

Beauty as Fairness: Toward an Ecoaesthetic Education

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This essay argues that beauty can help learners and educators with ecological thinking toward a nonexploitative coexistence among human and nonhuman others. Contributing to the literature on the intersection of aesthetic education and ecological education,¹ I explore the educational act of perceiving nature and nonhuman others through the frame of beauty and how this perceptual sensibility might be useful to ecological awareness. Taking a cue from Ramsey Affifi, who argues for beauty as a light in the dark situation of environmental crisis and the role education plays therein, I am of the mind that aesthetic ecology has an important role to play in educational theory. Affifi argues that even amidst hopelessness, “beauty can move us to action.”² Similarly, Angelo Caranfa advocates for a model of schooling and education that promotes the contemplation of “things of beauty” toward meaning of existence beyond the self.³ With these ideas in mind, I explore the educational act of not just looking at but being in mindful sensual proximity to nature and nonhuman others. Additionally, I explore the cultivation of a kind of sensibility that reconsiders an experience of beauty to be more than sensual delight, and that includes consideration of teleological function toward ecological reciprocity. Ultimately, I take beauty as a useful ontological ordering for not only perceiving nature and nonhuman others but also making them subjects of esteemed regard.

In her book *On Beauty and Being Just*, Elaine Scarry argues that beauty “assists us in the work of addressing injustice . . . by requiring of us constant perceptual acuity—high dives of seeing, hearing, touching.”⁴ I argue that perceptual exposure of some kind is not only helpful but perhaps necessary for building more just relations between humans and nonhuman beings and the natural environment. I argue, though, for a particular way of perceiving, one that foregrounds beauty as a perceptual frame. I engage with Scarry’s argument for beauty because she—following from Burke, Kant, and Schiller—associates beauty with moral thinking and ethical fairness.⁵ I first outline Scarry’s argument for the analogousness of perceiving beauty and extending ethical fairness to others; then,

I draw on my recent encounter with periodical cicadas in an Ohio emergence area in order to illustrate how beauty can bring us into a relation of generosity and reciprocity with the nonhuman world. I look to the cicadas' symmetrical and symbiotic reciprocity with old forest trees and suggest such symmetrical relations as a model of not only beauty but of fair relations with others. Finally, I situate this symmetrical reciprocity within philosophy of education literature toward practical considerations for an education for an ecoaesthetic.

BEAUTY AS FAIRNESS

Scarry's argument for perceiving beauty in nature lends itself well to the environmental humanities because looking at nature through the frame of beauty begets a moral attitude toward the nonhuman. For Scarry, "an *ethical fairness* . . . will be greatly assisted by an *aesthetic fairness*" (OBBJ, 114). In other words, beauty might serve "as a prelude or a precondition of enjoying fair relations with others" (OBBJ, 114). The word "fairness," as Scarry points out, is used both to describe beauty—as in Snow White "the fairest of them all"—and ethical requirements—as in "being fair, playing fair and fair distribution" (OBBJ, 91). When traced to their etymological roots, the two uses of the word converge. The roots of the word "fair" in Old English, Old Norse, and Gothic, as well as Eastern European and Sanskrit, "all originally express the aesthetic use of 'fair' to mean 'beautiful' or 'fit'—fit both in the sense of 'pleasing to the eye' and in the sense of 'firmly placed,' as when something matches or exists in accord with another thing's shape or size" (OBBJ, 92-93). Scarry's explanation of fairness echoes Kant's teleological judgment in the *Third Critique*. For Kant, beauty in nature for is associated with its perceived purposiveness: the free play between imagination, understanding, and the thing perceived. The external purposiveness of beings and phenomena in nature make clear the *beziehung*: the reciprocal relations of things in nature.⁶ When "something matches or exists in accord with" something else, not only is the symmetry associated with beauty clear, but, with it, a moral teleology reveals itself. For this reason, the notion of beauty and the perception of animals and things in the natural environment through the frame of beauty has an important place in an education that cultivates an ecological sensibility.

