey’s American hope for democracy is called for, at a time when recognition is urgently needed in the face of worldwide tensions, conflicts, and atrocities, its viability is severely tested.

In her philosophical-psychological analysis, Martha Nussbaum says that fear is “the emotion of an absolute monarch.”³ It is a part of human vulnerability. It turns us “away from others and toward a narcissistic preoccupation with ourselves,” producing a climate of “mistrust.”⁴ Furthermore in an interview about the aforementioned film, Moore remarks that Americans are afraid of other people, indicating that Trump’s politics exploits this psychology of fear.⁵ Democracy suffers from a certain spiritual vacancy—deep divides in the psyche that muffle people’s passion for democracy and for contributing their voice for the creation of democracy. Perhaps, as in Dewey’s times, and perhaps now in a more complicated way, we need to take into consideration the negative power of these political emotions: we need to determine the fate of democracy. In the face of such new challenges, how can we achieve democracy as a personal way of living, as Dewey envisioned nearly eighty years ago? What voice can bridge such divides, and how can it be cultivated in each of us? This is a task of political education in a broad sense.

In response to this question, and especially in response to the negative political emotions that create spiritual vacancy in democracy, this paper reexamines the possibilities of American transcendentalism for reclaiming the voice of democracy, and it does this in particular by way of the articulation of the feminine voice in the writings of Margaret Fuller. She writes of a “spiritual democracy,” but where the “spiritual” is to be understood in terms of the ordinary and the everyday. In contrast to the politics of recognition, which is fundamentally deficit-based in its way of thinking, accenting disadvantage, Fuller emphasizes the affirmative voice of the “I” in democracy—where the individual is understood in its singularity and in relation to a kind of femininity. Against the stereotype of strong individualism and against the Kantian autonomous subject, I shall reclaim Fuller’s notion of the human

subject as characterized by receptivity, passion, and humility. The cultivation of subjectivity thus understood requires “education for isolation,” a political education that bridges divides by reinforcing spiritual democracy from within, and this by foregrounding the necessity of facing oneself and finding one’s voice.

In the following, I shall first present the politics of recognition as a mainstream response to the need for reclaiming voice. Identifying certain limits in its response to the spiritual crisis of democracy, I shall then introduce an alternative idea of the voice of democracy through Fuller. Conversation is emphasized as a way of creating space for realizing the singularity of the self and for regaining democratic voice.

The Politics of Recognition

In one of his most recent writings, Richard Bernstein expresses his concern about the problem of incommensurability in circumstances of cultural pluralism. In the contemporary crisis of democracy around the world, and inheriting the spirit of Dewey’s democracy as a way of life, Bernstein acknowledges the real difficulty of achieving mutual understanding, and he identifies “fear” and “anxiety” as amongst its causes: “There is still fear, anxiety and deep prejudices about those who are different and foreign.”⁶ When we encounter “otherness,” it challenges our “deeply held convictions.”⁷ And this difficulty must, he claims, be addressed as a “practical challenge and a task,” involving people’s “passionate commitment” and action.⁸

Bernstein finds suggestions of a way forward in his “pragmatic encounters” with Gadamer, Habermas, and Taylor. With regard to Habermas, Bernstein appreciates his call for learning from each other through processes of self-reflection. This requires the cultivation of “a spirit of openness.”⁹ As for Gadamer, Bernstein highlights his hermeneutical idea of the “fusion of horizons,” which necessitates the “art of listening” and “imagination and humility” for genuine understanding.¹⁰ This, he says, is a “reciprocal” process.¹¹ Bernstein is also sympathetic to Taylor’s idea of the “politics of mutual recognition,” emphasizing the significance of listening to others in the kind

of conversation among people from different positions that does not deny or suppress “the otherness of the other.”¹² Bernstein’s way of addressing the challenge of incommensurability is more Deweyan and, thus, characterized by principles of mutuality and reciprocity.