ERRORS IN BEAUTY

A sensibility, or ability to appreciate and respond to an aesthetic object, is thought to be not an aptitude one is born with but a sensitivity that is refined and developed through exposure and experience.⁷ When we say, for example, “she has a refined taste,” we are making a claim about a sensibility that has changed over time. If the ability to appreciate beauty in nature is an aesthetic sensibility, that means we get it wrong sometimes. The getting it wrong is a valuable part of the process of an education for an ecoaesthetic. The frames through which children encounter nonhuman nature for the first time might be wonder and astonishment but may also be fear and disgust. The exclamation of “eewwwwwww!” when a child first watches a worm emerge from the earth comes to mind. Not only children but people of all ages have moments like this when they encounter an unfamiliar food or a seemingly strange work of art for the first time. The strange and unfamiliar begets feelings of discomfort and bewilderment. The job of an education for ecological consciousness is to guide students through the process of unlearning bad aesthetics: the ways in which they—indeed, all of us—have been conditioned to see the nonhuman world. This is a process of not only unlearning a bad aesthetic but cultivating a new one, an ecoaesthetic, which might also involve reconceptualizing what an experience of beauty entails. The reason that beauty is a useful perceptual frame through which to see nature toward moral and nonexploitative relations is because of the “radical decentering” Scarry suggests occurs when we glimpse something beautiful. This radical decentering leads to a perceptual acuity such that, when we enter into a moral relationship with the perceived, we engage in a symmetrical reciprocity.

The importance of this shift becomes clearer through a consideration of what is lost when we do not see nature—what happens when perceptual acuity is not achieved. Lack of exposure can cause what Scarry refers to as an “error in beauty” (OBBJ, 9). We wrongly withhold justice and care from beings that are unknown or unfamiliar.⁸ Scarry characterizes this lack of care for or even revulsion toward something as an error in beauty. She describes two possible errors: one is realizing that something previously thought beautiful no longer

deserves to be so regarded. The second is the realization that something from which the attribution was withheld deserved it all along. She finds the latter error to be graver and calls this error a “failed generosity” (OBBJ, 14). Human societal practices regularly operate under such a failed generosity. Most people care somewhat for beings and things in the nonhuman world to which they have had exposure: for example, dogs, cats, certain kinds of birds, butterflies, and flowers. Most people agree that these beings should be cared for and preserved. The same might not be said of things that seem more alien or signify abjection: slugs, spiders, opossums, for example. Indeed, Cris Mayo’s essay “Vermin, the Proximate and Often Unpleasant Stranger” attends to our relationships with “animals with whom we interact . . . although they may arouse worry or even disgust.”⁹ Mayo discusses so-called vermin such as mice who infiltrate human houses, racoons who rustle trash, and frogs who seek relief from cold winters in windows. Mayo is concerned with the challenges these beings “pose to thinking ethically about relationships between human and non-human animals.”¹⁰ In particular, our proximity and inadvertent relationships with these beings has the potential to start what Mayo calls “a process of rethinking.” The encounters we experience with these undesirable nonhuman others have the potential to invoke “additional consideration of the animal and their relationship to humans and the environment.”¹¹ Mayo, in naming the vermin “unpleasant strangers,” makes the good point that “our relationships with animals or any kind of vermin need not be pleasant to be ethical.” Indeed, “some of our closest relationships,” whether they be with other humans or nonhumans, “begin unpleasantly but move into ethical cooperation.”¹² Indeed, Mary Louis Pratt says of the “interspecies contact zone” that “relations of companionship, cooperation, competition . . . suspicion, love, dependency, and avoidance unfold” all at once. Specifically, Pratt points to rats in the New York City subway: they are certainly proximate and unpleasant strangers, but, nevertheless, humans and rats have “negotiated a voiceless, symmetrical relationship.”¹³

Mayo’s and Pratt’s arguments that our experience of a being need not be pleasant to be ethical might at first seem to undercut Scarry’s that beings and things ought to be attributed the esteem of beauty toward an ethical consider-