Furthermore, Bernstein points out the common ground between Dewey’s idea of democracy and that of Axel Honneth, who has contributed much to the development of the theory of recognition and who is sympathetic to Dewey’s ideas of “expanded democracy” and “social cooperation.”¹³ In *The Struggle for Recognition*, Honneth emphasizes the significance of self-realization through the recognition of others in a community. In his “naturalistic justification of Hegel’s theory of recognition,” he relies heavily on the pragmatist ideas of Mead.¹⁴ In Mead’s thought, Honneth claims, life is given meaning intersubjectively.¹⁵ What is significant in Mead’s Hegelian idea of mutual recognition is that “every individual can know himself or herself to be confirmed as a person who is distinct from all others in virtue of his or her particular traits and abilities.”¹⁶ This is at the heart of a “democratized form of ethical life.”¹⁷ Recognition is derived from a sense of being “‘cognizant’ of someone [Zurkenntnisnahme] that is semantically present in the word ‘recognition.’”¹⁸ Though Honneth’s writing style is theoretical and cerebral, he develops the idea of mutual or reciprocal recognition in a somewhat existential direction—involving a sense of danger and risk as a condition of solidarity.¹⁹

Bernstein and Honneth, thus following in the steps of Dewey and Mead, together develop an idea of mutual recognition that is a promising indicator of what the reclaiming of democratic voice might amount to. Although both inherit a Deweyan idea of democracy as a way of life, their views also reach a certain limit in their response to the spiritual void in contemporary democracy. This has to do primarily with the emphasis on cognition. Casting a doubt on this, and with reference specifically to Taylor’s interpretive view based upon the idea of perspicuous contrast and the fusion of horizons, Paul Standish writes:

I do not want to contest the importance of dialogue

in the construction and sustaining of human identity. What is worth questioning here, however, is the way that this is then understood in terms of a kind of reciprocity—the need for equal recognition. My suspicion is that, very much in spite of the intentions of those who advocate these views, such a way of thinking secures the position of the agent (or the subject) in such a way as to prevent the openness to the other that is necessary. That is, it involves a fundamental distortion of the ethical. One problem here is the principle of reciprocity. Another is the understanding of the relation to the other primarily in terms of cognition.²⁰

In the spiritual crisis of democracy epitomized today by the loss of passion and commitment, it is difficult to be sure who one's enemies are, to whom one should express one's anger, whom one should trust, and where bridges can be built. In a situation where the sources of deep division are difficult to identify, mutual recognition and the embracement of "hope" cannot even get started.²¹ Where then is the mutual recognition of voice? The approach of recognition based upon cognition discloses its limits here.

In this cognitive approach, furthermore, the particularity of and singularity of voice are not sufficiently acknowledged. There is much talk about solidarity and group identity, but if the voice of people in democracy is to be resuscitated from within, greater attention needs to be given, as Bernstein recognizes, to the sources of passionate commitment.

Hence, the discourse of mutual recognition needs to extend beyond its present limits of language and thinking. In response to the aforementioned sense of fear, anxiety, and uncertainty as the spiritual crisis of democracy, and in a conversion from withdrawal to active participation, an alternative way of thinking about our moral lives is needed—beyond the principles of "symmetrical esteem."²²

Margaret Fuller's Reclaiming of the Feminine Voice in American Transcendentalism: Bridging Gender Divides

The American transcendentalism of Fuller presents a distinctive contribution to the alternative line of thinking regarding the resuscitation of democratic voice that has been this paper's concern. Fuller draws attention to the spiritual vacancy of democracy—the void that stifles people's passion for democracy and for contributing their voice for the creation of democracy—and, more than anything, to the barrier that divides men and women.

When American transcendentalism is discussed in connection with education, it is usually Emerson and Thoreau who are highlighted. They are often represented as proponents of the idea of the self-reliant individual, and Thoreau especially is known for his defense of civil disobedience. But if American transcendentalism puts emphasis on finding one's voice, the voice of the "I," as we typically see in readings of Emerson and Thoreau, can a woman's voice be heard there? Fuller's voice responds to this call. She is not usually included in discussions of transcendentalism and education. Adding a feminine perspective to the ideas of Emerson and Thoreau, she enriches American transcendentalism as a whole.