ation, but I do not think these arguments are contradictory. In fact, experiences of beauty are not always pleasant; they are often disorienting and perplexing, and the beholder of the beautiful is thrown into a position of vulnerability. Take Dante and his beholding of Beatrice, for example: when he comes face-to-face with her, he trembles violently, and his senses go haywire.¹⁴ He feels uncomfortable and looks ridiculous. The poet Rainier Maria Rilke called beauty merely “the beginning of terror.”¹⁵ For Kant, when we judge things in nature, we “also take into account their objective purposiveness in order to judge their beauty . . . we then judge nature no longer as it appears as art, but insofar as it actually is art, and so we make a teleological judgment that serves the aesthetic one.”¹⁶ This is the work of fine art, says Kant: “it describes things beautifully that in nature we would dislike or find ugly.”¹⁷ Therefore, beauty can still be a useful perceptual frame even toward an “unpleasant stranger,” especially if such failed generousities toward lesser known and lesser liked beings are reframed as errors in beauty. Scarry describes her own error: she “had ruled out palm trees as objects of beauty and . . . one day . . . discovered [she] had made a mistake” (OBBJ, 10). Though a far cry from vermin, palm trees were nevertheless something Scarry claimed to have disliked. When Scarry encounters a palm tree, close up, she realizes her error (OBBJ, 16). Suddenly something heretofore she cared nothing for at all, even disliked, has shown itself to be magnificent, inspiring, sublime, beautiful. She notes that it was the palm tree’s absence in her proximal visual perception as they exist on a coast not her own—her lack of having *seen* many or even one at all close up. I am not arguing here that we start to feel about vermin the way that Scarry came to feel about palm trees. But we might take into consideration a rethinking, as Mayo suggests, or a reorientation toward the nonhuman that recognizes the potential for beauty. To extend Scarry’s argument and bring the idea of errors in beauty into a discussion of human and nonhuman relationships, I would like to share my own recent error in beauty. This error also occurred because of lack of visual exposure, though rather than hemispherical separation, as in Scarry’s example, mine was an issue of ground separation: above versus below.

In the summer of 2021, one of the largest broods of periodical cicadas

appeared across fifteen US states for the first time in seventeen years. Visiting an area outside Columbus, Ohio, I found myself in what naturalists call an “emergence area.” Cicadas were everywhere, their collective chirps at times deafening. While fearful of the archaic-looking bugs flying into my hair and taking up residence there, after doing some reading in the *Columbus Dispatch* about their unique lifecycles and ecological contributions, as well as encountering them in the old forests surrounding the area, seeing them spring and cluster above trees, jump and sputter, and, above all, chirp in a choral cacophony, I began to find them beautiful.

Researchers estimate periodical cicadas to be more than five million years old. Some, including the current brood, known as Brood X, emerge every seventeen years and “spend the vast majority of their life underground sipping on the sap of tree roots.”¹⁸ They emerge for only a few weeks to mate and then die. But they are doing important work while underground: “the roots of trees and plants have fluid flowing through them that cicadas sip out with a straw-like tongue, growing bigger over the years until it’s their time to tunnel out.”¹⁹ The cicadas make important ecological contributions. Throughout their seventeen-year slumber, “they’re . . . aerating the soil, which helps roots absorb water and nutrients.”²⁰ Cicada carcasses also fertilize the same trees they spend “nearly two decades latched onto.”²¹ This cycle has become especially important in light of climate change. The emergence, reproduction, and death of cicadas are the building blocks of forest floors, and forests counterbalance climate change caused by human activity.

Both climate change and human infrastructure developments threaten forests and thereby threaten cicadas. The numbers in which cicadas emerge are an important evolutionary defense against predators, enabling them to survive long enough to reproduce. Harsh seasons due to climate change and deforestation for development reduce cicadas’ numbers. “In just the last century, cicadas have all but disappeared from certain historical breeding grounds as forests made way for development,” according to a report in the *Columbus Dispatch*; “Other groups of cicadas are emerging years early and without protection in numbers, which many scientists attribute to warmer summers and harsher winters that

disrupt the cicadas' sense of timing."²² According to John Cooley, an ecology and evolutionary biology professor at the University of Connecticut, "cicadas depend on an interconnected network of forests to survive and thrive,"²³ and when trees are felled for developments, the cicadas get trapped underground. Significant changes in weather patterns over time due to climate change can also cause cicadas to emerge at the wrong time. Experts agree "the best way to protect cicadas is also one of the strongest tools for fighting climate change: protecting trees."²⁴

Although the bumbling, winged creatures pop into the public eye only once every other decade, it's important for humans to understand the impact they're having on their populations A cicada year has long been considered a symbol of nature's bounty and reminder of the forest's wellbeing. 'Cicadas are in some ways a long-term barometer of environmental health,' . . . 'If we see the cicadas declining, then over time that tells us that something's wrong. We need to really be paying attention.'²⁵

Because the periodic cicadas spend the majority of their lifecycle underground, hidden from human view, and then suddenly emerge in a multiplicitous chirping cacophony, they are a good candidate for the phenomenon of the radical decentering Scarry describes at the site of meeting between the beholder and the beheld. In the following section, I discuss what can happen, what ought to happen, when we sensually perceive nature and reconceptualize experiences of beauty.

SYMMETRICAL RECIPROCITY

According to Scarry, "at the moment we see something beautiful, we undergo a radical decentering" (OBBJ, 111). Scarry quotes Simone Weil, who writes that this decentering prompts us "to give up our imaginary position as the center [of existence] A transformation then takes place at the very roots of our sensibility."²⁶ Because the cicadas spend the majority of their lifecycle underground, outside of the human perceptual field, opportunities to behold them and experience such a decentering transformation at their behest are

few and far between. Perhaps this helps explain my error in beauty described above. But the cicadas made themselves known to me, piqued my curiosity, and ultimately made some small but important shift in my sensibility toward the world around me and the role I and my behaviors play in the world. Leading up to my trip to Ohio, I had been warned about the mass cicada emergence and how the creatures were swarming and jumping on people; I was obsessively worried about this. The idea of these prehistoric-looking bugs jumping at me brought on feelings of not only fear but visceral disgust. Fear and disgust often accompany lack of exposure. However, when I found myself in the midst of the cicadas, I found my inner experience to be one of intrigue and curiosity. I started reading about the cicadas, and, with new knowledge coupled with perceptual exposure, my perception of them completely changed. This change was especially potent when I learned about the symbiotic relationship between the cicadas and the mature, beautiful trees that I love most about Ohio visits. I saw the beauty in the cicadas after learning about their ecological function and realized I had generosity toward them after all—I wanted to be fair and regard them with fairness. With an ecological awareness came a sense of ethics and fairness—an ecoaesthetic awareness. Scarry describes this kind of educative encounter this way:

[T]his quality of heightened attention is voluntarily extended out to other persons or things. It is as though beautiful things have been placed here and there throughout the world to serve as small wake-up calls to perception, spurring lapsed alertness back to its most acute level. Through its beauty, the world continually recommits us to a rigorous standard of perceptual care: if we do not search it out, it comes and finds us. (OBBJ, 81)

My educational encounter with the cicadas would likely have not happened if the cicadas had not emerged in such numbers, taken up so much space, and been so present in my proximity. They emerged and compelled me to see them and to wonder about them. These tiny wake-up calls and “the rigorous standard of perceptual care” they inspire are invaluable educational moments; it is this kind of perceptual care and the experiences that might inspire it that I

propose be made a part of the effort to ecologize education. This might mean allotting more unstructured time for wandering in nature or perhaps emphasizing representations of the nonhuman world in literature, art, and even natural science classes that positions it as beautiful, as artful, as something of valuable aesthetic importance. Most of all, this kind of education will be greatly assisted by visual exposure and proximity; and, finally, a reconceptualization of the things in nature one sees and beholds. This reconceptualization will be assisted by an education that emphasizes the potential for beauty.

Beauty, apart from all other qualities a being or thing might possess, is particularly significant, thinks Scarry, because “the beautiful . . . acquaints us with the mental event of conviction, and so . . . ever afterwards one is willing to labor, struggle, wrestle with the world to locate enduring sources of conviction” (OBBJ, 31). In other words, seeking out beauty is generative. As one continuously revises one’s location in order to be in beauty’s path, they keep wandering, seeking, and experiencing; this “is the basic impulse underlying education” (OBBJ, 7). This perceptual care and willingness toward locational revision are the basic tools for an ecological education toward more just relations with the nonhuman world.

What might an education for ethical fairness toward a cicada or a tree look like? In other words, how can we educate for a symmetrical reciprocity? As aforementioned, exposure and proximity are the first steps. As philosophers of ecological and environmental education have pointed out, institutions of education are not attentive enough to nature.²⁷ This inattentiveness perpetuates lack of exposure to nonhuman things and the failed generosity brought on by errors in beauty, as I have described in this essay. LeAnn Holland offers a helpful proposal in her essay “An Element-ary Education,” in which she aims “to resituate human bodies and minds in the natural environment.”²⁸ Holland argues for exposing students to the elements, as an education confined to indoor spaces can never truly be experiential.²⁹ By sealing students “off from weather in ‘air-controlled,’ four-walled classrooms . . . weather becomes a field trip or project day only, sending the message to students that weather, while important content, is only to be ‘visited’ on sunny days,” Holland argues.³⁰ In other words,