Fuller is an exceptional figure in American transcendentalism as she is one of the few female thinkers who, though only through a short period, made the feminine voice prominent in the movement. She was involved in the transcendental movement in New England in the early 1840s until she left for New York in 1844. She was more socially and politically oriented than Emerson or Thoreau as her involvement in the *New York Tribune* as an editor and her later involvement in the revolution in Italy. In her eyes, according to Fuller's biographer, John Matteson, "Emerson's exaltation of the self took no cognizance of the prejudices and social conventions that can handicap the bravest spirit."²³

Yet she was herself deeply influenced by and in turn influenced transcendentalism. Even though her way of thinking was oriented more to the

social and the political, she believed that, as Matteson puts it, “the spiritual is the social and, as many more in later times would realize, the personal is the political,” and “[o]n this point,” he continues, “she was staunchly Emersonian.”²⁴ Indeed, Fuller sustained the Emersonian theme of the education of the self-reliant person, from the inmost to the outmost, from the private to the public—according to which, if there is anything social or political, it is grounded in the power of the self-reliant individual.

In her early career Fuller had a close friendship with Emerson, and her thought was inspired by her conversations with him. According to Buell, “Emerson was more responsive to intellectual women than were most nineteenth-century men.”²⁵ Emerson wrote that “[Fuller] was my ideal listener and critic” and that she was an “inspirer of courage, the secret friend of all nobleness, the patient waiter for the realization of character.”²⁶ Their friendship and conversations embodied the Emersonian perfectionist idea of friendship.

Indeed, one of the most striking features of her achievements in New England was her recourse to “conversations” as the medium of education—especially, the education of women. Between 1839 and 1844, she organized a series of occasions for conversations for women in the Boston area.²⁷ According to Buell, “[T]his gift, combined with the power to make even shy people open up, made her an exceptionally magnetic presence as a discussion leader,” and she demonstrated a “gift and zest for intellectual networking, surpassing Emerson’s own.”²⁸ Goodman says, “She required that her students not simply listen to her, but that each woman be ‘willing to communicate what was in her mind.’ In doing so she was in accord with Emerson’s idea that everyone has something original to say and do, and with his conception of the scholar as an ‘active soul.’”²⁹ And, as Matteson remarks, “Her conversations, certainly, had always brought her back into a feminine sphere of thought and feeling.”³⁰

The radicalism of Fuller’s thought is manifested in “The Great Law-suit,” her initial manifestation of the dissenting voice of a woman, published in 1843. Following this, her most well-known book, *Woman in the Nineteenth*

Century, was published in February in 1845. According to Matteson, “[I]f ‘The Great Lawsuit’ had been the most audacious statement on behalf of women’s right ever written in America, *Woman in the Nineteenth Century* would be the most comprehensive.”³¹ Here I would like briefly to capture the essence of “The Great Lawsuit” as it lays the ground for *Woman in the Nineteenth Century*.

“The Great Lawsuit” is the text in which her social orientation is demonstrated, and in it the Emersonian perfectionist spirit resounds in the voice of a woman. In order to create the Emersonian path from the inmost to the outmost, Fuller pays attention to the necessity of redressing the conditions of the outer, conditions that prevent a woman’s inner light from shining; she does this with a view to attaining “inward and outward freedom for woman.”³² Fuller embodied and practiced the finding of voice so central to Emersonian perfectionism, and what she sought to establish in the process was the woman’s voice, for the sake of the self-realization of women. Goodman says also that “Fuller’s unfolding of women’s ‘powers’ and ‘finding out what is fit for themselves’ are versions of the widespread Transcendentalist concern with self-development and self-expression, what Emerson calls in ‘History,’ discovering one’s ‘unattained but attainable self.’”³³

In “The Great Lawsuit,” Fuller declares “her goal of redressing the errors of feminine education.”³⁴ Thoreau praised the writing, and Emerson called it “an important fact in the history of Woman: good for its wit, excellent for its character . . . It will teach us to revise our habits.”³⁵ As much as it is considered to be a precursor of later developments of feminism in America, “The Great Lawsuit” is not simply a polemical statement bent on redress for the injustice done to women: it is dedicated more than anything to a spiritual enlightening of women in a broader conception of the human. She writes:

What woman needs is not as a woman to act or rule,
but as a nature to grow, as an intellect to discern, as a soul
to live freely, and unimpeded to unfold such powers as were
given her when we left our common home.³⁶

It is not that she wants women not to act and rule, but her aim is more far-reaching. Matteson comments that "Fuller intended her argument to be more comprehensive, and she meant her work to foster a greater good for Man and Woman alike, whom she regarded as 'the two halves of one thought.'"³⁷ What she calls for in this writing is the regaining of the autonomy of women, their "self-respect" and "self-dependence," remembering and resuscitating their voices as the voice of human being.³⁸ According to Buell, "Fuller's feminism is more 'cultural' than 'political' in aiming to revolutionize attitudes rather than to revolutionize society at the ballot box."³⁹ The political is fused with the spiritual in her writing.

One of the characteristic features of her writing is the way she justifies the equality of man and woman. She takes an Emersonian stance to the effect that "there is but one law for all souls."⁴⁰ She considers that the division between man and woman is to be transcended, and writes as follows:

Male and female represent the two sides of the great radical dualism. But, in fact, they are perpetually passing into one another. Fluid hardens to solid, solid rushes to fluid. There is no wholly masculine man, no purely feminine woman.⁴¹

Her positionist bridge gender divides, to appreciate "genderless souls" instead of sexual bodies.⁴² The division between man and woman, in her view, is an arbitrary barrier. Thus, we can see how Fuller helps Emerson's perfectionism to extend into the liberation of the female voice. In fact, there can be no doubt that the greatest contribution Fuller makes to American transcendentalism is in her emphasis on the cultivation of the feminine voice. "The especial genius of woman," she writes, "I believe to be electrical in movement, intuitive in function, spiritual in tendency."⁴³ Moreover, the receptive nature of the feminine voice is there in Emerson. He writes that "women, as most susceptible, are the best index of the coming hour" and that the feminine voice is delicate, even feeble, and yet in a certain sense, resilient.⁴⁴ These words of Emerson follow a lengthy paragraph in which he provides a long list of "great men," which he then subtly undermines with this turn to

the feminine.

Here is Fuller again:

In so far as soul is in her completely developed, all soul is the same; but as far as it is modified in her as woman, it flows, it breathes, it sings, rather than deposits soil, or finishes work, and that which is especially feminine flushes in blossom the face of earth, and pervades like air and water all this seeming solid globe, daily renewing and purifying its life. Such may be the especially feminine element, spoken of as Femality.⁴⁵

We can reread Fuller today as someone who invigorates Emerson's feminine voice—where this is taken not to refer necessarily to the woman but to the feminine voice as the mode of thinking. The feminine here is the woman as female—that is, it is not based upon exclusively biological/social/cultural distinctions between man and woman, but is an archetype, an aspect of the human.

Is it too much to say that Fuller is more radical and more dissenting than Emerson or Thoreau as she shifts Emerson's idea of "Man Thinking" to that of "Woman Thinking"?⁴⁶

The Education of the Feminine Voice: Bridging Divides through Isolation

Fuller's American transcendentalism reorients the way we think about political education. For her, the political is inseparable from the spiritual, and the political is inseparable from language and from finding one's voice. Rereading Fuller's American transcendentalism has shown that the political requires, if nothing else, our spiritual, inner transformation—a transformation in the ordinary. Fuller's "cultural" feminism, which bridges the spiritual and the political, makes us recast the inner and the outer distinction. Such spirituality is crucial in the age of globalization, when everything is exchanged into measured values and everything supposedly made transparent. Fuller helps us envision a political education for human transformation. To cultivate political sensibility, aesthetic education will be crucial—in particular, the development of aesthetic judgment and imagination. Here again, the

significant factor is the idea of dissent. The element of discord, disturbance, and eccentricity are crucial factors in anything that might be regarded as education for citizenship.⁴⁷ Fuller's call for the feminine voice is particularly significant in this sense.