“*weather* . . . is a subject to be taught,” rather than an experience to be had.³¹ This idea rings true of all nonhuman phenomena and beings: when regarded only as abstract subjects of study, they are not regarded as real, live processes and beings that we are interrelated to and with. Moreover, as Holland argues, the nonhuman environment “has the power to provoke transformational learning. But without experience in these elements, without *exposure*, students lack the necessary conditions for such moments.”³² But exposure alone is not enough. Looking, beholding, being adjacent to, are insufficient for a truly transformational educational process as it concerns the nonhuman environment.

If ethical fairness is to be extended to the nonhuman and reciprocity is to be achieved, the nonhuman ought to be included in social justice education. For such an inclusion to take place, though, “nature” must be a part of education in a more meaningful way than currently happens. Morwenna Griffith points out that the relationship between the human and more-than-human is “seldom recognized as contributing to a more socially just education.”³³ Griffiths offers a reading of Mary Wollstonecraft’s *Vindication of the Rights of Women* that considers the educational relationships “between human beings and the rest of the natural world, the more-than-human.”³⁴ Griffiths notes of Wollstonecraft, “in her pedagogical proposals she does not impose a sharp demarcation between what is indoors and outdoors, what is wild from what is social.”³⁵ Nature is complex in how it intersects with our human activities and how we intersect with its activities. As Griffiths explains,

It is all of: organic, inorganic, indoors, outdoors, and both; of our bodies, in our bodies and beyond them . . . growing, inanimate; beautiful, grim; huge, minute, and all sizes between; mysterious, wild, ordinary . . . and a force to be struggled with.³⁶

An education that attends to the pervasiveness of the nonhuman in our human existence and the (perhaps unknown or recognized) intimacy of our needs and values with those of the nonhuman would prompt an ecological awareness that lends itself to the extension of ethical fairness to include the nonhuman. Conferring beauty is a starting point for this. But it is not enough simply to regard something as beautiful as we typically conceive of such an experience; it

must be considered as the subject of justice and fairness. We ought, as Scarry says, to confer the gift of life on the other-than and more-than-human. By attending to the aliveness of a being, an act Scarry thinks beauty requires of us, we, as perceivers, enter into a contract with the beautiful being.

If symmetry signifies not only beauty but also a purposive reciprocity, then I look to the cicadas once again as providing a model for symmetry as ethical fairness. As explained above, the cicadas suck the sap from tree roots underground, but after they have emerged, reproduced, and then died, their carcasses decompose at the base of those same trees and provide vital nutrients for the soil, which then feeds the root of the trees. And so, there is a symmetry to the relations of the trees and cicadas as well as a fairness of distribution. In the same way that the cicadas and trees are fair to each other, we might mimic that fair relation in our treatment of the cicadas and trees and, indeed, all beings and things in the nonhuman world. Scarry describes this perceptual acuity to beauty and symmetry therein to affirm “the equality of aliveness” in the thing perceived.

The beholder and beheld form an enclosed circumference in which the two exchange a reciprocal salute to the continuation of one another’s existence . . . this two-member salute becomes . . . so that what is achieved is an inclusive affirmation of the ongoingness of existence, and of one’s own responsibility for the continuity of existence. (OBBJ, 92)

Each member of the salute affirms the aliveness of the other.

CONCLUSION

To conclude, I want to make one final case for beauty’s place in an education for ecological consciousness. Beauty, in the Kantian teleological sense, is around all the time in nature whether we are there to perceive it or not; nature’s processes do not stop when we look away. Unlike justice on its own, beauty in nature does not depend on humans to bring it about. We all hope for a world that contains both justice and beauty, but beauty is always available to our perception even when justice is not. I concede that the jump from teleological purposiveness to contemporary thinking on ecology is a big

one, but the conversation that bridges the two is worth having. I make the second concession that mapping ethical reciprocity onto nonhuman nature is wildly anthropocentric, but as aesthetic philosophy shows us, it is how we see the world that matters. If perceiving a moral reciprocity in nature leads to more ethical treatment of nonhuman others and spaces, it seems a perception worth cultivating. If perceiving beauty leads to fairness and reciprocity, as I have explored in this essay, then perhaps the beauty of nature serves as a wake-up call when justice is not as readily perceived.