In resistance to the inner death from which many of us suffer today, she seeks to create a space for the eccentric as for the unique, for the weak as for the great. This is a dimension of our political life that is missing from the politics of recognition. This is not simply a matter of giving equal opportunities to the different—to women, children, immigrants, minorities—but of exposing the human psyche to what it wishes to avoid. What I want to claim then via Fuller's feminine voice is not geared towards such a categorical division between the oppressed and the advantaged. As Thoreau says, it is addressed to "those who are said to be in moderate circumstances."⁴⁸ He means that the loss of voice is a serious problem for those people who apparently live satisfactory, comfortable lives. His appeal, like Fuller's, is addressed to the human condition in general, not only to women as oppressed. The feminine voice thus points us to an alternative mode of thinking about our political lives and orientates us toward bridging differences.

In creating democracy from within, through the conversations Fuller practiced, a particular mode of speech and relation to language is to be cultivated. This requires a mode of political engagement that is different from the dialectic of conflict and resolution, conducted in the language of polemos. It requires a conversation in which the mediation of language is allowed to do its own work, with space for the unknown and the non-transparent acknowledged. What is alleged to be "eccentric" awaits its expression. Such conversation destabilizes discourses of equality and fairness fossilized in the nostrums of face-to-face dialogue, in rational moral argument. The goal of conversation, then, is not to find the point of conversion, to reach an agreement, but the progressive unfolding of further difference. Its foremost task is to regain our pathos in words and life, where we strike a new light; it is to redeem a right in each of us to achieve "greatness."⁴⁹ Through passion and patience, as conditions of thinking, the self gradually and eventually builds a bridge to public

life. What I want to draw from Fuller is not the common voice of women as an oppressed group. It is the singularity of the human voice that tends to be covered over and forgotten under the weight of the abstract masculine voice of control. Conversation, for Fuller, is a robust way of finding my voice as I participate in the language community.

Cavell claims that *Walden* is “a tract of political education,” and he articulates the provocative thesis that “education for citizenship is education for isolation.”⁵⁰ What he means is that self-examination is at the heart of Thoreau’s political education. Its implications are diverse. It resists contemporary communal politics, which is often based upon a supposedly natural home as the place to return to. It reminds us that we are always on the border of acceding to the closure of politics, in the shadow of inclusion. Like Thoreau, Fuller provides us with the space in which the singularity of an individual, in particular, the femininity of voice, is never dissipated, never lost, in a homogenized publicity and sharing, and yet, at the same time, never falls into the “interiorisation of the spiritual.”⁵¹ Confronting one’s divided psyche is a precondition for the building that is needed.

The singularity and eccentricity of the self, the otherness of the self, need to be acknowledged before and throughout the process of socialization. This is best illustrated by Fuller’s feminine voice. The notion of political participation is then to be realigned with what Cavell identifies as “a confrontation which takes the form of a withdrawal.”⁵² This is markedly different from the call for a latter-day Hobbesian individualism, which is surely one of the targets that Michael Moore’s film identifies. And it makes requirements of education that are certainly not met by the prevailing culture of credentialism and achievement.⁵³ In political education, there is a need to create space for the self to face itself, and this in conversation with friends. To face one’s own self in withdrawal is to encounter and begin with the singularity of the feminine voice and the sense of separation. It is a call to those who are withdrawn to relearn the way of withdrawal in order to regain their voice in democracy.

1 Fahrenheit 119, directed by Michael Moore (2018; Santa Monica, CA: Briarcliff Entertainment), film.

2 John Dewey, "Creative Democracy – The Task Before Us," in *The Later Works of John Dewey*, Vol. 14, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1988).

3 Martha C. Nussbaum, *The Monarchy of Fear: A Philosopher Looks at Our Political Crisis* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2018), 30.

4 Nussbaum, 60; 51.

5 Interview with Michael Moore, Japan Broadcasting Corporation, November 5, 2018.

6 Richard Bernstein, *Pragmatic Encounters* (New York: Routledge, 2016), 72; 85.

7 Bernstein, 74.

8 Bernstein, 72; 73.

9 Bernstein, 73.

10 Bernstein, 70; 71.

11 Bernstein, 71.

12 Bernstein, 90; 98.

13 Richard Bernstein, *The Pragmatic Turn* (Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 2010), 86.

14 Axel Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts* (Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 1995), 75.

15 Honneth, 73, 83.

16 Honneth, 88.

- 17 Honneth, 90.
- 18 Honneth, 112.
- 19 Honneth, 91.
- 20 Paul Standish, "Equal Recognition: Identity Politics and the Idea of a Social Science," in *Beyond Empiricism on Criteria for Educational Research*, eds. Paul Smeyers and Marc Depaepe (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2003), 251.
- 21 Nussbaum, *The Monarchy of Fear*, 218.
- 22 Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition*, 128.
- 23 John Matteson, *The Lives of Margaret Fuller* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2012), 205.
- 24 Matteson, 268; 208–209.
- 25 Lawrence Buell, *Emerson* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), 88.
- 26 Buell; Quoted in Buell, *Emerson*, 88.
- 27 Matteson, *The Lives of Margaret Fuller*, 162; Buell, *Emerson*, 33; Lawrence Buell, *The American Transcendentalists: Essential Writings* (New York: The Modern Library, 2006), 297; Russell B. Goodman, *American Philosophy before Pragmatism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 165.
- 28 Buell, *The American Transcendentalists*, 297; Buell, *Emerson*, 33.
- 29 Goodman, *American Philosophy before Pragmatism*, 166.
- 30 Matteson, *The Lives of Margaret Fuller*, 259.
- 31 Matteson, 262.
- 32 Margaret Fuller, "The Great Lawsuit," in *The American Transcendentalists: Essential Writings*, ed. Lawrence Buell (New York: The Modern Library, 2006), 307.

- 33 Goodman, *American Philosophy before Pragmatism*, 167.
- 34 Matteson, *The Lives of Margaret Fuller*, 161.
- 35 Quoted in Matteson, *The Lives of Margaret Fuller*, 212.
- 36 Fuller, "The Great Lawsuit," 307.
- 37 Matteson, *The Lives of Margaret Fuller*, 208.
- 38 Fuller, "The Great Lawsuit," 309.
- 39 Buell, *The American Transcendentalist*, 301.
- 40 Fuller, "The Great Lawsuit," 307.
- 41 Fuller, 319.
- 42 Matteson, *The Lives of Margaret Fuller*, 266.
- 43 Fuller, "The Great Lawsuit," 319.
- 44 Ralph Waldo Emerson, *Selections from Ralph Waldo Emerson*, ed. Stephen E. Whicher (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957), 350.
- 45 Fuller, "The Great Lawsuit," 319.
- 46 Ralph Waldo Emerson, *The Essential Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson*, ed. Brooks Atkinson (New York: Modern Library, 2000), 44.
- 47 Fuller says: "Concord . . . [lacks] the animating influences of Discord" [quoted in Matteson, *The Lives of Margaret Fuller*, 257].
- 48 Henry D. Thoreau, *Walden and Resistance to Civil Government*, ed. William Rossi (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1992), 24.
- 49 Emerson, *The Essential Writings*, 256–257.
- 50 Stanley Cavell, *The Senses of Walden* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 85–86.
- 51 Paul Standish, "Education's Outside" (paper presented at the conference of Philosophy of Education and the Transformation of Educational Sys-

tems, University of Basel, Switzerland, October 29-31, 2009).

52 Stanley Cavell, *Themes Out of School: Effects and Causes* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 50.

53 For a critique of the culture of achievement, see William Deresiewicz's *Excellent Sheep: The Miseducation of the American Elite and the Way to a Meaningful Life* (New York: Free Press, 2014) and my paper, "Excellent Sheep or Wild Ducks? Reclaiming the Humanities for Beautiful Knowledge," in *Philosophy of Education 2017* (2019).