Holland's paper reminded me of a relevant scene in Plato's *Phaedrus*, when the city-dwelling Socrates is dragged out to the countryside.³⁷ Socrates is surprisingly enchanted by all the sensations of the natural world around him: the sparkling river, the soft grass, and *the sound of cicadas*. All these sensations beckoned Socrates' attention, just as the chorus of cicada chirps echoing off the trees in the forest beckoned me. Therein lies beauty's power to inspire in us generosity and move us to ethical fairness: beauty in nature is always there to spur our lapsed alertness to fairness—"beauty is a call" (OBBJ, 109).

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2 Ramsey Affifi, "Beauty in the Darkness: Aesthetic Education in the Ecological Crisis," *Journal of Philosophy of Education* 54, no. 4 (2020): 1132.

3 Angelo Caranfa, "Contemplative Instruction and the Gifts of Beauty, Love, and Silence," *Educational Theory* 60, no. 5 (2010): 561.

- 4 Elaine Scarry, *On Beauty and Being Just* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 62. This work will be cited as OBBJ in the text for all subsequent references.
- 5 Edmund Burke, *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful* (Oxford University Press, 1998); Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis, IN/Cambridge, UK: Hackett, 1987); Friedrich Schiller, *The Aesthetic Education of Man*, intr. Alexander Schmidt, trans. Keith Tribe (London, UK: Penguin Random House UK, 2016).
- 6 Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, 337.
- 7 David Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste," *Modern History Sourcebook: David Hume* (1711-1776), <https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/1760hume-taste.asp>.
- 8 Cris Mayo, "Vermin, the Proximate and Often Unpleasant Stranger," in *The Educational Significance of Human and Non-Human Animal Interactions*, eds. Suzanne Rice and A. G. Rud (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 191-202.
- 9 Mayo, "Vermin," 191.
- 10 Mayo, "Vermin," 191.
- 11 Mayo, "Vermin," 200.
- 12 Mayo, "Vermin," 191.
- 13 Mary Louis Pratt, *Planetary Longings* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2022), 134.
- 14 Dante, *Vita Nuova*, trans. Mark Musa (New York: Oxford University Press), xv, xvi, 20, 29.
- 15 Rainer Maria Rilke, "First Elegy," in *Duineser Elegien*, trans. Edward Snow (New York, NY: North Point Press), 5.
- 16 Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, 179.

17 Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, 180.

18 Sarah Bowman, London Gibson, and Beth Burger, "Latest Arrival of Cicadas Could Offer Insight whether Climate Change, Loss of Habitat Will Silence Them," *The Columbus Dispatch*, May 20, 2021: 4A.

19 Bowman, Gibson, and Burger, "Latest Arrival of Cicadas," 4A.

20 Bowman, Gibson, and Burger, "Latest Arrival of Cicadas," 4A.

21 Bowman, Gibson, and Burger, "Latest Arrival of Cicadas," 4A.

22 Bowman, Gibson, and Burger, "Latest Arrival of Cicadas," 4A.

23 Bowman, Gibson, and Burger, "Latest Arrival of Cicadas," 4A.

24 Bowman, Gibson, and Burger, "Latest Arrival of Cicadas," 4A.

25 Bowman, Gibson, and Burger, "Latest Arrival of Cicadas," 4A (emphases mine).

26 Scarry, *On Beauty*, quoting Simone Weil, 111: "Love of the Order of the World," in *Waiting for God*, trans. Emma Craufurd (New York: Harper & Row, 1951), 180.

27 Jane Roland Martin, "Renouncing Human Hubris and Reeducating Commonsense," *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 36, no. 3 (2017): 283-298.

28 LeAnn Holland, "An Element-ary Education," *Philosophy of Education* (2015): 352.

29 Holland, "An Element-ary Education," 251.

30 Holland, "An Element-ary Education," 251.

31 Holland, 252.

32 Holland, "An Element-ary Education," 252.

33 Holland, "An Element-ary Education," 252.

34 Morwenna Griffiths, "Educational Relationships: Rousseau, Wollstonecraft and Social Justice," *Journal of Philosophy of Education* 48, no. 2 (2014): 339.

35 Griffiths, "Educational Relationships," 350.

36 Griffiths, "Educational Relationships," 350.

37 Holland, "An Element-ary Education," 354.